THE IDEAS OF THE SOPHISTS IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES

K-C Chang

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

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M.Phil Thesis

K-C Chang

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Name: K-C Chang _____

Department of Greek,

University of St. Andrews

ABSTRACT

Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in five of Plato's dialogues: the *Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus* and *Republic* I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists.

Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' *physis* with the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence(ἀρετή). Chapter II investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter III shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps to explain his idea of *physis* and "the natural continuous bodies of being". Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other fellow's good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.

PREFACE

I am very grateful to have a chance to acknowledge benefits which I have received in writing on this work. My greatest debt is to Mrs. E. M. Craik, who has supervised my research, untiringly guided me and helped me not only to write accurately but to think clearly. Miss. S. Phillippo has kindly taken the trouble to correct my poor English and has offered me valuable criticisms and suggestions. Owing to them I have been able to complete my work. Of course it is my responsibility if there are any mistakes but I would like to express my warm thanks to both of them.

Professor G. E. R. Lloyd and Dr. M. Schofield kindly read the chapter on the *Hippias Major*, and saved me from mistakes. Thanks to their criticisms I had a chance to rethink and revise what I had intended. And I wish to record my thanks to my friends, G. Agelopoulos and M. Busk-Jepsen, for their encouragement and friendship. I owe also a great deal to K. Dragoo and N. Krishna for their help and friendship. Lastly, I should like to give my gratitude to the University of St. Andrews for nominating me as a candidate for the Overseas Research Scheme.

I wish I knew how I could express my thanks to my parents and my sisters for their love and support.

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INTRODUCTION

I. Interpreting the Role of the Sophists: A Methodological Problem

To study the thought of the philosophers of a specific period using the writings of a particular philosopher who was especially antagonistic to them, and take his representation of them as a matter of fact, is a procedure liable to lead to a mistaken and distorted idea of their thought. With this in mind prior to attempting an understanding of the Sophistic Movement in fifth century B.C. Athens through Plato's dialogues, one must realise that Plato, who is hostile to the Sophists, is "the producer, stage-manager and script writer for the whole performance"[1] with all the force of literary genius, whereas the Sophists have to keep silent even though they may be unfairly manipulated and criticised in Plato's dialogues. So to expound the thought of the Sophists through Plato's dialogues is to risk perverting and misrepresenting it. Plato was not an historian, but a great philosopher and writer who had sufficient ability to perform dramatic manipulation to the detriment of his master's opponents. And if we read his dialogues, e.g. the *Republic* and the *Gorgias*, we can find that Plato has contempt not only for all the Sophists and all the rhetoricians, but for all musicians, poets and politicians, and even for the great politician, Pericles. There are more than eighty references to the Sophists in Plato's dialogues. Most of them are purely negative: as the ruiners or corruptors of young men(*Meno* 91c), peddlers of knowledge(*Protagoras* 313a), the hired hunter of rich young men (ibid 313 c), the mercenary hunter after the young and rich(*Sophist* 231 d), a sort of wholesale merchant of learning for the soul(ibid), a sort of master, appropriating to himself the eristic technique, in the art of combat about words(ibid), the imitators of true being and astonishing money-makers(ibid 253 c). Especially, the terms Sophist and money maker belong almost inseparably together for Plato. Following his

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[1] The Sophistic Movement, G.B Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 119

master's view, Aristotle in his *Sophistici Elenchi* defines the sophistic art as wisdom that appears to be such, but is not real, and the Sophist as someone who makes money from such apparent but unreal wisdom(165 a). It has come to be the long-established tradition to interpret and determine the Sophists' ideas based on the viewpoint and the mouthpiece of the great moral philosopher, Socrates, through Plato's dialogues. Because of both the immortal teaching of "sacred" Socrates and the lasting influence of Plato and Aristotle who used the pejorative title "Sophists" of the professional teachers who were involved in the Sophistic Movement, the meaning of the Sophists has been traditionally recognised, according to H. Sidgwick,[2] as follows: "they(the Sophists) were a set of charlatans who appeared in Greece in the fifth century, and earned an ample livelihood by imposing on public credulity: professing to teach virtue, they really taught the art of fallacious discourse, and meanwhile propagated immoral practical doctrines".

However, this view was contested by the radical historian George Grote who in chapter LXVII of his book the *History of Greece* held that the Sophists were teachers of Greek morality. Grote argues that the Sophists were not a school, sect, or partnership with mutual responsibility but a profession, and there are no grounds for attributing to them any common doctrine, for the word Sophist was applied in Plato's time in a more extensive sense than that in which he himself uses it. Secondly as regards the teaching of immorality, even Plato does not furnish any proof of this charge against the principal Sophists, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus and Gorgias, for "it is a apriori improbable that any public teachers should propound doctrines so offensive to the common sentiments of mankind".[3] On the other hand, Edward Zeller, who, influenced basically by Hegel's approach, regards the Sophists as subjectivists and stresses the philosophic validity of their subjectivism, argues in his *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* against Grote and his followers that all of the Sophists had a common educational discipline despite individual differences, and tried to characterise the Sophistic movement as a whole : "instead of completing physics by a system of ethics, physics are now entirely set aside; instead of seeking a new method, the possibility of knowledge is denied; instead of searching for the internal grounds of

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2 The Sophists, Journal of Philology 4, 1872 p. 289

3 Ibid p. 290

obligation in the nature of moral activities and relations men are satisfied with a negative result, the invalidity of existing laws".[4] The defenders of the Sophists are commonly classified into two groups: the one, which labelled the Sophists "positivists of the Enlightenment", stemming from Grote, and the other the Hegelian i.e. Nestle and Zeller.[5] However, in the present century scholars on the Sophistic movement tend to combine elements from each group, for they have realised that it is dangerous to put them and their movement into either of two groups.

In the human mind there is a tendency towards extremism in making an eminent figure more conspicuous by contrasting him with other minor figures and differentiating him from them, so to us the polarisation between the Sophists and Socrates may be considered as a familiar and fixed opposite pair in relation to the Sophistic Movement in the fifth century B.C.. It does not follow that because Socrates was a morally good man, the morality of the Sophists must necessarily be bad. In this case minor figures like the Sophists are usually destined to be sacrificed as a scapegoat for the great figure, irrespective of the actual facts. So if we want to understand the Sophists' ideas more objectively, we must investigate them individually and in detail founded on the verified evidence, rather than comprehensively as has been the traditional approach, for the traditional interpretation of the Sophists' ideas might be suggested to be a sum of the views of Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle. As Kerferd rightly indicates in his article, *The Future Direction of Sophistic Studies,* "too much attention has been given in the past to attempts to arrive at general characterisations of the Sophists and the sophistic movement".[6] However, most of the evidence is scanty and second-hand, as in the case of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Our primary sources for historical lives and thoughts of the Sophists will be quoted and examined by means of H. Diels and W. Kranz's *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (DK) and K. Freeman's *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. K. Popper, arguing for a favorable view of the role of the Sophistic Movement, identifies the generation of the Sophists with "the Great Generation" in his *The Open Society and its Enemies*. Popper asserts that by the realisation of the distinction between man's natural environment

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4 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 9

5 Ibid, p. 10

6 The Sophists and their Legacy, Hermes, Einzelschriften Heft 44, ed. G. B. Kerferd Wiesbaden 1981

and his social environment in the spirit of scientific investigation this generation marked a turning point in the history of mankind, which consisted in the transition from the closed society(the magical or tribal or collective society) to the open society(the society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions).[7] And Untersteiner's *The Sophists* examines the Sophists' ideas in detail by looking at the persons of the individual Sophists. Untersteiner claims in defence of the Sophists that "The Sophists agree in an anti-idealistic concreteness which does not tread the ways of scepticism but rather those of a realism and a phenomenalism which do not confine reality within a dogmatic scheme but allow it to rage in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity, in all the impartiality imposed by an intelligibility which will revive the joy in truth".[8] On the other hand Guthrie's *A History of Greek Philosophy* III is a well-written work conducting an investigation based on subjects as well as on the individual Sophists. And in this book he tries to reconstruct the Sophistic Movement around the viewpoint of historical investigation and interest through "the contrast between Platonic idealism and the empiricism and scepticism of the Sophists,"[9] using philosophical and anthropological ideas, emphasising "essential connexions between the pre-Socratic tradition and the new intellectual ferment generated by the Sophists".[10] Kerferd's *The Sophistic Movement* discusses the controversial themes of the Sophistic Movement as if the movement had broken out in our modern world; he argues that "the Sophistic Movement opened the way for the first time to the possibility of a genuinely historical approach to the understanding of human culture, above all, through the conception of what has been called "Anti-primitivism", namely the rejection of the view that things were much better in the distant past in favour of a belief in progress and the idea of an unfolding development in the history of human beings."[11] And Kerferd's book discusses mainly the interpretation of two dominant themes[12] : "the need to accept relativism in values and elsewhere without reducing all to subjectivism, and the belief that there is no area of human life or of the

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7 The Open Society and its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Reprinted 1973 p.57, pp. 173, 175 and 185

8 The Sophists, M. Untersteiner, trans. K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p.xvi

9 A History of Greek Philosophy III, W. K. C. Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 p. 9

10 Ibid p. 4

11 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 2

12 Ibid p. 2

world as a whole which should be immune from understanding achieved through reasoned argument".

It is true that to criticise the ideas of the Sophists as revealed in Plato's dialogues has been the general way of understanding and interpreting them, instead of endeavouring to understand those ideas in relation to the Sophistic Movement. To study philosophy means to consider a matter in all its aspects and not to learn answers but to pursue them. The method of this research, motivated by asking questions on the problem of the Sophists, will be to concentrate on examining the viewpoint of individual Sophists in five of Plato's dialogues[13]: *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras* and *Republic* I. In these five dialogues we will deal with the thinking of six Sophists: Callicles, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Hippias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus. Keeping in mind Plato's intention of revealing the Sophists' negative aspects, we will consider whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists, and investigate whether or not Plato's view is convincing from the viewpoint of real life. In *Gorgias* we meet the so-called immoralist Callicles, a term applied to him by Adkins in *Merit and Responsibility* and by Annas in her book *An Introduction to Plato's Republic.* However, Dodds argues that "immoralist" is a misleading word, for Callicles believes that to obey the law of nature is not only profitable but right.[14] He is not a Sophist in the strict sense even if he is "beyond argument a very important figure in the history of the sophistic movement".[15] Plato's intention may be to show that "Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit".[16] In this respect Plato regards him as a member of the Sophistic Movement in the *Gorgias* ; mordern scholars(Untersteiner, Guthrie and Kerferd) also categorise him as a minor figure of the Sophistic Movement. That is the main reason why Callicles' ideas should be examined in our research. The opposition of *nomos* and *physis* is a starting point for understanding Callicles' ideas. Our viewpoint will concentrate on his view of freedom, hedonism and practical life. Through this research Callicles' ideal is revealed to be derived from the Homeric hero's ideal of power and honour. And we will examine to see whether Callicles' suggestion that his

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13 Quotations are from Burnet's OCT(5vol.) 1900-07.

14 Plato, *Gorgias* , E.R. Dodds, a Revised Texts with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1959 p. 266

15 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 52

16 Dodds 1951 p. 15

ideal man who is superior, wiser and more courageous should rule over other people can be justified. Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' ideas will be investigated in comparison with those of the Eleatics i.e. Parmenides and Zeno. The relationship between the two is strongly argued for by R. K. Sprague in her *Plato's Use of Fallacy*, where it is strongly suggested that the two Sophists are neo-Eleatics.[17] We will analyse how their application of fallacies is interrelated with the logic of the Eleatics. As for Hippias, although Untersteiner identifies him as an advocate of absolute "physis", he does not examine Hippias' ideas about "the natural continuous bodies of being". However, Kerferd suggests that Hippias' philosophical position "seems to have been based on a doctrine of classes of things dependent on a being that is continuous or carried right through physical bodies without interruption."[18] We will examine this neglected aspect of Hippias' ideas on the basis of Kerferd's suggestion, and will see that his thinking is basically influenced by the natural philosopher, Empedocles. In addition to this, Hippias' idea of *physis* will be discussed as being applicable to pan-Hellenism, rather than to cosmopolitanism as maintained by Tarrant(*The Hippias Major attributed to Plato*) and Untersteiner(*The Sophists*). J. S. Morrison argues that Protagoras' argument is "based entirely on the ambiguity of the phrase ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται".[19] Adkins also points out in his article *'Αρετή, τέχνη, Democracy and Sophists* (JHS 1973) that Protagoras is confusing co-operative excellences(αἰδὼς καὶ δίκη) with administrative and political skills(πολιτικὴ τέχνη), and that Protagoras' use of terminology in the *Protagoras* is vague. Our study will attempt to make clear whether or not Protagoras is consistent as a teacher of ἀρετή through his use of myth and argument, and to demonstrate that the confusion of terminology comes from Socrates, not Protagoras. To discover what Thrasymachus really means in Plato's *Republic* I is our main task in the study of Thrasymachus' ideas. We will argue against the regular prejudice against Thrasymachus which is to be found in Annas' *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* and Cross and Woozley's *Plato's Republic*, and try to investigate his consistent position in the dialogue. We will treat various aspects of the Sophists' views and lives; on one side their positive views, and on the other side their negative views, both of which aspects we can find in any movement at any period in the

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17 Plato's Use of Fallacy, R. K. Sprague, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962 p. xiii

18 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 47

19 The Place of Protagoras in Athenian Public Life, J. S. Morrison Classical Quarterly 1941, 1-16, p.8

history of human ideas. However, the result of this study cannot be to uncover the actual thought of the historical Sophists. Rather, by focusing our viewpoint on the Sophists instead of Socrates in Plato's dialogues we may achieve a clearer picture of their ideas than the traditional emphasis of Plato permits.

II. The Genesis of the Sophistic Movement.

It is said that the philosophy of a certain era is the idea grasped by the people in that time. This means that philosophical ideas are mainly derived from the interpretation of the external world, which consists of social and philosophical circumstances, in which one lives by one's own subjective ideas. So by examining the history of ideas we can find that a new philosophical idea is the sum of a reaction against the traditional views.

What characterised the fifth century B.C. in Athens was a reaction in favour of humanism and against dogmatism, through an effort to apply the methods of natural philosophy to a new subject: man.[20] Xenophanes emphasised the progress of human achievement, based on a belief in the self-awakening of human beings and their own efforts: the gods did not reveal to men all things from the beginning, but men through their own search find in time that which is better (οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν, ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον DK 21B18).[21] To have control over the natural environment results necessarily from philosophical and political achievements. The natural philosophers from Anaximander onwards had tried to give a natural explanation of the world favorable to a humanistic view, and rejected divine intervention in the account of the origin of the cosmos, which was also the root of the Enlightenment; lives are the product of nature, and social and political obligations are instituted by purely human agreement and are alterable by human consent. Also the philosophers of a later period believed in the relativity of religious ideas; Hecataeus was the first Greek to find Greek mythology absurd[22]; and Xenophanes, who had an interest in the red-haired gods of the Thracians and

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20 The Sophistic Movement and the Failure of Greek Liberalism, from The Ancient Concept of Progress, E. R. Dodds , Oxford 1973

21 See Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* 442-506 even though Prometheus credits the achievement not to man but himself, and Sophocles' *Antigone* 332-75.

22 Dodds 1973 p. 180

the snub-nosed gods of the Ethiopians(DK 21B16), castigated the Homeric and Hesiodic gods from the viewpoint of relative religious ideas(DK. 21B11): if oxen (horses) and lions had hands or could draw with their hands and execute the works of art that man can, then horses would draw the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves(ἀλλ' εἰ χεῖρας ἔχον βόες<ἵπποι> τ' ἠὲ λεοντες, ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες, ἵπποι μὲν θ' ἵπποισι βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας καί <κε> θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον <ἕκαστοι>. DK 21B15). Heraclitus ridiculed ritual catharsis, mentioning that men purify themselves by staining themselves with blood, as if one who had stepped into mud were to wash with mud(καθάρπονται δ' ἄλλως αἷμα αἵματι μιαινόμενοι οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο DK 22B5). Anaxagoras said that the sun is stone, the moon earth(*Apology* 26 d). He also maintained as follows: whereas animals have the advantage over man in strength and speed, man is their superior in experience, memory, wisdom and skill(DK 59B21). And medical science played an important part in understanding human nature as a part of the whole universe. The writer of *On Ancient Medicine* attributes "the rise of his own art not to Asclepius or any other god, but to 'necessity'".[23] The extension of perspective-increasing contacts with foreign countries through wars, trades and travel played an important role in introducing humanism. Through these contacts the Greek people realised that their culture and customs were not absolute and universal throughout the world, but relative and partial.

The fifth century B. C. in Athens was a period of political and social changes in which traditional ways of life and thinking were seriously criticised in favour of a more free and democratic life. From the constitutional reforms of Solon, continued by Cleisthenes, the Athenian democracy had gradually developed. Especially in the period of Pericles Athens had reached the peak of democracy which was based on two principles: "(1) power should be with the people as a whole and not with a small section of the citizen body, and (2) high offices carrying the right to advise and act for the people should be entrusted to those best fitted and most able to carry out these functions."[24] On the other hand, at this time Athens was engaged in a period of imperialism which promoted "the right of

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23 In the Beginning : some Greek View on the origins of life and the early state of man, London p. 1957 p. 96

24 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 16

the stronger," as we can see from the decision over Mytilene made by the Athenian democracy as reported in Thucydides' writings(Thuc. iii 37-44). The aristocratic class of supposed divine descent was replaced by free-born citizens in executing the power of the political community. The citizens of Athens had looked to the new education to mould their sons into the ideal citizens for the new democracy. So in Athens the intellectual and political ability of man came to be regarded as the most important point, which the new teachers were needed to develop. To meet the demand of the rising generation in the area of the new education, the individual Sophists came as itinerant teachers from all over the Greek world to Athens, which was in a state of forceful competition. As a result, an entire new and fundamentally individualistic culture came into Athenian society, in which Athenian citizens might live freely in the development of humanism. This new education was usually carried into effect by seeking a career in public and political life; one of its major goals was the art of persuasion in the matter of politics and public administration. Its aim was to go beyond the privileged education for the noble class, which had been allowed only to those of noble blood. At any rate it is true that the Sophists were teachers to train the Athenian young men for their duties, the pursuits and the successes of their city. The reason for their advent in Athens was to meet the increasing demand among the Athenian youth. The fact that they received considerable pay is indicative of the distinctive recognition they won from the Athenian people for their own teaching and activity. In this respect the Sophists were the product of the age in which they lived, as Socrates was too. The basic position shared by the Sophists was trying to explain the phenomenal world in itself instead of resorting to the so-called real world behind phenomena, for to the Sophists the practical and empirical way of thinking was more reliable than the extreme rationalism of Eleatics rejecting the evidence of human senses and experience. This reactional speculation moving from natural philosophy to human matters was based on two points: one was the new tendency to believe what is reasonable based on human empiricism, and the other, scepticism about the validity of social and political inheritance, rejecting divine causation or supernatural agency and abandoning the idea of eternal reality behind the phenomenal world in favour of chance and natural necessity.

III. The Art of Speech.

The Sophists' concern with the problems of language represents their reaction in favour of humanism and against dogmatism. The Sophists' interest in language indicates that, both by raising various questions on language and by explaining its use and origin, they made an effort to unveil the fabrication and falsehood of uncritically inherited and accepted ideas. Through the examination of the relationships between words, objects and thoughts, they threw doubts upon the possibility of epistemology and any natural validity of words concerning what they represent, and thus tried to find a way to develop and clarify the function of language. So problems of the correctness of names or words(ὀρθοέπεια) were investigated by the major Sophists(Protagoras, Antiphon, Hippias and Prodicus) for the purpose of winning over their audience by using the right words at the right moment. On the other hand the art of speech was a good weapon for educating young men for social success; a means to power, wealth and influence. The rhetorical teaching of the Sophists was to promote in Athenian young men the power of making speeches, debating social and political matters and maintaining their right and claim if they were called before the Athenian court or the assembly. The aim of linguistic proficiency was also connected with matters of private business and commercial affairs. This kind of art could flourish in the development of democracy, but not in a state of tyranny.

The Sophists themselves practised the art of speaking, and taught it to their pupils. Protagoras claimed that he could make the weaker argument appear the stronger(τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν Aristotle *Rhet.* 1402 a) and maintained that there are two opposite arguments on every subject(DK 80A21). Besides these, Protagoras was the first to distinguish the tenses of the verb(Diogenes Laertius IX 50) and the three genders of nouns, as masculine, feminine and inanimate things(DK 80A27). Gorgias as a teacher of rhetoric laid stress on the most inspiring, effective and persuasive methods of presenting a speech by appealing to intellect and emotion, as in the cases of the *Encomium of Helen* and the *Palamedes.* However, Prodicus concerned himself especially with linguistic problems and semantics (*Euthydemus* 277 e and *Cratylus* 384 b), having recourse to etymological explanations, and claimed to teach correct terminology(*Protagoras* 334 c, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* II, i, 21). Antiphon is said to have taught how new words should be made in correlation with the concepts which they were intended to express.[25] Hippias taught phonetics and metre(*Hippias Major* 285

25 Guthrie III p. 204

d). The Sophists wrote a lot of books concerning both rhetorical argument(Protagoras, Gorgias and Thrasymachus) and the correct use of language(Prodicus and Hippias). An absolutist and a man of dialectic, Plato condemns the practice of rhetoric which is interrelated with relativism, by contrasting reality(the object of knowledge) with appearance(the object of persuasion). Plato believes that rhetoric makes "probability" deserve more respect than "truth" (*Phaedrus* 267 a), and the rhetor can make trifles seem important and important points trifles by the force of their language(ibid 267 b). On the other hand, in his treatise, *The Cyprians* 6, the orator Isocrates, a distinguished pupil of Gorgias, says that logos or speech, by enabling us to persuade each other rather than to live like animals, brought about civilisation. He also was "a successful educator who applied rhetoric and literature to the development of intellectual and moral qualities in his pupils".[26] He especially criticises the Platonists who spent their time in disputing over the unity or plurality of virtue(*Helen* 2). Isocrates insists upon the the necessity of teaching with a view to an honorable life of citizenship.

IV. *Nomos* and *Physis*

According to Guthrie,[27] in earlier writers the two terms *nomos* and *physis* did not necessarily appear as antithetical, but after the advent of the Sophistic Movement they came to be regarded as opposed and mutually exclusive, especially in the field of moral and political matters. The term *physis*, which involves the concept of "the way things are,"[28] means primarily truth and reality as against falsehood and appearances. On the other hand *nomos*, which involves the concept of prescriptive custom or law, is "a kind of direction or command affecting the behaviour and activities of persons and things".[29] The realm of nature is assumed to be superior to the realm of law in that what is developed by nature "is antecedent in time" to what is agreed by human beings; it is more original and everlasting.[30]

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26 Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, H. D. Rankin, Banes and Noble Books1983, p. 37
27 Guthrie III p. 55
28 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 111
29 Ibid p. 112
30 Rankin 1983 p.82-83

The observation of various customs and religious beliefs through the contacts of wars, trade and travelling induced the Greek people to realise the differences of *nomos*. And the growth of atheism and agnosticism at this period was also connected with the ideas opposed to *nomos*. So it was inevitable that man should have a new conception of human nature and contrast *nomos* as being changeable and alterable with *physis* as constant and everlasting. Heraclitus maintained that "all human laws are nourished by the one divine law"(DK 22B114) on the basis of different human customs which are arbitrary and artificial. Democritus maintained that perceptible qualities exist only in *nomos* (DK 68A44), but in reality there are only atoms and void (DK 68B9). Hippias, appealing to the *physis* of things, states that like is by nature akin to like, but convention, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by force contrary to nature(*Protagoras* 337 c). Antiphon also, as an upholder of *physis,* contrasts *nomos* with *physis* in the following terms: laws are artificial compacts, they lack the inevitability of natural growth; justice in the legal sense is for the most part at odds with nature(DK 87A44). Antiphon's statement in favour of *physis* can be found in another of his surviving fragments(DK 87B44): in fact by nature we have the same nature in all particulars, barbarians and Greeks; we have only to think about the things which are natural and necessary to all mankind; ... in all these there is no distinction of barbarian or Greek; for we all breathe out into the air by the mouth and the nose. What is prescribed by *nomos* is opposed to what is prescribed by *physis,* as Callicles argues in the *Gorgias*. Callicles also declares that the absence of any coercion on his natural desires is freedom which lies in the state of nature. Thucydides and Thrasymachus both express their concerns about the real world. Thucydides says that: the customary values of words were changed as men claimed the right to use them as they pleased to justify their actions; an unreasoning daring was called courage and loyalty to party, a prudent delay specious cowardice; moderation and self-control came to be reckoned but the cloak of timidity(Thu. iii 82). And Thrasymachus sardonically declares in the *Republic* I that justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger, and later replies to Socrates that injustice is good prudence, and justice a noble simplicity. On the other hand Protagoras is depicted as a supporter of nomos in Plato's *Protagoras*, arguing for the conclusion that *nomos* is a necessary condition for the survival of society. And the Anonymous writer quoted by Iamblichus says: the observance of law would be best for the state and for the individual man; under the observance of law, men are freed

from the most unpleasant concerns, but they enjoy the most pleasant(DK 89. 7). An important difference between the Sophists and Plato is "on the question of what law(*nomos*) actually is": the Sophists regarded it as mere agreement amongst people, whereas Plato believed that nomos should be based on the true nature of reality.[31]

V. The term "Sophist" and Sophistic Education

The word σοφιστής was applied to various classes of people who had lived before the advent of the Sophists in the fifth century B.C.. The word σοφιστής is a noun of agent derived from the verb σοφίζεσθαι which means "to practice σοφία". Liddell and Scott distinguish the application of its meaning in three ways: (a) master of one's craft, adept, expert, of diviners (Herodotus); of poets (Pindar); of musicians (Aristophanes and Euripides) (b) wise, prudent, or statesmanlike, in which sense the seven Sages are called σοφισταί (Herodotus and Aristophanes); of Pythagoras (Herodotus); of natural philosophers (Hippocrates) (c) one who gave lessons in grammar, rhetoric, politics, mathematics, for money. Also Isocrates(XV. 313) says that Solon was the first Athenian to whom the name Sophist was applied. Kerferd argues as follows[32] : "Whereas σοφός and σοφία can be used of all sorts of skills, the term σοφιστής is confined to those who in one way or another function as the Sages, the exponents of knowledge in early communities". On the other hand Guthrie says[33] that the σοφιστής was assumed to be a teacher, for the name was often applied to poets whose main function was in Greek eyes to give practical instruction and moral advice, and he also guesses that the term σοφιστής was beginning to be used of prose-writers in contrast to poets, as the didactic function came to be more and more fulfilled through this medium.[34] A σοφιστής was a teacher and a writer who had a special skill to impart to his pupil. Socrates was denominated a Sophist not only by Aristophanes, but by the fourth century B.C. orator, Aeschines.[35] As we can see, the term σοφιστής was applied in a general sense as well as in a special sense. So the term σοφιστής could have a positive or negative meaning according to the prejudice and social status of the speaker. However, from early on in the fifth century it had lost its prestige, as we can see in

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31 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 80
32 The first Greek Sophists, Classical Review 64(1950), 8-10, p.8
33 Guthrie III p. 29
34 Ibid p. 30
35 Ibid p. 34

Aristophanes'*Clouds*, for the term Sophist came to be attached to the professionalism of the Sophists who professed to teach virtue or the art of acquiring power in a democratic society.

The common advocacy of the Sophists -with the exception of Gorgias- that virtue(ἀρετή) can be taught had a revolutionary effect upon Athenian society.[36] In this respect the Sophists were the heirs of the old poets(Homer, Hesiod, Simonides, Theognis and Pindar) who discussed by means of their poems how virtue(ἀρετή) could be acquired.[37] This idea is directly interrelated with the negation of the traditional viewpoint, since anyone can possess the aptitude of exercising political power if he receives the required instruction, regardless of his inherited privilege or birth. However, we must note that the Sophists' claim to teach virtue(ἀρετή) really applies only to political virtue(ἀρετή), for their emphasis was laid on the intellectual and rhetorical aspect rather than the ethical one. The Sophists were optimists concerning human natural endowment: they held that it could be developed and cultivated by human knowledge armed with reason(education) by laying the foundations for a study of language and rhetoric and refining the analysis of political and social phenomena. Socrates or Plato, however, applies the term ἀρετή to special excellence in relation to any function i.e. there is a proper ἀρετή belonging to whatever has a particular function to perform(*Republic* 353 b). And Plato's viewpoint is usually concentrated on a moral quality,[38] as as we see when Plato through the mouthpiece of Meno enquires as to the teachability of ἀρετή: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught? Or does it come by practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or something else? (Ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητὸν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ; *Meno* 70 a) So we can easily guess that this period was one of class struggle between the aristocratic class and the newly risen class who came to have power under the democratic system of Athens. Especially to the aristocratic class the claim of teaching ἀρετή was a

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36 Plato's way of referring to the Sophists was as the paid teachers of virtue(ἀρετή) *Gorgias* 456 c-e, *Meno* 95c

37 According to Guthrie, "*Αρετή* when used without qualification denoted those qualities of human excellence which made a man a natural leader in his community, and hitherto it had been believed to depend on 'certain natural or even divine gifts which were the mark of good birth and breeding". Guthrie III p. 25

38 Guthrie III p. 25, 252 and 256

revolting idea, for they were in danger of losing their own social status and privilege.

The Sophists' aim was to educate the young through various methods. Their methods of teaching were basically two[39]: (1) to impart to the human mind an encyclopaedic variety of facts, the material of knowledge; (2) to give the human mind formal training of various types aiming at cultivating all the power of the soul. According to Diogenes Laertius(Diogenes Laertius IX. 5O and DK 80A1) Protagoras made use of arguing by the method of questioning to show that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other. And Gorgias, as stated by Philostratus, had the boldness to say "suggest a subject" in the theatre of Athens, and showed that he knew everything and would trust to the moment to speak on any subject(DK 82A1a). Hippias, according to Plato, gave an ἐπίδειξις(public demonstrative lecture) regularly at Olympia where he professed his willingness to speak on a subject he had prepared, and to answer any questions(*Hipp, Min.* 363 c-d). However, the main instruction, of which the usual method was the prepared lecture on a set theme, was given by the Sophists "neither in public lecture nor in public debates, but in small classes or seminars".[40]

The Sophists' teaching was concerned with the humanistic view of man as well as the nature of the universe. Protagoras refuted the geometers on the basis of the theory reported to us by Aristotle(DK 80B7). Sextus (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I 216) states: what Protagoras says is that matter is in a state of flux, and that as it changes there is continuous replacement of the effluvia which it gives off; that, moreover, one's sensations undergo change and alteration in accordance with one's age and other aspect of one's bodily condition (DK 80A14). Gorgias was interested also in the theory of Empedocles as stated by Plato: colour is an effluence of things commensurate with and perceptible by sight (*Meno* 76 a). According to Cicero(*On the Orators* III 32, 128) Prodicus of Ceos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, or Protagoras of Abdera, all in their time wrote and spoke on the subject of natural philosophy(DK 84B3).

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39 Paideia I: the Ideals of Greek Culture, W. Jaeger, trans. G. Highet, Oxford 1939 pp. 289-290

40 Kerferd 1981, Cambridge p. 30

The common attribute of the Sophists(including Callicles) in Plato's dialogues has been suggested to be that, as rhetoricians, they are the experts at making a long speech, quite strangers to the method of Socratic dialectic; and they are the teachers of virtue. However, these views cannot be applied to the cases of all the Sophists, for Gorgias clearly denies any such profession(*Meno* 95c) and Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are caricatured as imitators of the Socratic elenchus in the *Euthydemus* even though we can find a difference between true dialectic and eristic whose effect is negative. In addition to this, the Sophists in the *Sophist* are much more similar to the pupils of Socrates than to those of Protagoras or Gorgias.

VI. Socrates

Paradoxically Socrates may be described as an Athenian Sophist, unlike the other Sophists who came from non-Athenian cities, in so far as his life was dedicated to the problematic question of whether ἀρετή can be taught. Socrates can be characterised as a man trying to understand the phenomenal world - thus sharing the objective of the Sophists - while taking into consideration its contradictions, not positing the ideal world as Plato does. Socrates knew, as the Sophists did, that "different specific activities had their different ends or 'goods', calling for different means to acquire them".[41] However, his fundamental question no longer concerned the phenomenal world but rather the nature of moral entities, examined through debate ranging over the fields of both social and political matters, employing paradox and appealing to common sentiment. He wanted to find out man's place in this world. He brought philosophy down from the skies by shifting his interest from natural science to human affairs. In this respect Socrates was a member of the Sophistic movement, not an opponent of it. His life-work was concentrated on seeking after real wisdom and universal truth. The method by which Socrates contended and disputed with his interlocutors was to lead their conversations into a discussion of moral concepts to grasp a general characteristic of a whole class from the examination of particular cases, even though the definition of moral terms maintained by the interlocutor would usually be refuted by Socrates' destructive cross-examination(elenchus), and found to be insufficient and objectionable. Aristotle testifies that Socrates was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking

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41 Guthrie III p. 460

the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions(Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἑτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· 987 b); he also affirms that two things may fairly be ascribed to Socrates - inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting point of science(δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης1078 b).[42]

Socrates identified the world of morality with the world of knowledge, and equated the good with what is beneficial or useful. The Socratic maxim that virtue(ἀρετή) is knowledge might be suggested as an outcome of the Sophistic Movement, for a part of this movement was characterised by the dispute over the way virtue could be acquired. Socrates' identification of virtue(ἀρετή) with knowledge is based on the close connexion between what a thing is and what it is for. This can be reasoned as follows: if virtue can be taught, it must be a kind of knowledge. If virtue is a kind of knowledge, then the cause of wrongdoing and wickedness must be lack of knowledge i.e. they are due to ignorance. To know what is good for the agent is a necessary and sufficient condition of his achieving what is good for him. This means that no one who knows what is good for himself pursues what is bad for himself against his will. So from this follows Socrates' paradox that "no one does wrong willingly" as he strongly affirms in the *Protagoras* (345 d) and the *Gorgias* (509 d). He believed that an honest search after the truth about the principles of human behaviour was the way to find the right way to live.

Socrates as the seeker after the truth is contrasted with the Sophists in Plato's dialogues, who are characterised as men of insidious counterfeit and illusion, "concerned only with the appearance of truth rather than the reality".[43] The difference between Socrates and the Sophists is defined as follows by R. Hackforth: "what in fact distinguishes Socrates from the Sophists is a sincerity which underlies all his banter, a passion for truth which inspires all his argument, a love of humanity which seeks to find expression in securing for men not outward success and reputation but

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42 Aristotle's Metaphysics I. II. W.D. Ross, Oxford University. Press, Reprinted 1981

43 Kerferd 1981, Wiesbaden p.4

inward satisfaction and happiness".[44] However, the Athenian public might have regarded Socrates as one of the Sophists; it was as such that Aristophanes introduced him, based on popular perception, in his comedy, the *Clouds*.[45] There Aristophanes makes fun of Socrates' philosophy and scientific notions as well as of the Sophistic Movement, using the method of "Right Argument" and "Wrong Argument" to parody the new sophistic education. The *Clouds*, which was later used to indict Socrates at his trial, was presented in 423 B.C. for the first time when Socrates was forty five and Plato was an infant. At that time it might be guessed that Socrates' name and way of life must have been quite well known to the Athenian audience, to be produced in a comedy. Dover rightly suggests that "although the difference between Socrates and the Sophists was known to Ar(istophanes), in the sense that the data which constituted that difference were available to his organs of perception, he simply did not see it, and if it had been pointed out to to him he would not have regarded it as important."[46] The differences between Socrates and such men as Protagoras would appear to the public less important than the resemblances, for "the charges brought against him by his accusers express just those general grounds of suspicion that would be felt against both alike".[47] And, moreover, Socrates' method of argument(elenchus), dialectic, based on the destructive cross-examination which is very similar to the contentious eristic of the Sophists(e.g. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus), in conservative eyes led his interlocutor to question and doubt the traditional moral and educational structures of Athens, even if Plato revealed the advantage of Socrates' sincere dialectic over the so-called sophistic eristic. Also his indifference to material wealth and a successful life, and his freedom from sensual desire and political ambition, even though he had sufficient ability, were an acute criticism of Athenian society. We must further note that it was no strange coincidence that Socrates came to be one of the men charged on religious grounds, who directly or indirectly were involved in the Sophistic Movement as the leading progressive thinkers of Athens - Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Protagoras and possibly Euripides.

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44 Socrates, R. Hackforth, Philosophy Vol. VIII, No. 31 July 1933 p. 267

45 The *Clouds* which we have was a partially revised one from the first version. For detailed explanation, see Introduction(IX) of Aristophanes *Clouds*, K. J. Dover Oxford 1968

46 Ibid p.liii

47 Sidgwick 1872 p. 291

I. CALLICLES

Life and Activity

Callicles, an ambitious and educated noble young citizen from the deme of Acharnae in Attica, is portrayed in Plato's *Gorgias* as taking an energetic stand against Socrates' view that "to do wrong is more shameful than to suffer wrong"(τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι 482 d), and as proposing a sort of natural justice based on the principle : "by *physis* what is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering wrong"(φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 483 a), so "it is right for the better to have the advantage over the less"(... δίκαιον ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου 483 c-d). Callicles' personality is depicted as more impressive than the two Sophists, Gorgias and Polus. Callicles despises the Sophists as worthless people(οὐδενὸς ἀξίων 520 a), notwithstanding the fact that he plays the part of Gorgias' host in this dialogue. And Socrates describes him as a man of rhetor rather than a Sophist(520 a).

Unfortunately we do not have any independent evidence about Callicles of Acharnae, one of the very few characters in Plato's dialogues of whose historical existence nothing is known to us, who plays the role of the main interlocutor in this dialogue. Various older scholars suggested that he might be a mask for some real historical figure in the Athenian aristocracy. His real existence was doubted by Grote and other scholars, who have suggested other figures whom he might be meant to represent: Charicles (Bergk), or Critias (Cron, Menzel), or Alcibides with whom he is linked at 519 a (Apelt), or even(absurdly) the respectable and unadventurous Isocrates (Sudhaus); the majority of present-day scholars, however, have been prepared to

accept him as an historical figure.[1] And there is sufficient reason to believe that he might be an historical person, for in this dialogue he is described as being in love with Demos, the son of Pyrilampes(481 b) who was Plato's stepfather and a friend of Pericles and is said to be a friend of Andron, who was one of the Four Hundred set up in the oligarchic revolution of 411 B.C.. Dodds suspects that the reason why such a vigorous and richly endowed personality left no mark on the history of his time is that the man who in the dialogue is just embarking on an active career (515 a) died too young to be remembered.[2]

Above all we must note Plato's hidden intention of showing the dangers inherent in the education of the Sophists like that of Gorgias, which "put a deadly instrument into unscrupulous hands for the corruption of simple people who are morally only children: Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit".[3] Through the mouthpiece of Socrates this dialogue especially criticises Athenian politics and politicians from the Persian Wars to the disaster of 404 B.C. and the execution of Socrates five years later. Plato shows us the reason why he has a feeling of disgust for Athenian political life - the overt and cruel desire for power of people like Critias or Alcibiades and their associates - by putting all the corrupt aspects of Athenian politicians into Callicles. Concerning this dialogue Friedländer points out that "Three separate issues converge upon a single focus-the struggle between immoralism and justice, the struggle between practical politics and philosophy, and the struggle between the Athenians and Socrates."[4] Callicles' view seems very similar to that put forward by Thrasymachus in the *Republic* I. However, we must note that, as Burnet puts it, the difference between them lies in that Callicles holds, not like Thrasymachus that "right" is reducible to might, but that might really is right.[5] The difference between Callicles and Thrasymachus is their way of turning their views on laws. This dialogue is full of accusations between Callicles and Socrates.

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1 Plato *Gorgias*, E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1959 p. 12
2 Ibid. p. 13
3 Ibid. p. 15
4 Plato II, P. Friedlander, trans. H. Meyerhoff, Pantheon 1964 p. 26
5 Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato, J. Burnet, The Macmillan Press, Reset and Reprinted 1981. p. 98

Callicles' Thought as Revealed in Plato's Dialogue *Gorgias*

Callicles, entirely dissatisfied with the way the argument between Socrates and Polus has developed, enters the discussion by introducing a new concept of justice which he calls justice according to *physis*, and criticises the concept of justice agreed on by both Socrates and Polus as the justice of *nomos*. Callicles does not oppose Socrates with mere argumentation, as Gorgias and Polus did. He has his own theory according to which he criticises Socrates for illegitimately deriving the conclusion that "to do wrong is less advantageous" from Polus' admission that "to do wrong is more shameful than to suffer it(τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι 474 c)". Callicles maintains that Polus' admission "to do wrong is more shameful than to suffer it" is not the answer of *physis*, but that of *nomos*, for the *nomos* forces man to accept the idea that to get the better of others is immoral. At any rate his intervention lifts the argument onto a higher philosophical level in the procedure of this dialogue. Callicles is different from Thrasymachus in that from the start he delivers a long and expert speech through which his intended idea is to be clearly expressed. As W. Jaeger says,[6] Callicles takes into consideration his opponent's personality: he sees that Socrates' strength lies in the firm and incontrovertible spiritual attitude which he embodies. But Callicles thinks this will really prove to be a disadvantage as soon as his apparently consistent thinking is brought up against experience and the reality Socrates has avoided all his life.

Callicles manifests his ideas in a long speech from 482 c to 486 d. This first speech can be divided into two parts; one is from 482 c to 484 c, the other 484 c - 486 d.

I. In the former part of his first speech, against Socrates' view that "to do wrong is more shameful than to suffer wrong"(τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι 482 d) Callicles proposes a sort of natural justice based on the principle: "by *physis* what is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering wrong"(φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 483 a); "it is right for the better to have the advantage over the less"(... δίκαιον ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέροῦ 483 c-d):

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[6]Jaeger 1939 p. 136

> ... But in my opinion those who lay down the *nomoi* (τοὺς νόμους) are the weaker, the majority. And accordingly they lay down the *nomoi* for themselves and their own advantage, and so too, with their approval and censure, and to prevent the stronger who are able to overreach them from gaining the advantage over them, they frighten the stronger by saying that to overreach others is shameful and evil, and injustice consists in seeking advantage over others. For they are satisfied, I suppose, if being inferior they enjoy equality of status. That is the reason why seeking an advantage over the many is by *nomos* said to be wrong and shameful, and they call it injustice. But in my view *physis* herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the less (ἡ δέ γε ... φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιον ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου). And both among animals and in entire states and races of mankind it is plain that this is the case - that right is recognised to be the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger over the weaker. For what justification had Xerxes in invading Greece or his father Darius in invading Scythia? ..... But I imagine that these men act according to the true *physis* of right, yes and, by heaven, according to *physis'* own law (κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως), though not perhaps by the *nomos* we lay down. We mould the best and strongest among ourselves, catching them young like lion cubs, and by spells and incantations we make slaves of them, saying that they must be content with equality and that this is what is right and fair. But if a man arises endowed with a *physis* sufficiently strong, he will shake off all these controls, burst his fetters, and break loose. And trampling upon our scraps of paper, our spells and incantations, and all our unnatural conventions, he rises up and reveals himself master and there shines forth *physis'* true justice.

According to Callicles the weak majority created a large number of prescriptive things(*nomoi*) which might include laws, moral demands and social taboos.[7] *Nomoi*, which can be legal decrees or moral precepts for the

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[7] On the other hand, we can find the other kinds of prescriptive things; languages, music and signs. These are much less serious and urgent compared to laws, moral demands and social taboos. K. Popper defines the difference between them exactly : "It is therefore most misleading to say that a man decides for or against slavery as he may decide for or against certain works of music and literature, or that moral decisions are purely matters of taste," for moral decisions involve the life and death of other men.-

justification of the actions of the weaker, are laid down as directions or regulations for the behaviour of every member of society, which are imposed and enforced by no-one but the weak majority. It holds true that after these "rules" have been created, the behaviour and view of life of all the members of society are to be estimated, evaluated and judged according to these as if they were external criteria for their own life. Callicles contends that the weak majority lay down the normal law for their own interest, in fear of the stronger individual(483 b-c). As a result of the *nomos* the weaker individuals, by organising the power of all the weak individuals, come to be the collectively stronger even if in fact they are weak individually. The organised collective power of the weaker can manipulate those who are individually stronger but are a minority compared to the collective weaker. This can be interpreted as meaning that the strong individual may come to be put in a dangerous predicament by the weak majority, if tackled as an individual. In this aspect we can find that Callicles criticises democracy on the grounds that the majority who are individually weaker legislate democratic laws to make themselves stronger and protect and extend their own advantage. So it follows that the strong individual is under the obligation which *nomoi* prescribe to the members of society regardless of their natural ability. If he does not behave in conformity with the *nomoi*, his failure to confirm will arouse social disapproval and condemnation, and in extreme cases earn him expulsion or the death penalty from his society. It is true that *nomoi* are the representation of human will, whereas *physis* is devoid of human will which is arbitrary. From this it can be derived that the unnatural *nomos* should be altered and amended by man if he is naturally stronger. Against this unnatural *nomos* Callicles proposes to set a revised principle based on *physis'* own law(κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως), which is made up of natural facts. He gives two demonstrations of these natural facts: the case among animals and the case in whole states and races of mankind(483 d). When Callicles gives an example of the latter case: Darius and Xerxes, typical despots and tyrants, he maintains that they invaded Greece and Scythia according to *physis'* own law(κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως) Also later on, by mentioning a famous passage of Pindar, Callicles extols the behaviour of the stronger Heracles who carried off the cattle of Geryon by force. Heracles' action is justified, for it is the stronger's right to do what he wants

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The Open Society and Its Enemies I, K. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 1973 p. 65

regardless of accepted *nomos*. These three instances are based on the natural behaviour, that it is right for the stronger to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the less.

Let us think about Callicles' idea of natural law. The man who supports natural law might derive his theory from the observation of the empirical facts which he has noticed and observed in the natural world which he must face every day. Callicles presupposes that *physis* herself makes it plain that it is right for the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the less (ἡ δέ γε ... φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιον ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέροῦ 483 c). He thinks that ideal law, which is contrasted with normative law, should be grounded in some wider and more general law i.e. the law of *physis*. If we can define the meaning of *physis*, we can get the meaning of *physis* own law. *Physis*, which can be applied in various ways, is in its widest sense the totality of things. The natural can be preferred to the artificial, as being more basic; on the other hand the natural can be criticised as being mere raw material, requiring artifice to add to it. From the viewpoint of Callicles' idea *physis* is contrasted with whatever is artificial or conventional. In its meaning physis also implies the laws of natural structure by which the behaviour of things can be understood. This means that the object or organism would behave according to the innate(natural) causality which is the distinguishing factor of any one thing. If we consider Callicles' phrase "by *physis'* own law"(κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως 483 e) we can find that it contains an ambiguous meaning, for he presupposes a kind of necessity to follow *physis'* own law, which governs the natural world and which might be interpreted as a kind of *nomos* for a criterion of our life. So we can argue that Callicles' antithesis between *physis* and *nomos* seems to be based not on *physis* in general, but on the *physis* of man or human *physis*, for the demands of human *physis* seem to give the applications of this antithesis a clear prescriptive force.[8] The artificial and conventional are regarded by Callicles as interferences, forcing natural behaviour to be transformed by an unnatural aspect. Callicles might think that human physis should be free from any interferences, left to itself. Callicles seems to presuppose that human physis, which should follow *physis'* own law, is an ordered mode of attributes possessed in common by every human being and essential to his being. In consequence we can say that Callicles' "*physis'* own law" is based

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8 The Sophistic Movement, G. B. Kerferd, 1981 Cambridge University Press p. 114

on the biological way of natural human desire which is the empirical fact observed from both animals and human beings. His interpretation of human desire is based on the concept "to get the better of(τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν)" others, for both the weaker majority and the stronger seek their own advantage. The weaker majority will get less compared to what would be the case if they observed natural law, whereas the stronger tries to break the *nomos* to get the better of the weaker majority. We might guess that Callicles tries to expose the hidden human wickedness of getting the better of others.

II. In the second part of his first speech Callicles holds a different viewpoint from Socrates about how we should live our lives. He argues for his view of what a man should be, and what he should practise and to what extent, both when old and when young. From 484 c to 486 d he advises Socrates to follow his way of life by drawing a contrast between a life of theoretical study and an active life in public affairs:

> ..... This is the truth and you will realise it if you will now abandon philosophy and rise to greater things. For philosophy, you know, Socrates, is a delightful thing if you engage in it moderately at the right time of life; but if you persist in it longer than you should, it is the ruin of any man. For if a man is exceptionally gifted and yet pursues philosophy far on in life, he is bound to end up inexperienced in all the accomplishments requisite for a gentleman and a man of distinction. ... It is a good thing to engage in philosophy just so far as it is an aid to education, and it is no disgrace for a youth to study it(φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι φιλοσοφεῖν), but when a man who is now growing older still studies philosophy, the situation becomes ridiculous, Socrates, and I feel towards philosophers very much as I do towards those who lisp and play the child. ... When I see a youth engaged in it, I admire it and it seems to me natural and I consider such a man ingenious, and the man who does not pursue it I regard as illiberal and one who will never aspire to any fine or noble deed (...., τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος·), but when I see an old man still studying philosophy and not deserting it, that man, Socrates, is actually asking for a whipping. .... For now if anyone should arrest you or any others like you and drag you off to prison, claiming you were guilty when you were doing nothing, you

> realise you would have no idea what to do with yourself, but you would reel to and fro and gape openmouthed, without a word to say, and when you come before the court, even with an utterly mean and rascally accuser, you would be put to death, if he chose to demand the death penalty. And yet what wisdom is there in this, Socrates, in an art which finds a man well-gifted and leaves him worse - able neither to help himself nor to save from the extremes of danger either himself or anybody else, but fated to be robbed by his enemies of all his property and to live literally like one disenfranchised in his own city (καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπο δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει;)? ... But, my good fellow, cease your questioning, and practice the fairer music of affairs and try something that will win you a name for good sense, and leave to others these dainty devices, whether we should call them babblings or follies, which will set you to dwell in empty mansions.

The subject of Callicles' argument has changed from the external *physis*(society) to the internal *physis*(the human mind). His position is that to study philosophy according to *physis'* own law is natural life. Callicles has a different ideal for life from Socrates in that he is the supporter of the life of action rather than the life of philosophy of Socrates, for he has a morality of the powerful man to whom suffering wrong is more disgraceful and shameful. Callicles differentiates between two types of men: one is the practical(political) man; the other is the theoretical(philosophical) man. The theoretical man knows nothing of the actual laws in his city, or of the language he should use in his business associations, both public and private, with other men, or of human pleasures and appetites. The man is, in a word, totally ignorant of the ways of normal citizens. So when he enters upon any activity, public or private, he proves himself ridiculous, just as politicians will look ridiculous when they take part in philosophical discussions and arguments with Socrates. Callicles introduces into his argument the *Antiope* of Euripides in which the twin brothers Amphion and Zethos debate with each other, representing a contrast of two kinds of views of life. Callicles holds the position of Zethos, the man of action, who summons his brother Amphion, a harper, away from his life of speculation and idleness to a life

of action.[9] Theoretical reason only deals with what a thing is, while, practical reason, on the other hand, copes with how it is i.e. rather unstable things related with human life. The life of action leads to more "getting the better of others(πλεονεξία)" than the life of philosophy does. And Callicles adds that there is no wisdom in 'an art(philosophy) which finds a man well - gifted and leaves him worse-able neither to help himself nor to save from the extremes of danger himself or anybody else, but fated to be robbed by his enemies of all his property(486 b). It is certainly true that "both in Homer and in later Greek thought the power and ability to defend friends, associates, and family is regarded as a part of someone's virtue".[10] To gain favour in the assembly of Athens "a man must show that he is an *agathos polites*, willing to expend himself and his possessions to promote the city's prosperity; and to gain favour for any proposal of his he must naturally show that it is conducive to the city's prosperity".[11]

What makes Callicles think that to study philosophy is an aid to education for a youth even though he himself is the person of action? He argues that "social education and *nomoi* mould the best and strongest among ourselves, catching them young like lion cubs, and by spells and incantations these make slaves of them, demanding that they must be content with equality and that this is what is right and fair"(483 e - 484 a). Does this mean that human consciousness and ideas are determined by a man's social environment and conditions? We can say "Yes" if he is not one of those strong enough by *physis*. However, the naturally stronger can overcome and shake off all such controls. In this procedure Callicles seems to suggest that to study philosophy leads the naturally stronger to be critical and sceptical of the accepted values, as he regards "the man who does not pursue philosophy as illiberal"(τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον 485 c) and one who will never aspire to fine and noble deed(485 d). This means that one must study philosophy in one's youth in order not to be the slave of the "spells and incantations". To have knowledge of philosophy is a good basis for freeing the young from unnatural moral obligations so that they can rise to study

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9 Practical reason is different from theoretical reason according to Aristotle: "firstly, it works together with appetite, which is irrelevant to pure theory; secondly, it is concerned with the individual as well as the universal, for we cannot act in general; and thirdly, it deals with what is indeterminate and contingent" - Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of natural Law, J. Wild, University of Chicago Press 1953 p. 83

10 Plato *Gorgias*, T. Irwin, Oxford P. 172 and cf, Rep. 332 a-b, Euripides' *Medea*, 807-10

11 Merit and Responsibility, A. W. H. Adkins, Oxford 1960 p. 205

practical things. But to study philosophy beyond the proper age leads one to be critical and sceptical not only towards the unnatural *nomoi* but also towards natural law throughout one's life. So if a man continues in philosophy longer than one should, then it will be the ruin of him, for he will waste his time and lose the desire to study the practical requisites for a citizen and a man of distinction. As Callicles maintains, to engage in philosophy is good just so far as it is an aid to education(φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν 485 a). Callicles maintains that education should be balanced in two stages; one is the right time of life for studying philosophy and the other is that for public matters; he admonishes Socrates to concur with his opinion about the proper way of life and to follow it in future. To Callicles theoretical knowledge or philosophy cannot be the final object of wisdom, for he identifies philosophy with an art which finds a man well-gifted and leaves him worse(ἥτις εὐφυῆ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα 486 b).

Before his next speech Callicles explains his position to Socrates: I identify the better with the more powerful(ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους 489 b-c). Socrates' refutation of Callicles, in which the majority are stronger than an individual strong man, looks fatal to Callicles' position if Socrates confines his position to the domain of physical power. Socrates deliberately does not differentiate between the matter of quantity and that of quality. It is true that the quantitative physical power of slaves is stronger than that of the master, however, the master's strength lies in his ability to exercise his non-physical power: his social status, influence and administration. After Socrates' refutation Callicles is given the opportunity to clarify his idea. So he once more identifies "the more powerful" with "the wiser and nobler"(489 d-e). Socrates identifies Callicles' account as saying that "one wise man is often more powerful than ten thousands fools and it is right that he should rule and they be subjects and that the ruler should have more than his subjects"(490 a). Also Callicles argues that it is natural justice that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior (τοῦτο γὰρ ... τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων 490 a). Socrates tries to refute this argument by citing the case of the doctor and the other people. Socrates asks whether, if people of various kinds, some strong, some weak, and among them, a doctor, gathered together in the same place, with plenty of food and drink in

common, the doctor, wiser in these matters, should have a larger portion of the food than the other people. In this case Callicles can refute Socrates, if he argues that the power of the doctor lies in his authority for treating patients. So the doctor can rule over the other people and have more power than the inferior(the patient) in treating them, for if he does not have enough authority he cannot exercise his power from the viewpoint of authority. Concerning what he means by "the more powerful" Callicles adds that "the more powerful" are above all those who are wise in affairs of the state and the best methods of administering the state, and not only wise but courageous, being competent to accomplish their intentions and not flagging through weakness of soul (τρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν ... ἄν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὦσιν, ὅντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἃ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς 491 a-b). This pronouncement is good evidence that Callicles lays emphasis on the excellence of one's role, and it can be regarded as a kind of an answer to Socrates' question of the case of the doctor. So we can say that Callicles thinks that it is proper that those who are wise and courageous in the affairs of the state should govern states, and this is the meaning of justice (καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν), that these should should have more than the others, the rulers than the subjects (491 d).

III. Callicles makes his second speech(491 e - 492 d) to explain his idea of the relation of the wise with themselves, and of whether they are rulers or slaves:

> ..... Why, how could a man be happy when a slave to anybody at all? No, but what is the naturally noble and just is what I shall now describe to you with all frankness - namely that anyone who is to live aright should let his appetites grow to the greatest extent(τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι) and not check them, and through courage and practical wisdom should be competent to minister to them at their greatest and to satisfy every appetite with what it craves(... καὶ μὴ κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὔσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν). But this, I suppose, is impossible for the many; hence they blame such men through a sense of shame to conceal their own impotence, and, as I remarked before, they claim that intemperance is shameful and they make slaves of those who are naturally better. And because they themselves are unable to procure satisfaction for their

> pleasure, they are led by their own cowardice to praise temperance and justice(... καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσὐνην διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀναδρίαν). For to those whose lot it has been from the beginning to be the sons of kings or whose natural gifts enable them to acquire some office or tyranny or supreme power, what in truth could be worse and more shameful than temperance and justice(<τί ἄν> τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις)? For though at liberty without any hindrance to enjoy their blessings, they would themselves invite the laws, and the talk and censure of the many, to be masters over them. And surely this noble justice and temperance of theirs would make miserable wretches of them, if they could bestow no more upon their friends than on their enemies, and that too when they were rulers in their own states. But the truth, Socrates, which you profess to follow, is this. Luxury and intemperance and freedom, when they are well supplied, are virtue and happiness, and all the rest are tinsel, the unnatural catchwords of mankind, mere nonsense and of no account (τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀνθρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια).

In this speech, by contrasting the terms "courage and practical wisdom"(ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις) with the terms "temperance and justice"(σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσὐνη), Callicles claims that it is naturally noble and just(τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον) that the man who so lives his life should rightly let his appetites, to which courage and practical wisdom(ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις) should minister for his satisfaction, grow to the greatest extent and not to check them. The weaker majority who praise temperance and justice(σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη) are stupid, for they are unable to procure satisfaction for their own pleasure owing to their lack of courage and practical wisdom. The courage and practical wisdom of Callicles' ideal man lead him to the life of luxury, intemperance and freedom which also make him virtuous and happy, whereas temperance and justice make him miserable.

It is true that Callicles raises the problem of freedom, which needs to get rid of "what is felt to be the overly restrictive and inappropriate

heritage of traditional moral norms and requirements".[12] Freedom refers to the absence of coercion or constraint in body and mind imposed by anyone. In this respect a man is free insofar as he can choose between the alternatives available to him in such a condition that nobody disturbs or interferes with him while he is choosing by his own will. This kind of freedom can be called negative freedom; freedom from restraint and coercion. This is in accord with Socrates' idea of freedom: those who are in need of nothing are rightly happy(οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαίμονες εἶναι 492 e). Citing the sayings of an anonymous Italian writer, he explains that an uncontrolled and nonretentive desire is just like a leaky jar never filled. On the other side there is another kind of freedom called positive freedom; freedom for the satisfaction of desire. Positive freedom can be possible only if our volition can fit the natural conditions of the real world. We cannot fly like a bird, swim like a fish or live forever even if we strongly desire to. Natural conditions ordain restraints on our ability to choose our alternatives. In this case we must presuppose an area in which it is possible for us to choose or make our own decisions, in order that our desire may be accomplished entirely by our human capacity e.g. freedom of speech, action and thought. We can say that we are free to bring about something if we are free to perform it. From this, if we think about the case of alternatives which are available to us and depend on our capacity in reality, then the growth of our knowledge and physical strength can increase our ability to extend our freedom. In any society the ruling class may have control over the property and freedom of the ruled class. So the ruling class have the ability to regulate and to control the alternatives of choice of the ruled class. In this case the ruled class usually lack the means or power to choose their alternatives consciously or unconsciously, for the powerless class can be hindered from knowing even what kinds of choices will be available to them. And moreover, even though we are entitled to be free to choose alternatives, we cannot say that we are entirely free if we do not have the means to achieve whatever we have chosen. We thus can say that, if anyone is free, it implies not only that there are no physical restraints or natural conditions preventing him from choosing his alternatives, but that he possesses the means to achieve the alternative he chooses. If all these conditions are satisfied, we might say that at that time the necessary conditions are met for the existence of freedom. All these necessary conditions can be reduced to the possession of power, for the possession of power can guarantee the potentiality for

12 Kerferd 1981 p. 122

getting one's own way. It implies that "to have the power to do X" means "to have the means to do X", and also "to be free to do X". Callicles' desire like Nietzsche's, has a determined ideal "will-to-power" which overpowers him. That is the ideal of "the men of action for action's sake".[13] For Thrasymachus of the *Republic* I the will-to-power is unjust and this is the desire of the unjust stronger man, whereas Callicles calls this will-to-power "justice" according to the law of *physis*. As we have seen above, Callicles identifies the *nomoi* of society with coercions which prevent a man from choosing his alternatives. So he thinks that the existence of the laws and customs of society places fetters and bonds on natural human desire and freedom. This means that the things that are laid down by the laws are bonds on *physis*, whereas those which are given by *physis* are freedom to him who follows "*physis*'s own law"(κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως).

The central idea of Callicles' view of freedom is to live according to the direction of *physis*, which pursues the fulfilment of all desires and involves the absence of any restraints and bonds on a man's desires, which leads him to the state of happiness. Callicles' ideal man urgently wishes to have a freedom which would guarantee his ability to do what he wanted for the purpose of satisfying every natural desire to the limit. However, he stands his ground on the idea of liberty and freedom in the life of luxurious happiness. He holds temperance and justice in contempt, for the possession of these two moral attributes prevents and inhibits him from having his freedom. To him self-denial or self-discipline and the justice of Socrates are nothing but restrictions acting as burdens to the pleasure he is seeking by means of practical wisdom and power. The powerful and intelligent man who constitutes Callicles' ideal man would have sufficient ability to promote his own interest and need, so it follows that he would also enjoy the necessary conditions for the obtainment of freedom. Callicles knows very well that the growth of his knowledge extends his capacity for freedom. The more powerful man can restrict the alternatives of choice and the freedom of the powerless man in order to satisfy his own interests more fully, since Callicles defines his natural justice as meaning that the wiser or the man who has more knowledge in civil affairs must rule over the less wise or the man who has less knowledge. In this respect Callicles is no different from Socrates or Plato in the matter of political philosophy. To Plato also "the class prerogatives are necessary for upholding the stability

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13 Plato, the Man and His Works, A. E. Taylor, Metheun Reprinted 1952 p. 116

of the state".[14] However, Socrates upholds the importance of self-control and temperance, but Callicles advocates that one should satisfy one's desires as much as possible, and never repress them, because to practise self-control and restraint is against one's natural desire.

From the viewpoint of hedonism let us think about Callicles' idea of pleasure. Hedonism means that only pleasure, i.e. a pleasant state of mind, is desirable and all other things apart from this are less desirable. It means that an action is desirable only to the extent that it leads to pleasure as a result. We can say that a man is in a state of pleasure if and only if he enjoys his activity for itself regardless of other considerations of consequences at any time when he does not wish the alternative in lieu of what he has chosen. To gain pleasure is to be in the state of mind which consists in the idea that one has attained something one desires. In this view, one's choice of pleasure is entirely derived from one's past experiences i.e. one's fundamental values are interrelated with one's past experiences. Callicles thinks that the weaker majority in fact praise temperance and justice "for their own interest"(483 d), for they themselves are unable to procure satisfaction for their pleasures. By means of praising justice and temperance the weak majority can acquire for themselves benefits which are the result of keeping *nomoi*, but which should actually accrue to the stronger. In this respect the human mind is basically filled with an egoistic desire for its own pleasure. So it can be said that Callicles' idea is a kind of psychological egoism to the effect that all human actions or desires are derived from the idea of a person's own pleasure and benefit. It means that the natural world is in the state of a ceaseless struggle of "every man against everyone else" for his own satisfaction. The individual is in the state of natural desire as having a natural right to protect and to enjoy his life by the use of all means and all actions, irrespective of the stronger or the weaker. Callicles' "right of *physis*" is derived from man's inclination to assert himself and seek power. And he raises the fundamental ethical question: why should I sacrifice my own interest and pleasure for the sake of others?

To Callicles pleasure is good, so if something does not give pleasure to him he will not pursue it. This means that there is a natural relationship between what is pleasant and what is good in his mind, which is

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[14] Popper 1973 p. 119 and Plato's *Laws* 690 b-c, 714 e - 715 a, and 890 a-b

manipulated by the weak majority unjustly. What Callicles comes to crticise directly is the tendency of making any prescriptive judgments whatsoever about the values to be followed in life. To him there are no objective normal values, rather they created by man for his own pleasure or desire. However, Socrates differentiates good pleasures from bad ones in that the end of our pursuit is not pleasure but the good. Against Socrates' view that "those who are in need of nothing are rightly called happy (492 d)," Callicles retorts that in that case stones and corpses would be supremely happy. And when Socrates asks Callicles about the happiness of the pervert whose desires are fully satisfied, then Callicles responds that such a life is awful and shameful (494 e4 ff). From this it evidently follows that this kind of pleasure is not what Callicles has in mind, for random desires which interrupt the well-ordered fulfilment of one's essential integrity cannot be the objects of the freedom he is talking about, for they are not natural but unnatural, also they contradict the law of diminishing utility. So Socrates' refutation cannot be justified. The main difference between Callicles and Socrates on the issues of pleasure is that Callicles thinks that pleasant is good, whereas Socrates thinks that good is pleasant. However, the main problem of Callicles' idea is that he has made no definite distinction between brutal appetite or sensual pleasure, and that intentional or planned desire which is combined with practical reason.

We have examined Callicles idea mainly as revealed through his two speeches: one is 488 b - 489 c, the other 492 a - 492 c. Callicles' idea is defined as that of the immoralist by both Adkins and Annas.[15] Adkins in particular argues that Callicles claims that "injustice is a preferable course of action to justice".[16] However, Callicles argues that "it is right for the better to have the advantage over the worse, the more able over the less(δίκαιον ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέροῦ 483 d)," "it is natural justice that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior"(τοῦτο γὰρ ... τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν φαυλοτέρων 490 a) and that "it is the just that these (who are wise in the affairs of the state and courageous) should govern states, should have more than others, the rulers than the subjects (καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν

15 An Introduction to Plato's Republic, J. Annas, Oxford 1981 p. 37 and Adkins 1960 pp. 222-23

16 Adkins 1960 p. 222

ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων 491 d)". As we can see we cannot deny that he has a conception of justice and rightness. He simply has a different view of the meaning of justice. If we think about his idea in comparison with the Homeric ideal of power and honour, his idea will be revealed clearly. The Homeric heroes have "all an insatiable thirst for honour"[17]in order to declare their own excellence (ἀρετή), for the Greeks believed honour to be the aspiration of the individual towards that ideal and supra-personal sphere, in which alone he can have real value.[18] In the traditional thinking the Greeks always believed that unrivalled strength and prowess were the natural basis of leadership, which was closely interrelated with one's excellence(ἀρετή), a special description of herioc strength and courage. As Adkins explains,[19] "The admired qualities are in fact best characterised as 'strength-bravery-and-wealth-leading-to-or-preserving-success'" which is the unitary and unanalysed *physis* of excellence(ἀρετή) for Homeric man. *Agathos* is the most powerful adjective available to commend a man in Homeric society, who must be brave, strong and successful.[20] The *agathos* claim against society affects ascriptions of responsibility. Adkins explains the relations between the claims of the *agathos* and the physis of his society as follows[21]:

> If the *agathos* chooses to make use of his advantage, his fellows may grow angry with him, and attempt to restrain him by force; but if for any reason they are unable to do this, his claim to act as he pleases in respect of the co-operative excellences is stronger than any claim they can bring against him; and if he feels that any thwarting of his desires would be failure, the *aidos* which he feels at not being agathos must be stronger than the *aidos* which he feels at not being *pinutos.*

On the other hand one of the most powerful denigrative words used of actions in Homer is *aischron* which is attributed to the vanquished for having been defeated, whatever one's intentions[22] . Callicles also argues strongly; "by *physis* what is worse is more shameful, i.e. suffering wrong"(φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι 483 a) In Homeric society, however, the quieter co-operative excellences must take

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17 Jaeger 1939 p. 7
18 Ibid p.8
19 From the Many to the One, A. W. H. Adkins, London, 1970 p. 30
20 Ibid p. 29
21 Adkins 1960 p 50
22 Adkins 1970 p. 28

an inferior position in comparison with the competitive excellences which the society needs most.[23] So it is not necessary "for men to possess any of the quiet virtues" which excellence commends for women "in order to be agathos".[24]

Let us return to the case of Callicles. In his first speech Callicles seems to regard the stronger as the physically stronger, as he gives two kinds of evidence: the cases of animals and the case of men like Darius and Xerxes. And the way Callicles describes how the stronger, just like a young lion cub, comes to be adapted to the life of *nomos* in his explanation of the contrast between *nomos* and *physis*, strongly implies that the power of the stronger lies in physical strength. In addition to these Heracles' action from Pindar's poem is cited for the purpose of supporting his position. However, he identifies the stronger with the better at 489 b-c when Socrates is trying to refute him. He adds that a rabble of slaves and nondescripts are of no earthly use except for their bodily strength collected together. Furthermore he puts the stronger in the same category as the wiser and nobler. And Callicles concludes that it is natural justice that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior(490 a). As far as Callicles' position is concerned his view of natural justice can be interpreted as saying that it is just that the better and wiser should rule and get the better of the worse - as the Greek always traditionally believed, if we think about the matter of just distribution according to one's own ability. This is natural for the traditional Greeks, who rank every man according to his ability. Concerning what he means by "the more powerful" Callicles adds that "the more powerful" are above all those who are wise in affairs of the state and the best methods of administering the state, and not only wise but courageous, being competent to accomplish their intentions and not flagging through weakness of soul(491 a-b). So we must understand Callicles' idea in terms of his latter definition of the stronger, for the latter definition is the result of clarifying his former idea at Socrates' demand. His ideal man has the desire "to get the better of"(τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν) others through his wisdom and courage, as equivalent to ἀρετή of the Homeric heroes. If one is the stronger by *physis*, one must exert oneself to get more good things and incur fewer evils, for Callicles believes that ἀρετή cannot be real the ἀρετή if it does not bring happiness to the agent who is

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23 Adkins 1960 p. 36

24 Ibid p.37

exercising it. To be a superior, Callicles' ideal man, as a man of action, must study philosophy and all the accomplishments required for a gentleman and a man of distinction. To study philosophy leads one to be critical and sceptical of the accepted values as Callicles regards "the man who does not pursue philosophy as illiberal"(τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον 485 c) and one who will never aspire to be a fine and noble deed(485 d). At 492 a-b Callicles contrasts the terms "courage and practical wisdom"(ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις), corresponding to the competitive excellences in Homer, with the terms "temperance and justice"(σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσὺνη), corresponding to the quieter co-operative excellences. The former two terms can be attributed to the man of action(the practical man), whereas the latter ones can be attributed to the man of theory(philosophical man). Callicles is in the position of admiration of φρόνησις, which can be rendered "prudence in government and affairs" or "practical wisdom"(*Sym.* 209 a, Arist. EN 1140a 24, 1141b 23, Isoc. 12. 204, 217). Callicles insists that "the *agathos* is the *phronimos*, and that the *agathon*, the end of life, is the pleasant; and hence, since the man who is most *agathos* is the man who can obtain the most *agathon* by means of his skill, he must be the man who obtains the most pleasure".[25] In *Illiad* XV 641ff, practical wisdom is mentioned along with physical strength and warlike prowess under the collective term "all sorts of excellence". The world of Callicle is in the state of competition as that of the Homeric heroes. It is a ceaseless struggle of "every man against everyone else". So Callicles' ideal man who is in the state of *physis* has a natural right to protect and promote his life by means of all his practical wisdom and courage. With the advantages of his high practical wisdom and innate astuteness, the efficient man can gain favours easily from the multitude, and control these less sensible men. His possession of power can guarantee the potentiality for getting one's own way which will lead to him achieving, through courage and practical wisdom, the life of luxury, intemperance and freedom which is to be identified with the life of virtue and happiness. Callicles urgently wishes to have a freedom which would guarantee his ability to do what he wanted for the purpose of satisfying every natural desire to the limit. In Athens, while she was flourishing, the term *arete* (ἀρετή) was used to approve the production of certain results in the administration of government, for at this time the term ἀρετή came to approve not only "those who secure in the field of politics the ends secured

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25 Ibid p. 272

by traditional *arete* (ἀρετή) on the field of battle, but those who secure them in the *manner* of traditional *arete* (ἀρετή)"[26]

Conclusion

As we have seen above we can realise that the origin of Callicles' idea is derived from the Homeric ideal. Callicles' ideal man, aspiring to a fine and noble deed, just like the Homeric heroes has an insatiable desire to "get the better of" others. In the traditional thinking the Greeks always believed that unrivalled strength and prowess were the natural basis of leadership, which was closely interrelated with one's excellence(ἀρετή), a special description of heroic strength and courage. We can see in the Melian dialogue that Thucidides shows how such a view of life might be used to justify the attitude of the imperial democracy to its subject allies. Callicles' position approaches the Homeric hero's ideal of power and honour, affirming "the individual's natural right against a hypocritical society".[27] Plato also in fact agrees with "Callicles in wishing to get away from conventional justice in order to move to something higher", "appropriate above all to the ruler and the philosopher,"[28] for he too thinks that it is right that the better and wiser(in the sense of the philosopher-king) should rule over and have more than the inferior. Although both Callicles and Hippias criticise the *nomos* in a similar way, their starting points are different, so their ideas are driven in different directions. Callicles prefers "*physis'* own law", that men are unequal by *physis*, to the democratic ideal of equality; while Hippias, the Sophist, claims that democratic equality is too limited as being only for free citizens of equal privileges. The Sophist Antiphon, who argues that *nomoi* are imposed by force and contrary to *physis*(DK 87B40), also makes the similar distinction between what is just in natural terms and what is just in normal terms as Callicles does: the advantages which are prescribed by the laws are fetters on *physis*, whereas the advantages which are prescribed by *physis* make for freedom(DK 87B40).

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26 Ibid p. 225
27 Dodds 1959, p. 267
28 Kerferd 1981, p. 119

II. EUTHYDEMUS and DIONYSODORUS

Lives and Works

The two sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, were natives of Chios, who emigrated to join the colony at Thurii, where they spent a good many years but were then exiled. Spending their time in Athens they are depicted as teachers of two kinds of special techniques: one is to train their pupils to become first-rate physical fighters; they are themselves masters at fighting in armour, and can make anyone able to pay their fee an expert; the other is to train people so that in the battle of the law courts they are champions; they can compete themselves and teach others to speak, and they can compose speeches suitable to deliver in court. That both Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real people is established by references to them by Xenophon and Aristotle[1], and we know from the *Cratylus* (386 d 3-7) that the theory of Euthydemus is that all things appear equal to all men at the same time and always(σοὶ δοκεῖ πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ). From Aristotle's statements about Euthydemus in the *Rhetoric* (ii 24 3-4) and the *Sophistici Elenchi* (177 b 12ff), it can be surmised that he was a well-known Sophist at Athens. Aristotle's remarks would also suggest that he had before him one of Euthydemus' writings containing sophistic argument not found in Plato's dialogue.

However, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are portrayed in this dialogue as inferior to the greater Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, in that Plato's treatment of them is severe and disapproving. Dionysodorus, especially, is described as a frivolous and shameless Sophist(297 a). Also they portrayed as itinerant professional teachers, non-Athenian citizens, boasting of themselves as teachers of virtue (273 d), so skilful in wordy warfare that they can contest with equal success anything which anyone says, whether

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[1] Concerning their historical existence, see Philologus 87, K. Praechter, pp. 121-135

true or false(272 b), moreover they can help a man defend himself in the law court if he is wronged (293 c), and they are also called "all-wise" (πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς) (271 c).

The Fallacies of the Sophists as Revealed in the *Euthydemus*

This dialogue, in which Socrates narrates what happened the previous day with the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, has a dramatic structure, consisting of five scenes.[2] Socrates and Crito get in on the act, in terms of the structure of the narrated conversation, in framing sections before and after the five scenes. In the introductory conversation Socrates, full of satirical humour, irony, and sarcasm, proposes that he and Crito should go and sit at the feet of the two sophists to learn how to use the sophistic fallacy. The first, third, and fifth scenes consist of examples of these fallacious arguments, in which the sophists show off their technical method of education leading a man of virtue (ἀρετή) by refuting their interlocutors. In the second and fourth scenes we can see the typical Socratic protreptic leading the young to pursue the love of real knowledge(φιλοσοφία), for it is the only way of leading a truly happy life. In the epilogue Socrates and Crito discuss the real good education which the son of Crito (Critoboulos) should be given.

Plato's serious task in this dialogue is to demonstrate the fallacious method of the so-called sophistic new education by contrasting it with the Socratic method. Cleinias is a young Athenian man of good family and great promise. He must have a good education and should be inclined towards

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[2] This dialogue has a lot of similarities to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. It has been pointed out that Plato's versatility "in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues resemble far more what we call 'Genteel Comedy' than a philosophical exposition, " and "the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing less than *a dramatic satire*, of boundless humour and variety, on the follies of the sophistic professors, and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than Aristotle".- The Euthydemus of Plato, E. H. Gifford, Oxford, 1905 p. 10. And we can see that this dialogue consists of five scenes distinguished by the different characters who speak in each scene:

Introductory Conversation - Socrates and Crito (271 a - 272 d)
Sc I. Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias, and Socrates (272 e -277 c)
Sc II. Socrates and Cleinias (277 d - 282 e)
Sc III. Dionysodorus, Socrates, Ctesippus, and Euthydemus (283 a - 288 b)
Sc IV. Socrates and Cleinias (288 b - 290 d)
Sc V. Euthydemus, Socrates, Dionysodorus, and Ctesippus(293 d - 304 b)
Epilogue - Socrates and Crito (304 c - End)

philosophy and the practice of virtue and the act of being a good citizen. So Socrates is afraid for him, as for other young men, that someone may get in first, turn his mind in some other direction, and ruin him. The dramatic effectiveness of this dialogue also reveals the dazzling presentation of fallacious arguments, whose purpose is not to lead the young to study philosophy but to refute and dispute. In this respect we can see Plato's intention to expose what was publicised under the name of education at that time of Athens.

The intended contrast between dialectic and eristic is the main theme in this dialogue: the sophistic art of eristic aims simply at refutation, regardless of the truth, whereas the dialectic of Socrates is to lead the answerer to the truth[3]. Plato usually identifies the term eristic [ἐριστική - from ἐρίζω; strive, wrangle and quarrel(of sophistical refutation)], with the meaning of sophistry, in any case attaching it to whatever practice he considered at that time as a danger which must be avoided. By the term eristic or the case of quarrelling, he indicates that the aim of the Sophists is to win the argument, whereas the aim of dialectic is to discover the truth. This kind of skill is well exemplified in the *Euthydemus*. The reason why Plato constantly pillories eristic and distinguishes it from dialectic is that in truth his own dialectic very closely resembled "eristic"[4]. On the other hand "antilogic" or "the art of contradiction"[ἀντιλογική - from ἀντιλογέω, ἀντιλέγω (to speak against, to contradict)], which Plato attributes to the Sophists above all others, means a tendency to contradict, to maintain aggressively whatever position is opposite to that of one's interlocutor. Antilogic usually consists in confusing everything together(*Phaedo* 101 d). And antilogic is the power of making everything seem similar to everything else as far as possible (*Phaedrus* 261 c). Kerferd explains the difference between eristic and antilogic in two ways[5]: first its meaning is different, and secondly unlike eristic, when used in argument antilogic constitutes a specific and a fairly definite technique, namely that of proceeding from a given *logos* to the establishment of a contradictory logos in such a way that the opponent must either accept both *logoi*, or at least abandon his first position. However, "the elenchus"[ἔλεγχος from ἐλέγχω

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3 Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus, R. S. W. Hawtrey, American Philosophical Society 1981, pp. 6-7.

4 Plato's Earlier Dialect, p. 83-84, R. Robinson, Oxford 1953

5 The Sophistic Movement, p. 63, G.B. Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981

(to cross-examine, to question)] which Plato comes to approve is a contest in which both parties openly admit that the questioner is trying to refute and the answerer is trying not to be refuted. Socratic elenchus in the wider sense means examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further statements, in the hope that he will determine the meaning and the truth-value of his first statement.[6] Socratic elenchus changes an ignorant man from the state of falsely supposing that he knows anything to the state of recognising that he does not know anything as an epistemological prerequisite, thus supplying the motive which will lead him to knowledge. The whole essence of the elenchus lies in making visible to the answerer the link between his actual beliefs and the contradiction of his present thesis,[7] however, it only tells the answerer that he is wrong without giving the reason for it and does not give the man any positive knowledge.[8] Socratic elenchus is incorporated into the larger whole of dialectic, though it is still negative and destructive in essence. It goes forward into Plato's new constructive instrument of "dialectic" [διαλεκτική from διαλέγομαι (to converse with, to discourse with)]. To Plato the dialectical method is "the ideal method," as the art of discussion(ἡ περὶ τους λογόυς τέχνη *Phaedo* 90 b) or the procedure of discussion(ἡ μέθοδος τῶν λόγων *Sophists* 227 a). In general it is always the search for "what each thing really is"(*Republic* 533b). It means that dialectic searches for the essence of each thing and the formal and abiding element in that thing. Dialectic is the technical aspect of philosophy, directed in one sense to all existence and in another to essences only; it is the activity of philosophy.[9] Dialectic is a necessary condition for the pursuit of the truth by using the faculty of reason as a way of thinking. However, dialectic is dangerous because it entails refutation; there is a temptation to treat elenchus as an amusing game and practice it for its own sake.

The technical method of Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus is a kind of eristic derived from the logical method of the Eleatic Zeno. Zeno's *reductio ad absurdum* is based on leading the respondent to the logically absurd antinomy. So they can refute any statement with equal certainty.

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6 Robinson 1953, p. 10
7 Ibid, p. 16
8 Ibid, p. 17
9 Ibid, p. 70-71

Their eristic method is very similar to the Socratic elenchus in appearance: the short questions give it a formal similarity. The Socratic dialectic by use of elenchus is represented as an art whose practice displays a real concern for one's soul, whereas the eristic of the sophists appears to be completely lacking in such concern. Also the Socratic method is a private one which cannot be achieved by formal teaching in front of the public. While the Socratic conversation, ascending in a straight line and approaching very important insights, culminates in aporia, the Sophists, who at least touch upon some serious topics, i.e. virtue can be taught, in the beginning and pose logical knots not easily untangled, end up by doing something simply silly. The Sophists pretend to teach virtue, however they would not and could not do it. On the other hand Socrates gives a basis for leading the young towards the state of virtue or knowledge by getting them to realise that they know nothing.

Aristotle classifies arguments into four kinds in his *Sophistici Elenchi;* didactic, dialectic, examination-arguments and contentious arguments (διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί).[10] In this classification it is necessary for us to note the contentious arguments which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but actually are not, generally accepted. Aristotle explains that there are two modes of refutation; one has to do with the language used, the other is unconnected with the language: of fallacies connected language there are six kinds; (1) equivocation (ὁμωνυμία) (2) ambiguity (ἀμφιβολία) (3) combination (σύνθεσις) (4) division (διάρεσις) (5) accent (προσῳδία) (6) form of expression (σχῆμα λέξεως); of fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds; (1) those connected with accident (παρὰ τό συμβεβηκός) (2) those in which an expression is used absolutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or relation (τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλά πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι) (3) those connected with ignorance of the nature of refutation (τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν) (4) those connected with the consequent (τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον) (5) those connected with the assumption of the original point to be proved (τὸ παρὰ (τὸ) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν) (6) those which assert that what is not a cause is a cause (τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι) (7) the making of several questions into one (τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἕν ποιεῖν).

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10 Aristotle, Sophistici Elenchi, 165 b 8-10

Let us go back to the *Euthydemus* and examine the fallacies of the Sophists. There are XXI different kinds of fallacies in this dialogue. This classification is originally that of Bonitz.[11]

(I) What sort of people is it that learn, the wise or the unwise? (ποτέροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς; 275 a7) - This question leads each answer into *reductio ad absurdum* because if the respondent answers that those who learn are the wise, then the questioner will refute this by saying that students in a school learn what they do not know; or if the respondent answers that those who learn are the unwise, then he will refute this by saying that the wise will learn a thing when a teacher recites it. Accordingly each answer will be refuted in this case. This sophism is based on the equivocation of μανθάνειν, σοφός and ἀμαθεῖς.[12]

(II) Do those who learn learn what they know or what they do not know? (πότερον οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μή ἐπίστανται 276 d7). This question is very similar to sophism(I). The respondent is to be put into a dilemma because the sophists exploit on purpose the equivocation of μανθάνειν, which can be used in two ways ; one is to have knowledge(ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνειν) - when one has no knowledge at the beginning about something, then afterwards gains knowledge of it, the other is to understand (σύνιεναι) - when one already having the knowledge uses this knowledge to examine the same thing done or spoken.

(III) You wish him to become what he is not and no longer to be what he is; therefore you wish him not to exist(ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτον γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι 283 d). This is a case of exploitation of an equivocation on the existential and the copulative sense of the verb "to be (εἶναι)," also there is an equivocation of the term ὅς, which can be interpreted as having two meanings; one is his attribute, the other is his existence.

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11 Platonische Studien, H. Bonitz, Vahlen Berlin, 1880 pp. 93-151, and See Gifford 1905, pp. 35-39, and R. S. W. Hawtrey 1981, pp. 2-3

12 For detailed explanation of this sophism see Hawtrey's book pp 57-61

(IV) Do you really think that it is possible to tell a lie ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψέυδεσθαι; 283 e7)? This sophism uses the ambiguity of the verb to be (εἶναι) between its existential and its veridical senses. However, Gifford classifies the fourth sophism as "Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ἢ μὴ λέγοντα;" He maintains that the Sophists make use of the equivocation of the phrase "λέγειν τι" as either "to speak of a thing" or "to utter a word". On the other hand Hawtrey rejects this on the ground that the term πρᾶγμα should refer to a sentence, not a thing.[13]

(V) No one says the things that are not(Οὐκ ἄρα γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεις 284 c2). This fallacy lies in the assumption that to speak of something is the same as to do something. The sophistic logic is as follows; (i) to speak is to do something (ii) not to speak is not to do anything (iii) therefore, to speak the things that are not is not to speak at all, so it is impossible for us to say the things that are not. Accordingly whenever a man says something, he says a thing that exists.

(VI) Are there indeed people who say things as they are? (εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἳ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει; 284 c 9) By the phrase ὡς ἔχει Ctesippus, as Gifford says, refers to the proper relation between the subject and the predicate, but Dionysodorus makes the phrase ὡς ἔχει refer to the conditions or qualities of the subject. For example, he rephrases the expression "speaking of cold things as they are" into "speaking coldly of cold things" by use of the ambiguity of the phrase ὡς ἔχει.

(VII) Do you think there is such a thing as "speaking against" one ... when you say that('Ως ὄντος ... τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν ... ποιῇ τοὺς λόγους; 285 d7)? This sophism identifies a thing(πρᾶγμα) with a meaning or a explanation(λόγος). Hence if two people are saying the same thing, then no contradiction arises. If they are saying different things, even then there are no contradictions because they do not have the common basis of contradiction. So in both of these cases no contradictions arise.

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13 See Ibid p. 98

(VIII) Is there soul in things which have sense, when they have sense? Or do the soulless things also have sense(Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα; 287 d7)? This sophism uses the equivocation of the verb νοεῖν, for it can have two meanings according to its application, one is "to mean" and the other is "to have in mind".

(IX) Is it not necessary for you to know everything if you are in the state of knowing(ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα; 293 c4)? This is the case of the fallacy of *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter* i.e, this is possible by dropping the qualification; if Socrates knows something he is in the state of knowing something, but in this case the Sophists drop the qualification "something", so Socrates is in the state of knowing. Accordingly he cannot be "not knowing," for he cannot be both knowing and not knowing at the same time, consequently he knows everything.

(X) Is it by this same thing always or by this thing on one occasion, and by another thing on another occasion (Πότερον ... τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' ἀεὶ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε ἑτέρῳ; 296 a5)? In this case the term ἀεί is used absolutely without qualification. The term ἀεί can be applied in two cases according to situations; one is "in each related case" and the other is "always" without qualification.

(XI) Then was a father being other than a father(Ἆρ' οὖν πατὴρ ἦν ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς ; 298 a2)? Someone who is other than one's father is not a father. This is the case of the fallacy of the accident (παρὰ τό συμβεβηκός). It is the result of what is predicated of the subject being maintained in its accident; If A is father of B, so A is a father. Accordingly C is not a father of B, so C is other than a father of B. As a result C is not a father by dropping the qualification of B.

(XII) Or do you think the same man being a father is not a father(ἢ οἴει τὸν αὐτὸν παρέρα ὄντα οὐ παρέρα εἶναι ; 298 c2)? - so your father is the father of everything. This fallacy is similar to (XI). This is the case of *a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid.* This sophism also omits qualifications and uses the sentence absolutely.

(XIII) Isn't the dog yours? ... being a father he is yours, so the dog becomes your father and you the puppies' brother(οὐ σός ἐστιν ὁ κύων; ... Οὐκοῦν πατὴρ ὢν σός ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός; 298 e 3-5). According to Hawtry this is the fallacy of composition. Again the meaning of father is used absolutely without qualifications. This fallacy runs as follows: If a dog is yours and he has puppies, he being yours is a father of puppies. So he is a father as yours by dropping the qualification of puppies, therefore he is your father. Aristotle explains this case as the identification of the attribute, which is true of the accident, with the subject.[14]

(XIV) But he does not want a lot of good ... neither he nor you('Αλλ' οὐδεν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ... οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος οὔτε σύ 299 a6). This is the case of *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter* by omitting qualifications. All men want to have a lot of good things. A sick man needs medicine because it is good for him. So he needs to take medicine as much as he can. That is absurd. Also this idea represents the Socratic idea that "nothing is good without knowledge" in the dialogue 278 e - 281 e).

(XV) They see ... and do they see, whether Scythians or anybody else, things possible to see, or things impossible (Πότερον δὲ ὁρῶσιν, ... , καὶ Σκύθαι τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα ; 300 a)? This is the case of both equivocation and ambiguity. The phrase τὰ δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν can be interpreted in two ways; one is as the active sense of the term δυνάτος "things which are capable of seeing", the other is as the passive sense of "things which can be seen".

(XVI) Isn't speaking of the silent possible (Ἦ γὰρ ουχ οἷόν τ' ... σιγῶντα λέγειν; 300 b)? This is the case of syntactical ambiguity because the phrase σιγῶτα λέγειν can be read in two ways; one is "speaking while silent," the other is "speaking of things that are silent".

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14 Aristotle, 179a 36ff

(XVII) Then you are silent also in speaking of things(Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾷς, εἴπερ τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν [τὰ λεγόμενα] 300 c) This sophism is the same case as (XVI). The phrase "λέγοντα σιγᾶν" can be read either as "to be silent in speaking" or "to be silent about speaking things".

(XVIII) And because I am with you now, you are Dionysodorus? (καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγώ σοι πάρειμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ; 300 e3). This is the case of exploiting the philosophical term παρουσία by changing from the metaphysical sense to the physical one.

(XIV) It is appropriate to cut up and skin the cook(τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν 301a). This fallacy is the case of ambiguity by using "τὸν μάγειρον" as a subject or an object of the infinitive κατακόπτειν.

(XX) Are you free to sell them [the gods] or give them away or do what you will with them just as with the other animals? (ἆρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτι ἄν βούλῃ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις; 303 a) This sophism is the case of equivocation on the term ζῷον and the ambiguity of the term σός.

(XXI) Is Heracles a bravo or is the bravo Heracles (πότερον ὁ Ἡρακλῆς Πυππάξ ἐστιν ἢ ὁ πυππάξ Ἡρακλῆς; 303 a)? This is the case of ambiguity. Dionysodorus pretends to understand the exclamation "πυππάξ" as a proper name, and besides this silly grammatical joke assumes that if two words stand side by side they must be in apposition.[15]

What are the means by which these two Sophists can defeat every respondent unchecked? Their means is an art of speaking by use of mere words by which they can control and easily deploy their aspects of eristic and verbal quibbling just like the many-headed Hydra(297 c). They reduce all things to words in that they will not identify the real world with the world of words, but only base their thoughts on words. It means that they do not have any objective criteria with which they can compare the words and find the way leading to the truth. According to Aristotle, names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number; and so the same

15 Gifford 1905 p. 36

expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of things[17]. That is, names can be used as the means of fallacy. Accordingly it is necessary to clarify their way of using words, through which we can realise the fallacies of their sophistry.

The Sophists' Thought as Revealed in the *Euthydemus*

Our main task is to try to find out the thought of these two Sophists. On the face of it their use of fallacies seems to depend on a random method for their own purpose of defeating other respondents. However, the fallacies used in this dialogue, especially (III), (IV), (V), (VII), (IX), and (XI) are related to important problems which we frequently face in the history of Greek philosophy, for all these are concerned with the problems of change (becoming), falsehood, contradiction, being and not-being, the one and the many, and the theory of Forms. By means of these ambiguities the Sophists can refute everyone by carefully constructed sophistry, whether or not he speaks the truth. What is the basis of their thinking and logic? A.E Taylor says that "Plato reminds us repeatedly that his two Sophists had lived at Thurii".[18] R.K Sprague also maintains that the Sophists in this dialogue are neo-Eleatics, that is, their arguments are based upon the the philosophical position of Parmenides.[19] Our treatment of these two Sophists' thought will be to investigate their relations with Parmenides by comparing their thinking with his. Through this examination we can find that the two Sophists, equipping themselves with Parmenides' way of thinking, lead their argument towards a Protagorean relativism of "whatever anyone believes true".

Parmenides first asked what is the common presupposition of all the views he had to deal with, and he found that this is the existence of what is not. The next question is whether this can be thought, and the answer is that it cannot. Therefore there is no nothing. Only that can be which can be thought(DK 28B5); for thought exists for the sake of what is (DK 28B8). Also Parmenides is regarded as the first great philosopher who made the explicit

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16 Aristotle, 165 a 11-14

17 Plato, the Man and His Work p. 95, A.E. Taylor, Methuen and Co. Ltd, Reprinted 1952

18 Plato' Use of Fallacy, R.K. Sprague, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. xiii

distinction between Knowledge and Opinion which was to be the main matter of Plato's philosophy. The idea of Parmenides' philosophy related to these Sophists can be found in his surviving fragments:[19]

> Fr. 3 ... for the same thing can be thought and can be i.e.It is the same thing that can be thought and that can be(... τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι DK 28B3).
>
> Fr. 6 It is necessary to say and to think Being; for there is Being, but nothing is not (χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τὲ νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι' ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν' DK 28B6).
>
> Fr. 8 ... that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete .... . Not from non-Being shall I allow you to say or to think, for it is not possible to say or think what is not. ... How could it (Being) have come into being? If it was, it is not, nor if it is going to be in the future. So, coming into being is extinguished and perishing is unheard of. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike. .... It is the same thing to think and the thought that [the object of thought] exists, for without Being, in what has been expressed, you will not find thought; for nothing other, besides Being, either is or will be, since Destiny fettered it to be whole and immovable (... ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνωλεθρόν ἐστιν οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδὲ τελεστόν' ... οὔτ' ἐκ μη ἐόντος ἐάσσω φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν' ... πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο; εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι. τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος. οὐδέ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον' ... ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα' οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ὧι πεφατισμένον ἐστίν, εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν' οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἐσ̈ται ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν οὖλον ακίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι' DK 28B8).

In the world of Parmenides' philosophy, whatever exists can have the construed characteristic of Being absolutely. By systematic reasoning he excludes the middle stage between Being and non-Being and shows that to accept the phenomenal world would imply the assertion of the existence of non-Being. He also identifies the world of thought with the world of existence, for to him it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. The object of thought, i.e Being, is in the state of Being without change

19 Texts and the Translations are those of L. Tarán's Parmenides, Princeton, N. J. 1965

and generation. If we think the existence of change or generation, in that case we must presuppose not-Being because change or generation means going from non-Being to Being or from Being to non-Being. In another words, if A can be changed into A', in the point of A, A' does not exist and also in the state of A', A is not existent because the change from A to A' must presuppose the existence of non-Being. Also if there is the change or generation of something, then it must come out of being or non-being. If it comes out of being, then it comes out of being. So there is no generation or change. If it comes out of non-being, then it is impossible, for out of nothing comes only nothing. Besides we must presuppose that nothing is the object of our speaking. Consequently that is impossible, for non-Being cannot be thought and cannot be an object of thinking. His important idea is that "it is". It, i.e Being, is existent and cannot not be. Nothing cannot be the object of speaking and thinking, for to think about nothing is not to think, and to speak about nothing is not to speak at all. M. C. Stokes summarises the meaning of Parmenides' ideas as follows[20]:

1) No thought is possible except the subject's existence.
2) If anything different from the existent is included in a thought it is not a thought but a nonsense.
3) The reason why to think about anything other than the existent is nonsensical is that there is not (and never will be) anything else to think about.
4) Logic constrains the existent to be οὖλον and ἀκίνητον.

We can easily find that the main defect in the philosophy of Parmenides is that it makes no differentiations between relative non-Being and absolute non-Being i.e Nothingness. To take an example, we might say: "it is a pencil or a book" (a pencil or a book exists) if a man asks what it is on the table. In this case the pencil or a book is an object of our thinking and speaking (reference). If there are no pencils or books on the table, then we must say that pencils or books are not existent on the table, or do not exist on the table. This is the case of a conditioned situation, for definitely there are objects of reference in these questions. In this case we can say that relative-Nothingness in lieu of absolute-Nothingness should be used, for if we presuppose the Being of something, we can have an object of reference in

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20 One and Many in Pre-Socratic Philosophy, M. C. Stokes, p. 139, Harvard University press, Cambridge, 1971

our thinking and speaking. On the other hand, there is the case of absolute-Nothingness which cannot be the object of speaking and thinking. If we want to think about non-existent thing, i.e a unicorn or dragon, even though they do not exist in the world we can have a conception of them. However, how can we think about absolute-Nothingness? If we think or speak about something, then we must postulate something which can be the object of our thought or speaking. So we must presuppose absolute Nothingness to be something. By doing this it is possible for us to get a conception of the absolute Nothingness. And later we must withdraw our postulation. As a result, to think the absolute-Nothingness remains nothing in our minds.

We have discussed the main defect of the philosophy of Parmenides. Let us try to find out the basis of the Sophists' ideas. In classification III there is the dialogue between Socrates and Dionysodorus ; "Then you wish him to become one that he is not and no longer to be one that he is ... you want him to be destroyed". If Socrates wants Cleinias not to be ignorant, his ignorance will become non-existent by education. Dionysodorus construes this absurd result by omitting the qualification ἀμαθής. This is the tactful exploitation of Parmenides' philosophy in that he would not differentiate between relative non-Being and absolute non-Being, between an attribute and existence. He would not admit a change of attribute. In fact a sick man can be a healthy man or vice versa. In this case the existence of man does not change i.e he still remains as a man even though his attributes can be changed or substituted. It means that the change or substitution of attributes is to be conceived as dependent on the continuity of an object. The denial of the change or substitution of attributes leads to the flat denial of the Sophists' doctrine "virtue can be taught".

As we can see from Parmenides' Fr. 3, it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. In the world of his philosophy everything that can be thought is existent. The identification of thought with existence is also exploited by the Sophists to contradict the respondent just as in the case of classification (IV). They maintain that it is not possible to tell a lie. If a man makes a statement, even if it does not correspond to the fact, he talks of another thing which is existent in speaking and thinking. Being existent, it is fact. In this process of the Sophists' logic we find that Euthydemus on purpose deceitfully puts the phrase τὰ ὄντα in the same category as τἀληθῆ(284 c). The difference between τὰ ὄντα and τἀληθῆ can easily be

explained if we think about a unicorn or a dragon once more. Even though they can be the object of our mind, actually they can still be not existent, for they can be in the category of τἄ ὄντα, not τἀληθῆ. So the Sophists eventually raise the impossibility of contradiction on the same grounds. Let us consider their assertion (285 d); (i) if two men describe the same thing, there is no contradiction, (ii) if neither of them speaks a word describing that thing, there is no contradiction, (iii) if one man speaks the truth, and the other does not speak the truth, then no contradiction occurs because no one speaks what is not. This result comes from the non-differentiation between the two senses of the verb εἶναι : between the existential and the copulative(prescriptive) sense, for the qualification of the phrase "is not" is dropped. Dropping the phrase "is not" raises two points in the state of things. One is that it has the meaning of "what is not"-existential, the other means "other than"-copulative. Falsehood should be explained by use of the meaning "other than", however, the Sophists unreasonably turn this case to their own advantage by making the respondent confused. This problem is made use of in other sophisms in classifications (IX) and (XI) of this dialogue. Let us think about sophism (IX). If Socrates knows something, then he is in the state of knowing something. It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be (ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν τὸ αὐτο εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ, 293 d) So if he knows one thing, he knows all things because he is in the state of knowing - by omitting the qualification "something". In Plato's *Parmenides* we can find a similar expression used by Zeno; "if things are many, they must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible : unlike things cannot be like, nor like things unlike(εἰ πολλὰ ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ ἀυτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι; 127 d)". Cornford explains as follows - if things are many, they must be both homogeneous and heterogeneous. For (i) each of them must be one, and what is one is homogeneous; therefore they are homogeneous. But (ii) if they are many, they must be distinguishable , and therefore unlike one another ; therefore they are heterogeneous.[21] The other sophism(XI) uses the same fallacy. If Chaeredemus is a father of Patrocles<the brother of Socrates>, Sophroniscus<the father of Socrates> is other than a father of Patrocles. He cannot be a father and not a father at the same time. So Chaeredemus is the father of all things. However, that Sophroniscus is other than a father leads to the fact that Sophroniscus is not a father by dropping the qualification. So Socrates is fatherless.

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21 Plato and Parmenides , F. M. Cornford, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1939 p. 68

Finally we must think about the refutation of the theory of Forms. Similar criticism of the theory of Forms is pointed out by R.K Sprague in another of Plato's dialogues, the *Parmenides*.[22] Her main point is that by an Eleatic either - or question, Parmenides asks a question based on the two incompatible interpretations of "partake(παρεῖναι)". The thing that partakes of the Form receives the Form either as a whole or as a part, and there is no other way of partaking. In the first case, that of the Form being received as a whole, the Form will turn out to be separate from itself. Also in the second case, he goes on to show that reception of the Form as a part involves dividing the unitary and perfect Form into pieces, which is impossible. The reason why, according to Sprague,[23] he is able to draw this conclusion is that he has interpreted "partaking" in a physical sense only. Let us return to the case of *Euthydemus*. The conversation between Socrates and Dionysodorus is as follows:

> What about you, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, have you ever seen a beautiful thing? ... Were they different from the beautiful, he asked, or the same as the beautiful ... I said they were different from the beautiful itself, but each of them had some beauty with it. Then, he said, if you have an ox with you, you are an ox, and because I am with you now, you are Dionysodorus? ... But how can it be, he said, that when a different thing is with a different thing, the different thing should be different?(Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἄν εἴη ; 300 e - 301 b)

This fallacy which Dionysodorus uses is based on the Eleatic logic, as in the case of *Parmenides*, which denies the dualism of two distinct sorts of Being, the theory of Forms. The relationship between Forms and particulars is regarded as the most difficult problem in Plato's theory of Forms. In this question Socrates faces a dilemma, for an Eleatic question forces him to be in *reductio ad absurdum*. If Socrates answers that beautiful things are the same as the beautiful, then there is no difference between particulars and the Form. If they are different from the beautiful, they are other than the beautiful. So they cannot be not beautiful. Sprague indicates two points, one is that Dionysodorus has taken presence in the purely physical sense, the

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22 Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox, R.K. Sprague, Phronesis 1967, p. 91-98
23 Ibid p. 96

second is that he has destroyed the contrast between Forms and particulars by dealing in terms of particulars only.[24] His reduction of Socrates' statement to absurdity depends on the substitution of a physical particular for a universal and ideal Form. So if an ox comes near to Socrates, then Socrates comes to be an ox by eliminating the dualism of the relation between ox-ness and oxen.

It is necessary for us to examine the saying of Euthydemus in the *Cratylus* : all things appear equal to all men at the same time and always(... πᾶσι πάντα ὁμωίος εἶναι ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ 386 d 3-7). Kerferd argues that Euthydemus differed from Protagoras on the application of the Man-measure doctrine.[25] The Man-measure doctrine of Protagoras implies subjectivism on the relativity of values. It means that only our own views can be the criteria of the nature of all things, which exist independently of us. Protagoras' doctrine must have been a reply to the Eleatics, who denied the evidence of senses and the reality of opposites. Protagoras agrees also with Heraclitus on the point that opposites co-exist inseparably. However, if we think about the statement of Euthydemus more carefully, we can realise that his theory is basically interrelated with the Eleatics. If a thing, ungenerated and imperishable, whole, unique, immovable, and complete, exists, then it is now altogether, one, and continuous irrespective of time, for it was not once nor will it be. Since it remains the same and in the same place, it lies by itself and abides so firmly where it is(ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὕτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μενεῖ DK 28B8). Let us suppose a perfect spherical shape. It will be to be seen the same in every respect and time. So we can easily understand that Euthydemus' theory is based on Parmenides' philosophy and applies it to Protagoras' subjectivism in that this viewpoint is centered on each man. We might say that his idea of objects external to us is basically absolute objectivism even though he leads his argument into the Protagorean tenet "whatever anyone believes true". To him the external world exists independently of human sensations, and just as in the world of Parmenides he denies a conception of time by using the phrase ἅμα καὶ ἀεὶ. In that case all things are equally to all at the same time and always.

Conclusion

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[24] Plato's Use of Fallacy, R. K. Sprague, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1962. p. 26
[25] Kerferd 1981, p. 54

We have seen the two Sophists' art of speaking which is very effective in putting down their respondents or opponents, and examined the relations between Parmenides' philosophy and their thought. In appearance their way of conducting arguments seems arbitrary. However, we can find a consistency in their thinking based on the Eleatics. Of course they are not natural philosophers nor members of the Parmenidean school. They merely exploit the Eleatic philosophy for their own procedure of refutation. They have reduced the Eleatic ontological theory into vain words which do not correspond to the facts i.e. they deal not in things but in words(278 b). However, they raise similar philosophical problems to those of the Eleatic philosophers. Above all we must note that Plato indirectly criticises the Eleatic philosophy. In his other dialogues the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*, the same problems are raised and examined.

III. HIPPIAS

Life and Works

Hippias was a native of Elis, son of Diopithes and a pupil of Hegesidamus, according to Souda.[1] About his birth and death nothing is known to us. His widowed daughter married Isocrates. His third son, Aphareus, became a tragedian active in the middle of the fourth century. Plato depicts him in the *Protagoras* as a contemporary of Protagoras, Gorgias and Prodicus. In the *Hippias Major* (283 a) Protagoras is described as being far older(πρεσβυτέρου ὄντος) than Hippias is(νεώτερος ὤν). So it is guessed that he was about the same age as Socrates.

The main references to him are found in the writings of Plato and Xenophon. Apart from the dialogues named after him, the *Hippias Major* and the *Hippias Minor*, Plato mentions him in some of his other works, the *Protagoras* and the *Apology* . Also we can find a dialogue between Socrates and Hippias in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Symposium*.

Hippias was an important man in his city as the best judge and reporter of anything said by other governments, and frequently discharged a number of diplomatic delegations for his city. He was also an itinerant teacher, and hence travelled to a lot of places. He visited Athens at least twice, Sicily, and, most often of all, Sparta. In Sicily he had a great reputation and made a lot of money (*Hippas Major* 281 a-b). At Athens he was treated as an honorable guest at Callias' house where he was a prominent member of a company which included Protagoras, Prodicus, Alcibiades, Callias and Critias. All these journeys might have given him a universality of knowledge through his various contacts with the most

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1 Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker II, Diels/ Kranz , p. 326

distinguished persons in Hellas. He carried on his activity at Olympia, the festival of Hellas, where armed with material of every sort, epics, tragedies, dithyrambs, and speeches for display, he continually professed his willingness to perform what he prepared, and to answer any questions which anyone might wish to ask (*Hipp. min.* 363 c - d).[2]

Hippias had attained such powers of memory by drinking certain potions: once having heard them he could repeat as many as fifty names. Xenophon also says that Antistenes introduced Callias to Hippias of Elis from whom he learn the art of memorising. So he had a vast amount of knowledge, especially in mathematics, astronomy, language, geometry, mythology, rhythm and harmonic science. He also discussed painting and sculpture. Of his various writings, however, nothing is left to us.

Writings ascribed to him include the *Register of Victors at Olympia* (Ὀλυμπιονίκων ἀναγραφή) in which he mentioned his native state and the games, and the *Collection* (Συναγωγή) which consists of a collection of various notices, anecdotes and pieces of information concerning the history of philosophy and religion; one of them is about Thargelia of Miletus: Thargelia was a woman of Milesian decent who was married fourteen times, fair in looks, and wise in other respects, so that she controlled cities and rulers Another is the *Trojan Dialogue* (Τρωικὸς διάλογος) which includes a speech : Nestor at the fall of Troy counsels Achilles' son, Neoptolemus, as to the pursuits which a man should follow to achieve a good reputation by recommending to him a great many excellent and customary practices.

Diogenes Laertius (I 24) writes that Aristotle and Hippias say that Thales ascribed a soul even to inanimate things, arguing from the magnet and from amber. Proclus mentions in his *On Euclid* (p. 65) that Hippias of Elis has recorded that it was in geometry that Mamercus, brother of

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2 The appearance of the Sophists at Olympia has a threefold significance according to Guthrie' s view - A History of Greek Philosophy III, Cambridge University Press 1969 p. 42-43.

(a) They considered themselves to be in the tradition of the poets and rhapsodes. So recitation at a pan-Hellenic festival was a way of making a new work known.

(b) It was agonistic, competing for prizes in set contests as did the poets, musicians and athletes.

(c) The festivals were occasions for members of Greek city-states to meet together and forget their differences, and the public appearance there of the sophists was symbolic of a pan-Hellenic outlook that went naturally with their habit of staying in different cities in turn.

Stesichorus the poet, gained his reputation. In mythology he maintained that the stepmother of Phrixus is not Demodice but Gorgopis. On language he mentioned that the word "tyrant" passed on to the Greeks in the same period as the time of Archilochus, and the names of the continents [Asia and Europe] from the daughters of Oceanus. On astronomy his only pronouncement is that the Hyades are seven in number. He also composed elegiac verses for the statues commemorating the Messenian boys' chorus drowned on the voyage to Rhegium. He also remarks, regarding Homer's *Iliad* , that Homer made Achilles the best man of those who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest (*Hippas Minor* 364 c).

Plutarch quoted Hippias' remarks in his lost work, the *On Slander* : Hippias says that there are two kinds of envy; one is just, when one begrudges bad men the honour given them; the other kind is unjust, when one begrudges it to good men. The envious have double the distress of others; for they are vexed not only, as others are, by their own ills but also by others' good. Also he says that slander is a terrible thing because the law provides no redress against slanderers, as it does against thieves. Yet slanderers are thieves of one's most valuable possession, namely friendship. Hence, violence, wicked as it is, is more just than slander, in that it is not concealed. This represents his ethical views on *nomos*.

In addition to his diverse knowledge Hippias was, practically, a dexterous man. He once visited Olympia, wearing all the clothing he made and carrying only things he made for himself - engraved rings, a seal, a skin-scraper, an oil-flask, sandals, a cloak, a tunic and Persian girdles. This practice of his was based on his idea that the proper end of the individual man is self- sufficiency.

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (IV 4 ff), the author reports that Socrates converses with the Sophist Hippias, when Hippias maintains that laws are compacts made by the citizens themselves concerning what they must do and what not, and that laws can be amended and rejected at any time.

According to Plato Hippias shares certain common characteristics with the other sophists; the qualities of conceit and self-admiration, in that he has not met anyone superior to himself in anything and knows better than anyone else how to impart virtue(ἀρετή). Especially in the *Hippias Major*

(282e) he is depicted as an ostentatious money-maker by being made to say that he has made more money than any other two sophists put together.

Hippias' Thought as Revealed in Plato's Dialogues *Protagoras* and *Hippias Major*

Out of the five above-mentioned dialogues of Plato, we can investigate Hippias' thinking through two: the *Protagoras* and the *Hippias Major.* What he says in the *Protagoras* is related to his ethical views. On the other hand, his discussion with Socrates in the *Hippias Major* is a good expression of his natural philosophy.

I. Hippias in the *Protagoras*

In the *Protagoras* (337 c - 338 a) Hippias says:

> Gentlemen, I regard you as all related, all akin, all fellow citizens - by nature, not by convention. For like is by nature akin to like, but convention, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by force contrary to nature. Surely it is shameful if we, who understand the nature of things and, being the wisest of the Greeks, have for that very reason come together to the very shrine of wisdom in all Greece and to this, the greatest and most magnificent house of that very city, should achieve nothing worthy of our reputation, but quarrel among ourselves like the most worthless of men. I beg and counsel you then, Protagoras and Socrates, to regard us as arbitrators and come to an agreement(Ὦ ἄνδρες ... οἱ παρόντες, ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας ἅπαντας εἶναι — φύσει, οὐ νομῳ' τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται — ἡμας οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ κατ αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτάεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε, μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφηνασθαι, ἀλλ ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ συμβουλεύω, ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμβῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον,...).

In relation to this we must refer to the conversation which Xenophon reports Hippias having had with Socrates in his *Memorabilia* (IV.iv. 14-25). He maintains:

> Laws can hardly be thought of much account, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them often reject and amend them. (Νόμους δ' ... πῶς ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο σπουδαῖον πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὕς γε πολλάκις ἀράμεναι αἱ πόλεις πάλιν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται) ... Unwritten laws are uniformly observed in every country. ... the gods made these laws for men.(Τούς ('Αγράφους νόμους) γ' ἐν πασῃ ... χώρᾳ κατὰ ταὐτὰν ομιζομένους. ... θεοὺς τοὺς νόμους τούτους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις θεῖναι·)

In this paragraph we can find the distinction between *nomos* (convention) and *physis* (nature) which was of considerable importance in the period of the sophists. So it is necessary for us to get an idea of what Hippias really means by the contrast between these conceptions. The term *nomos,* traditionally translated either as "law" or "convention" or "custom" according to what seems best to fit the context, and the whole range of terms that are cognate with it in Greek, are always prescriptive and normative and never merely descriptive - they give some kind of direction or command affecting the behaviour and activities of persons and things[3]. On the other hand the term *physis* is usually translated by "nature" which is the static concept of "the way things are".[4]

Hippias regards the participants in Protagoras and Socrates' conversation as all related, all akin, all fellow-citizens - by nature because like is by nature akin to like. However, convention, he says, a tyrant over mankind, ordains by force many things contrary to nature and makes them wrangle. In this aspect we must keep in mind that Hippias is a polymath and natural philosopher. His preference of nature to convention betrays his knowledge concerning the nature of things which makes him undertake the role of arbitrator between Protagoras and Socrates. This means that "the *physis* of the universe, which is the object of the natural science, must determine the guiding criteria of human conduct."[5] Nature, as K. Popper maintains, consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither

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3 The Sophistic Movement, G,B Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 112

4 Ibid. P.111

5 The Sophists, Mario Untersteiner, Translated by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p. 278

moral nor immoral: it is we who impose our standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part of the natural world.[6] We are products of nature, but nature has formed us with the power to alter the world, to foresee and to plan for the future, and to make far-reaching decisions for which we are morally responsible.

Ideal or universal law, which is contrary to actual law, is suggested in the fifth century B.C. as a basis for something more general and everlasting than custom or convention.[7] The natural philosophers commonly believed that the whole universe or nature is governed by natural law because they thought that there is a universal cause, from which every thing comes and to which everything is destined to return. In the fifth century B.C the name *physis* was regarded as the abiding and eternal something of which and from which this natural world was made. However, in this condition man is not easily defined because of his free will, whereas animals or inanimate objects exist according to their necessity. So to live by conformity to natural law can be interpreted in two ways, one negative, the other positive. The former represents non-human brutality, the latter human morality. Those who are in favor of *physis* can have quite different views, which may be either egoistic or altruistic. If we look around at the natural world, we will be confused. On the one hand we find that the natural world is very unequal, e.g trees, the physical build of men, the sizes of fishes in the sea; on the other hand, planets in the heavens and successive seasons are very regular. Questions about the relation of nature to value give diverse answers according to the views of the natural philosophers. Philosophical views of nature can be related to the problems of evaluation in complex ways. Accordingly, to infer the natural laws which men should follow from the laws by which animals are ruled, is to risk falling victim to a simple ambiguity. In this case natural justice is that only the strongest man can live to the highest degree of his powers and at his convenience. Might is right, and nature has endowed him to get as much as he wants. Actual human laws are utterly absurd and unnatural because the strongest man must live against his nature under these laws. The real natural man is

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6 The Open Society and Its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 1973 p. 61

7 Concerning the contrast *nomos* and *physis*, see Introduction IV.

the cruel tyrant. Is it the egalitarianism of the beaver or the hierarchical life of the bee that is the proper exemplar for human society?

What is the meaning of nature in the context of Hippias' statements? Does it have any relation to the negative meaning of nature? If it does, how could he dare to say that convention is a tyrant over mankind? If not, how can we discover his real intention? We need to confine the meaning of nature to a restricted sense because the meaning of nature can be variously applied according to the interpreter. Hippias' intention will be revealed if we think the meaning of convention is the oppression of natural right, as he says. An actual law or convention can be imposed by men, so it can be transformed according to the manner of the situation. It describes a way of life, norms of conduct and the source which guarantees them, the mores of a political or social group, law-and-order, conventional beliefs, and religious practices. It is possible to judge whether it is right or wrong, acceptable or not, since it does not represent a matter of fact, but ordains formulations for our behaviour. Popper defines the term "norm", i.e. " Norms are man-made in the sense that we must blame nobody but ourselves for them; neither nature nor God".[8] So if they are unacceptable and intolerable it is our task to change them. E. R. Dodds rightly explains the contrast between *nomos* and *physis*:

> *Nomos* (convention) could stand for the Conglomerate, conceived as the inherited burden of irrational custom; or it could stand for an arbitrary rule consciously imposed by certain classes in their own interest; or it could stand for a rational system of State law, the achievement which distinguished Greeks from barbarians. Similarly *physis* could represent an unwritten, unconditionally valid "natural law," against the particularism of local custom; or it could represent the "natural rights" of the individual, against the arbitrary requirements of the State ... . [9]

So in the case of Hippias, *physis* can be interpreted as freedom from the coercion of conventional and arbitrary thinking. His main role is as an arbitrator between Protagoras, who prefers long speeches, and Socrates who

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8 Popper 1973, p. 61

9 The Greeks and The Irrational, E. R. Dodds, University of California Press 1950 p.182-183

wants to have a conversation by short question and answer. Hippias' knowledge of all the manifestations of *physis* enable him to act rightly in a troubled situation. If each insists on his own conceited views, they cannot continue conversing any more. The participants in this conversation come from different Greek cities. Their customs and conventions are different according to their cities. They are somewhat conditioned in a conceited and subjective way because our social structure, just like a tyrant, regulates and determines our ways of thinking and life. Our subjective mind cannot apprehend the meaning of *physis* as long as our mind is attached to our private opinions and interests. In this way we can agree with F. Dümmler's view that Heraclitus' ξυνὸς λόγος can be identified with the φύσις of Hippias, while the ἰδίη φρόνησις of Heraclitus responds to the νόμος of the Sophist.[10] Let us think about the ideas of Heraclitus as revealed in his surviving fragments:[11]

> Therefore it is necessary to follow the common, but although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding (διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ <ξυνῷ> τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδιαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν DK 22B2).
>
> Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one(οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἕν πάντα εἶναι DK 22B50).
>
> The thinking faculty is common to all(ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονέειν DK 22B113).
>
> Those who speak with sense must rely on what is common to all, as a city must rely on its law, and with much greater reliance: for all the laws of men are nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over(ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις και πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως· τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον εθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται DK 22B114)

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10 Kosmopolitanismus order Panhellenismus? E. Schutrumpf, Hermes, C 1972, p. 5-29

11 Texts and translations are those of G.S Kirk, Heraclitus - The Cosmic Fragments except Fr. 113 and 116 which are those of G.S Kirk/J. E. Raven's The Pre-Socratic Philosophers.

All men have the capacity of knowing themselves and acting with moderation (ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρόνεῖν DK 22B116).

The majority cannot recognise the Logos even though they have the common thinking faculty, for they rely on their private and fallacious understanding. What they should recognise is the Logos, which is perhaps to be interpreted as the unifying formula or proportionate method of arrangement of things.[12] Heraclitus suggests that all human beings have the potential to realise the Logos, as in the case of Hippias, in principle but they would not do that because of their ignorance. Hippias also thinks that we are part of nature, so we can grasp the idea of natural or universal law which underlies the changing world, for like is akin to like if we discard private opinion acquired by conventions or customs contrary to nature. The law or formula of nature, is regarded as more objective, universal and lasting than custom or personal understanding. Since there is a universal law or formula which is essential to the ways of all things, men and all natural things are subject to this. So we should follow it. What is common to human beings is rationality. Only the man who thinks with reason can do that. If not, and we follow *nomos,* we will be the most worthless of men (τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων). The main idea of Hippias indicates improvement from the individual to the universal, from disorder to order, to a fuller and more complete reality. Also we can identify the natural law with the unwritten law of which Hippias speaks in the *Memorabilia.* The unwritten law, which is divine in origin and universal in application, is given to men by the gods as the worship of the gods and respect for parents. As we can see in Fragment 114 of Heraclitus, οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι is contrasted with εἷς θεῖος νόμος. According to Reinhardt in his *Parmenides* (215f), οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι does not refer to the νόμοι of the city, but to the precepts or habits of mankind in general; thus the sense of νόμος is changed within the limits of the fragment: there is an opposition like the sophistic νόμος - φύσις, with ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι representing νόμος and the εἷς θεῖος νόμος representing φύσις.[13] From this viewpoint the relationship between the ξυνὸς λόγος and the ἰδία φρόνησις corresponds to that of the εἷς θεῖος νόμος and the οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι.

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12 The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, G.S. Kirk/ R.E. Raven, p. 188

13 Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments, G. S. Kirk, Cambridge 1954 p. 50-51

On this epistemological view of Hippias we can find that his method is analogous to the theory of Empedocles. In his surviving fragment 109,[14] Empedocles says, "For with earth do we see earth, with water water, with air, bright air, with fire, consuming fire; with Love do we see Love, Strife with dread Strife (γάιῃ μὲν γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ DK 31B109)". Empedocles, for whom sense-perception and knowledge respectively are based on an act of perception or thought in which like deals with like, gives an explanation of perception by attraction of similarities.[15] The attraction of like to like is supposed to cover a whole range, from the basic form of a part of one root being aware of another part like itself and moving towards it, through compounds that can sense and combine with similar compounds, to perfect mixtures that are assimilated to their like, the process of highest thought. So we can deduce that a part of *physis*, the internal *physis* of man, can make contact with the external *physis*, the whole of nature. That is the way leading to *physis*.

We have seen that Hippias' thinking is related to the pre-Socratic philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles. In addition to this we need to consider, as regards his idea of *physis,* if it can be applied to pan-Hellenism or cosmopolitanism. At that time the consciousness of pan-Hellenism was strong because of the great pan-Hellenic festivals at Olympia during which quarrels among Greeks were temporarily called off. At these times the ties of a common language, religion and culture overruled the differences between the states.[16] D. Tarrant and M. Untersteiner maintain that Hippias' thinking includes cosmopolitanism.[17] However, it is to be shown that this is unconvincing if we consider his idea more analytically.

Hippias implies that even if men have the potential to apprehend *physis* they cannot be equal in reality because of *nomos*. If we think once more about what he says, we can see that he knows that the difference of human inequality does exist. He differentiates between wise men who understand the nature of things and ignorant men who do not. The Hellenic race are all related, all akin and all fellow citizens by nature. We know that

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14 Text and Translations are those of Kirk / Raven

15 Untersteiner 1954 p. 285

16 Guthrie III, p. 162

17 The *Hippias Major* attributed to Plato, D. Tarrant, Cambridge Univ. Press 1928. p.xxii. The Sophists, p.283-284

their common basis is the Greek language which is the main criterion for distinguishing between Greeks and barbarians. If we are sure that Hippias' ideas is based on Heraclitus, we can infer his thinking from Heraclitus who says in his surviving fragment 107 that the eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men if they have barbarian souls (κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων DK 22B107). So a barbarian soul does not understand the Greek language in which the Logos of *physis* is hidden. To experience and feel something through eyes and ears cannot be a good criterion for finding the truth, for these faculties are lacking in reason. Also these experiences are in the state of change according to one's condition. Only through thinking and reasoning can man be led into the logos of *physis*. What is the vehicle of thought? It is language. If we do not use language, we cannot think systematically. So we can infer that the relationship between wise men and ignorant men corresponds to that between Greek and barbarian in Hippias' ideas. His idea corresponds to that of Plato in that the Hellenic race is friendly and akin to itself, but foreign and alien to the barbarians ... Greeks are still by nature the friends of Greeks(τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν γένος αὐτο αὑτῷ οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ συγγενές, τῷ δὲ βαρβαρικῷ ὀθνεῖόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον ... Ἕλληνας δὲ Ἕλλησιν ... φύσει μὲν φίλους εἶναι *Rep.* 470 c) .

II. Hippias in the *Hippias Major*

The *Hippias Major* along with the *Euthyphro* and *Laches* presents a Socratic question in the form of the 'What is X' question. In each case Socrates is looking for a common character in those particulars by which all these can be named under an abstract conception. Hippias, greeted by Socrates, is interrogated by him about what he has done during his absence from Athens, then about "What is the fine itself(αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ἐστί)?" The consequences of this question are divided into two stages. The first consists of Hippias' own answers. However, the second is a more appropriate line of reasoning initiated by Socrates' *alter ego.* Socrates also adds that all fine things are fine by means of the fine in which case the fine is definitely something(τὰ καλὰ πάντα τῷ καλῷ ἐστι καλά ... Ὄντι γέ τινι τουτῷ 287 c-d).

To this question Hippias answers that a fine girl is a fine thing (παρθένος καλὴ καλόν 287 e). However, this answer is rejected because a fine

girl cannot be the condition of making those fine things fine and even the most beautiful maiden is ugly in comparison with the race of the gods. Socrates defines the "fine itself," by which everything else is ordered and appears to be fine when its form is added (... αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσμεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, 289 d). In this case Hippias says that this can be nothing else than gold, in that gold makes things fine when added to them. If so, Socrates responds, was Pheidias who did not give his Athena eyes of gold ignorant of this fine thing of which Hippias speaks? To this Hippias replies that whatever is appropriate to a particular thing makes that thing fine. Then, Socrates says, the wooden ladle is more appropriate than the golden one to the soup and the pot. Hippias, supposing that the fine is the sort of thing that will never be seen to be foul for anyone, anywhere and at any time, concludes that it is always finest, both for every man and in every place, to be rich, healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a fine memorial to his parents when they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from his own children (... ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ καὶ πανταχοοῦ κάλλιστον εἶναι ἀνδρί, πλουτοῦντι, ὑγιαίνοντι, τιμωμένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἀφοκομένῳ εἰς γῆρας, τοὺς αὑτοῦ γονέας τελευτήσαντας καλῶς περιστείλαντι, ὑπὸ τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐκγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ταφῆναι 291 d-e). But Socrates rejects this answer on the ground that it is awful, unholy and foul for some heroes, Achilles, Aeacus and Heracles.

From this second stage Socrates takes the initiative in this investigation and tries to get answers from Hippias. Socrates suggests through the unknown, Socrates' *alter ego*, that anything else is fine if this has been added to it: 'this', being 'the appropriate itself' - the nature of the appropriate itself (αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρέποντος ... τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ καλόν 293 e). This time also the suggestion is rejected because the appropriate makes things be seen to be fine rather than actually be fine. So the appropriate cannot be the fine. Socrates proposes another suggestion that the fine is useful (τοῦτο ... ὅ ἄν χρήσιμον ᾖ 295 c). He gives an example that eyes are fine not when they are in such a condition that they are unable to see, but whenever they are able to see, and are useful for seeing. Also in the cases of all utensils and means of transport on land and sea, boats and warships, and the tools of every skill, music and all the others, we look at the nature it has, its manufacture, its condition; then we call what is useful "fine" in respect of the way it is useful, what it is useful for, and when it is useful; but anything useless in all these respects we call

foul(... ἀποβλέποντες πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ᾗ πέφυκεν, ἢ εἴργασται, ἢ κεῖται, τὸ μὲν χρήσιμον καλόν φαμεν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἄχρηστον αἰσχρόν· 295 d-e). Accordingly what is able to accomplish a particular thing is useful for that for which it is able. Thus ability is fine, but inability foul(Δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλόν, ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρόν 295 e). However, when people do bad work, they do it by ability. So ability and the useful cannot be the fine. At this point, Socrates suggests another alternative: what is useful and able for some good purpose is the fine(... τὸ χρήσιμόν τε καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν 296 e). So they agree that the beneficial is the fine. But this is rejected by Socrates himself, the reason being that, if the beneficial is the maker of good, the fine which is the cause of good will be different from the good, for the cause is different from what it is a cause of. Once more they are confused. At last Socrates suggests that the fine is what is pleasant through hearing and sight(... τὸ καλόν ἐστι τὸ δι' ἀκοῆς τε καὶ δι' ὄψεως ἡδύ... 298 a). Then if the pleasant through sight and hearing is fine, whatever is not pleasant in that way clearly would not be fine. But Socrates does not think that pleasure through sight is fine because of this definition: because, if that were the cause of its being fine, the other - the one through hearing - would not be fine. So he construes that they have some quality that itself makes them fine, that common thing that belongs to both of them in common and to each privately (Ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὅ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ· 300 a). Then, Socrates says, if something is attributed to both pleasures but not to each one, they would not be fine by that attribute (Εἰ ἄρα τι αὖται αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἀμφότεραι πεπόνθασιν, ἑκατέρα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἄν τούτῳ γε τῷ παθήματι εἶεν καλαί 300 b). To this suggestion Hippias responds strongly that what is attributed to "both" is also attributed to "each" as in the cases of just, health, sickness, wound, etc. And he criticises Socrates and the unknown for not looking at the entities of things (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων) and chipping away at the fine and other elements by taking each separately and cutting it up with words (... κρούετε δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες 301 b) because they both do not realise the greatness of the natural continuous bodies of being (... μεγὰλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα 301 b). Hippias also adds that Socrates presupposes there is some attribute or being that is true of both of these but not of either on its own, or of each but not of both. However, Socrates counters this view with the argument that in the case of numerical terms such as one, two, odd, and even, this suggestion cannot be applied. Hippias agrees that it is

not entirely necessary that whatever is true of both and each is true of each and both as well.

Hippias is outraged with this logic-chopping, flakings and chippings of speeches divided up into small bits. He sarcastically answers that what is fine and worthwhile is the ability to present a speech well and finely in a law-court or council. So Socrates answers that, when he goes home to his own place and the unknown hears him saying those things, the unknown (Socrates' *alter ego*) will ask if he is not ashamed that he dare discuss fine activities when he has been so plainly refuted about the fine. Thus this discussion ends in aporia.

We have considered the synopsis of this dialogue. Through this dialogue we can find that the view of Plato, using Socrates as a mouthpiece, is contrasted with that of Hippias. Let us think about Hippias' thinking in detail. In the first stage his answers can be arrived at by our own experience and come from defining the nature of the fine in an abstract sense. In his first answer he certainly identifies the fine(τὸ καλὸν) with something fine (καλὸν). However, we can say that Hippias is appealing to the nature of a fine girl in order to state the nature of the fine.[18] This is the reason why there is no difference between the nature of a fine girl and the nature of the fine in respect of the notion of the fine. In this point of view he gives an instance of an empirical example rather than a definition of the nature of the fine. Again Socrates asks, in his second question, what makes things fine when it is added to them. It is evident that Socrates is asking Hippias for the abstract idea that can be the common character of fine things. But Hippias understands this concept physically and suggests gold which indicates a material substance. It is true that by the addition of gold something will be made finer. He does not suggest that gold can be the only answer. This answer is the very opposite conception of what Socrates wants. Hippias' third answer is that it is always finest for everyone to be rich, healthy, and honored by Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a fine memorial to his parents when they die, and to have a fine, grand burial from his own children. This time Hippias' reply is a definition of broader scope and is on a higher level. He tries to raise the ordinary aspirations of social existence to the level of the fine itself.[19] However, to Socrates this answer

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[18] Plato *Hippias Major*, Translated with Commentary and Essay, P. Woodruff, 1982. p. 49
[19] Plato 2, Paul Friedländer, p. 109

also can be found in ordinary life and is one of a great number of many fine things.

On the other hand, in the second stage, Socrates suggests more abstract answers to Hippias for what the fine is. Stage two is an exercise in the logic of Socratic definition. Socrates tries to take the incompleteness of "fine" into account, proposing to define it by such similarly incomplete predicates as "the appropriate" and "the able".[20] His suggestions are as follows: the appropriate, the able, the beneficial, and pleasure through sight and hearing. In these proposals we can find that the concept of one quality, aimed at by the Socratic method, is contrasted with many instances of this quality, supplied by Hippias' answers. Socrates wants to find the fine which is one thing that makes all fine things fine. Also he differentiates between to appear(φαίνεσθαι) and to be(εἶναι). The appropriate (τὸ πρέπον) is a cause of being seen to be fine, not to be fine. So the appropriate cannot be fine. This distinction between reality and appearance is based on Plato's thinking that the objects which we perceive and experience through our senses are not real because they vary according to our senses and to conditions. Many fine things appear to us at different times and in various conditions in a way which we call fine. These, however, cannot be identified with the fine itself, for the condition of its existence presupposes an objective world in which the models of natural things exist. The basis of objective reality is in those ideal forms which cannot be recognised in the world known to sense-perception. His second attempt to identify the fine with "being able" shows us his ethical view "No one does wrong willingly". Someone's ability leads him to do either wrong or right. Thus "being able" can be a necessary condition for him to achieve the fine but not a sufficient condition. So "being able" is not enough to constitute the fine without knowledge of what the fine is. Because of lack of knowledge many people, even if they have power and ability, do wrong things. The third definition is that the fine is the beneficial. This puts the true Socratic and Platonic position even more precisely.[21] In this case his reasoning is absurd; the beneficial is the cause of good, but cause and effect are different just as in the relationship between father and son, therefore the beneficial is not the good. If we think about the relation between father and son, it is true that the father, being a 'cause' of the son, is different from the son. However, if we think of them in

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20 Woodruff's 1982 p. 62
21 Guthrie III p. 186

respect of being human beings, they have no differences. Does this mean that the beneficial is bad? Here we have a Socratic fallacy.

The last suggestion, that pleasure through sight and hearing is fine, displays the opposing philosophical positions of Hippias' natural materialism and the Socratic or Platonic idealism in that what is attributed to "both" collectively cannot be attributed to "each" distributively. Socrates presupposes some other quality which "both" share in common but Hippias denies the possibility of the existence of such a thing. He maintains that phenomenal reality is the whole of reality.

The question that opposes one and many is the fundamental issue in Pre-Socratic philosophy. As F. M. Cornford puts it :

> The conflict of materialism (many) and idealism (one) was not an entirely fresh issue that arose for the first time among the contemporaries of Plato. Ever since the sixth century the schools had been divided into two traditions: on the one side the Ionian science of the Milesians and their successors, on the other hand the Italian tradition of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. The Ionian, all through, had been seeking the real nature of things in some ultimate kind of matter or body, such as water or air or all the four elements. The Italians had sought reality, not in a tangible body, but in supersensible things. The Pythagoreans made numbers the real nature of things; and Parmenides' One Being was not a tangible body but an object of thought, possessing none of the opposite qualities which our senses delusively profess to reveal. Accordingly, the Ionians had been essentially materialists, not merely monists.[22]

What is the meaning of the materialism on which Hippias' thought is based? Materialism is concerned with the nature of the world in a way which gives to matter a primary position and accords to ideas a secondary one. A material thing can be defined as being made up of parts possessing many physical properties. In this respect we can find that the view of the materialists is that the real is nothing other than tangible bodies. Against these two philosophical backgrounds, we must consider Hippias' philosophical ideas. Kerferd rightly remarks that "the materialists

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22 Plato' Theory of Knowledge, F.M Cornford, Routledge and Kegan Paul p. 229

mentioned in connection with the battle of the gods and the giants in the *Sophists* (246 a-c) may well include people like Hippias".[23] When he answers Socrates' question "what is the fine itself by which every fine thing is to be fine when it is added (προσγένηται)?", he gives an answer based on materialism-gold-because he understands the meaning of "is added" physically.

Bearing in mind this view-point, it is necessary for us to consider the final argument between Hippias and Socrates carefully. Their argument is as follows.

Socrates says, "both fine things have something that itself makes them fine, that common thing that belongs to both of them in common and to each privately. ... what is not attributed to me to be, and what neither I am nor you are, and this can be attributed to both of us. And there are other things besides, which are attributed to both of us to be, things neither of us is (Ἔχουσιν ἄρα τι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο, ὅ καὶ ἀμφοτέραις αὐταῖς ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ· ... ὅ μήτ' εἰμὶ μηδ' αὖ σὺ εἶ, τοῦτο ἀμφότερους πεπόνθέναι ἡμᾶς οἷόν τ' εἶναι· ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ἀμφότεροι πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδέτερον εἶναι ἡμῶν 300 a-e)". Against this Hippias argues:

> "But Socrates, you do not look at the whole of things, nor do the people you are used to talking with. You people chip away at the fine and the other entities by taking each separately and cutting it up with words. Because of that you do not realise how great they are - naturally continuous bodies of being. And now you are so far from realising it that you think there's some attribute or being that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. That is how unreasonably and unobservantly and foolishly and uncomprehendingly you operate (Ἀλλα γὰρ δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ ἔιωθας διαλέγεσθαι, κρούτε δὲ ἄπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες. διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὑμᾶς λανθάνει καὶ διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. καὶ νῦν τοσοῦτον σε λέληθεν, ὥστε οἴει εἶναι τι ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν, ἥ περὶ μὲν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἔστιν ἅμα, περὶ δὲ ἑκάτερον οὔ, ἢ αὖ περὶ μὲν ἑκάτερον, περὶ δὲ ἀμφότερα οὔ· οὕτως ἀλογίστως καὶ ἀσκέπτως καὶ εὐήθως καὶ ἀδιανοήτως διάκαισθε 301 b-c).

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[23] Plato and Hippias, G.B. Kerferd, Proceedings of the Classical Associations 60 1963, p.36

Against this argument Socrates responds, "we have been instructed by you that if two is what we both are, two is what we each of us must be as well; and if each is one, then both must be one as well. The continuous theory of being, according to Hippias, does not allow it to be otherwise; but whatever both are, then each is that as well; whatever each is, both are(νῦν δὲ παρὰ σοῦ ἤδη ἀνεδιδάχθημεν ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο ἀμφότεροί ἐσμεν, δύο καὶ ἑκάτερον ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, εἰ δὲ εἷς ἑκάτερος, ἕνα καὶ ἀμφοτέρους ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας κατὰ Ἱππίαν ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὅ ἄν ἀμφότερα ᾖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑκάτερον, καὶ ὅ ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα εἶναι. 301 e)." However, Socrates concedes later that of some things this is true (Hippias' view), and of others it is not (Socrates' view).

Hippias' main contention is that Socrates cannot look at the whole of things and the natural continuous bodies of being because he takes each separately and cuts it up with words. However, if we want to understand his thinking more clearly, we need to understand the terms Hippias uses: whole things (τὰ ὅλα), the continuous bodies (διανεκῆ σώματα), attribute (πάθος) and being (οὐσία). Hippias also remarks concerning "a whole" in the *Hippias Minor*, "You (Socrates) are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole (ἀεὶ σύ τινας τοιούτους πλέκεις λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὅ ἄν ᾖ δυσχερέστατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχῃ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλῳ ἀγωνίζῃ τῷ πράγματι περὶ ὅτου ἄν ὁ λόγος ᾖ 369 b-c). According to Aristotle:

> the whole means that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in two senses - either as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them. For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a kind of whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being severally one single thing, because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and limited is a whole , when it is a unity consisting of several parts(τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς καὶ πεπερασμένον, ὅταν ἕν τι ἐκ πλειόνων ᾖ), especially if they are present actually.[24]

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[24] Aristotle's Metaphysics I, 1023 b, 26 - 1024 a, 10, W.D Ross

Hippias' usage of whole things is similar to Aristotle's (b). The surface of a whole has a beginning, a middle and an end which can be named as parts. So Hippias must have thought that the representation of an object is a whole. It means that he sees things as they are. It is true that an object given in our direct perception as an individual is, on closer scrutiny, seen to be identified with a whole made up of parts. When we conceive an object as a whole, we conceive that the first reality belongs to the members of a whole. That is the main reason why Hippias does not differentiate an attribute (πάθος) and a being (οὐσία). Hippias treats these as equivalent.[26] Οὐσία has diverse meanings in Plato's usage; (1) "Essential nature" *Phaedrus* 237c, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου. (2) "Essential substance" *Phaedo* 78c, αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι. (3) "Being" as a characteristic of essential substance, *Republic* 585b, καθαρᾶς οὐσιας μετέχειν. (4) "Property," in the common material sense, *Theaetus* 144c, οὐσιαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπε.[26] On the other hand Plato's use of πάθος is as an attribute of οὐσία; "affectus," "status," and "perturbatio (tam corporis quam animi)": *Protagoras* 352 a, ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ πάθος, ὅ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι. *Cratylus* 419 c, ἣν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα.[27] Through the contrast between an attribute and a being, we can find that this corresponds to the relationship between a whole and a part. Above all, the most important idea of Hippias is hidden in "the natural continuous bodies of being (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεπυκότα)". The term "διανεκῆ" is used only once elsewhere in Plato's dialogues, in the *Laws* (839 a) (νόμος ... διηνεκὴς γενὸμενος). Empedocles uses it in his surviving fragment 59:[28]

> But as one divine element mingled further with another, these things fell together as each chanced to meet other, and many other things besides these were constantly resulting (αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα, ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῆ ἐξεγένοντο DK 31B59).

In relation to this term "διηνεκῆ," it is necessary to understand Empedocles' use of "ἠνεκές" (far-stretching) in his Fragment 17:

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25 Woodruff's 1982 p. 86
26 Tarrant 1928 p. 79
27 Lexicon Platonicum, D.F. Astius, Rudolf Habelt Verlag 1956
28 Texts and Translations are those of G.S. Kirk/ R.E. Raven

> Nay, there are these things (four elements) alone, and running through one another they become now this and now that and yet remain ever as they are (ἀλλ' αὖτ' ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα DK 31B17).

As we can see from his uses of the terms "διηνεκῆ" and "ἠνεκές," Empedocles' intention is to account, in a naturalistic manner, for the organised matter of living things into wholes by using these words. He presupposes that the elements are everlasting; the physical particular things are, we know unstable compounds, which come into being as the elements are run through one another and degenerate after the separation of what has been mixed. The elements are made into a unified whole under the law of attraction between likes. Four parts to the one organic whole which has no voids might well be called a continuous unity. He also recommends, "to use whatever way of perception makes each thing clear"(γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἦ δῆλον ἕκαστον DK 31B4). Empedocles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that perception is due to the "effluences (ἀπορροαί)" fitting into the channels of our senses for he defines colour as "effluence from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible by it (ἔστιν γάρ χρόα απορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός *Meno* 76 d)". Empedoclean sensation is a purely physical process based on his theory of the attraction of like to like. So we can say that the term "διανεκῆ" of Hippias is a representative expression of an external object which we can perceive through our senses. Hippias regards a physical object as a whole which does not have any voids.

In *Lysis* 214 b4-5 Socrates tells Lysis, "And it is not also so with the writings of those sages which tell of these very things, namely that like must, of necessity, always be dear to like? And it is perhaps these who converse and write about nature and the concept of the whole (Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶν δὲ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες)." We can easily recognise that Empedocles and Hippias are included among those sages because their ideas have common characteristics; (a) natural philosophy, (b) materialism, (c) the theory of perceptive knowledge, and (d) their conception of things as whole entities which denies the void. So we can conclude that Hippias was influenced by Empedocles in his epistemological view of natural philosophy.

Hippias' idea of "the natural continuous bodies of being" is related to his suggestion that both of a pair have an attribute if and only if each of them does; whatever both are, that each is as well; and whatever each is, both are. It means that attributes (πάθῃ) are distributed throughout a physical object, so that they cannot be isolated within a total whole which, as a collection of attributes, has continuity. To put it in another way, if we concentrate on parts of a thing, we cannot see the whole of what they made up. What Hippias abhors is the tendency to chop up properties and whole things so that one is inclined to consider the properties of the parts as independent of those of the whole and vice versa.[29] That is his main point. If we think about his examples, gold, silver and ivory(χρυσοῖ ἢ ἀργυροῖ ἢ ἐλεφάντινοι 301 a), his theory is well applied because each thing is one and the same without any difference between the whole and its parts. So the continuity of a physical object and the continuity of its kinds and kind-bound properties throughout all of its parts become coextensive continuities.[30] As Kerferd puts it, this doctrine(διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεπυκότα) can be expressed as "continuous physical objects that spring from being".[31] He reduces all material objects to what can perceived by our senses. Hippias' idea about the phenomenal world is that the nature and status of material objects exist external to us and give their representations to our sensual perception. However, the weakness of his theory is that material objects unnoticed can be causes of our sensation. That is the main difference in position between Hippias and Socrates or Plato who try to explain the phenomenal world by the use of abstract ideas which do not exist in this phenomenal world.

Conclusion

We have examined both the ethical views of Hippias in the *Protagoras* and his idea of natural philosophy in the *Hippias Major*. Hippias' idea of *physis* in the *Protagoras* implies the idea of more objective lasting or universal law which underlies the changing world and is essential to the ways of all things. And we examined the possibility that Hippias' idea is interconnected with both Heraclitus' meaning of the Logos i.e. unifyng

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29 The Continuity Theory of Reality in Plato's *Hippias Major*, M. L Morgan. Journal of History of Philosophy 21 1983 133-158, p. 145

30 Ibid. p. 150

31 Kerferd 1963, p.36

formular and Empedocles' epistemological theory i.e. the attraction of like to like (like is by nature akin to like). Also we have realised that Hippias' idea of *physis* can be applied to pan-Hellenism rather than cosmopolitanism. Through detailed analysis of the *Hippias Major* Hippias' neglected idea, "the natural continuous bodies of being," can be revealed to be interrelated with Empedocles' theory of effluence, based on materialism. Hippias' idea that the nature and status of material objects exist external to us and give their representations to our sensual perception can be interpreted as Hippias' own interpretation of Empedocles' theory for the purpose of explaining the continuity of a physical object throughout all of its parts, i.e. that attributes (πάθῃ) are distributed throughout a physical object.

IV. PROTAGORAS

Life and Work

Protagoras of Abdera in Thrace was the oldest and most famous of the fifth-century Sophists. The date of his birth and death is uncertain, but it is guessed that he lived from 490 B.C. to 421 or 420 B.C. In Plato's *Meno* (91 d-e) Protagoras is said to have lived for seventy years and to have been a Sophist for forty years. In the third century A.D. Philostratus stated(*Lives of the Sophists* I 10) that Protagoras was a child at the time of Xerxes' expedition against Greece(480 B.C.), who in return for the generous hospitality of Protagoras' father permitted the Magi to give him personal tuition(DK 80A2). Philostratus suggested that Protagoras borrowed his agnosticism from the Magi. From the age of thirty Protagoras embarked on a professional life as a Sophist and went from one place to another in the Hellenic cities as a teacher of political art and rhetoric in return for money. Stobaeus(III 29, 80) states that Protagoras said that art was nothing without practice and practice is nothing without art(DK 80B10). And in his work entitled the *Great Logos* Protagoras says: Teaching requires natural endowment and practice; learning must begin in youth(φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται; ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν DK 80B3). His practical teaching, based on the art of persuasion and arguing, aimed at the personal and political careers of prominent young men. Diogenes Laertius(IX 51) states that Protagoras was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other (DK 80A1).

He visited Athens a number of times where he became a friend of Pericles, who, having planned a pan-Hellenic enterprise, chose him to frame a legal code for the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C.. In Athens he also

enjoyed friendship with the wealthy Callias and with Euripides, in whose house he gave a reading of the first part of his book, *On the Gods.*[1]

After the military disaster of the Sicilian expedition in 411 B.C. Protagoras was accused of impiety, owing to his views on religion, by Pythodorus, son of Polyzelus, one of the Four Hundred, which led to his being exiled from Athens at the end of his life and to all his books being burnt in the market place. It is said by numerous authorities that he died by drowning on a sea voyage because of shipwreck after leaving Athens.

Protagoras had wide interests: philosophy, politics, ethics, theology, rhetoric, cultural history and literary criticism. Numerous titles of books are ascribed to him : *The Art of Debating, On Wrestling, On Mathematics, On Government, On Ambition, On the Virtues, On the Original State of Things, On Those in Hades, On Human Errors, Direction, Trial over a Fee, Contradictory Arguments in Two Books.* However, many of these names were associated with him in later centuries and none of his works is extant except in a few quoted fragments.[2] According to Diogenes Laertius (IX 50) Protagoras was the first to distinguish the tenses of the verb, to expound the importance of the right moment, to conduct debates, and to introduce disputants to the tricks of argument(DK 80A1).

We can find a lot of information concerning Protagoras' thought and life in Plato's dialogues. In the *Phaedrus* (267 c) Socrates says that Protagoras wrote a book on writing, the *Correct Diction.* Protagoras also wrote on wrestling and other arts according to Theaetetus in the *Sophists* (232 d). In the *Euthydemus* (286 b-c) Socrates attributes to Protagoras and his followers the contention "how can a man who says nothing be answering him who is speaking? (ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς <ἂν> ἀντιλέγοι;)". Hippias states in the *Hippias Major* (282 e) that he met Protagoras when Protagoras was living in Sicily, where he had a great reputation, and that he was a far older man than himself. Socrates makes mention of Protagoras' man-measure theory once in the *Cratylus* (386 a): man is the measure of all

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1 Diogenes Laertius IX 51 : concerning the gods I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what form they might have, for there are many things to prevent one's knowledge: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of man's life (περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ' ἀδηλοτης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου).

2 A History of Greek Philosophy III, W. K. C. Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 p.264

things ("πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον" εἶναι ἄνθρωπον) and in the *Theaetetus* (152 a) : man is the measure of all things - alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not(πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον" ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, "τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν). Protagoras said too that a soul is nothing apart from its sensations, according to Plato's *Theaetetus* (152).

Protagoras' Thought as Revealed in the *Protagoras*

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates addresses Protagoras as a teacher of culture and excellence, the first to claim payment for his services(349 a). Protagoras admits himself to be a Sophist and educator(317 b). And he says that he might be the father of any one of his listeners, who include Socrates, Prodicus and Hippias (317 c). He boasts of himself that he could improve the state of the young Hippocrates if Hippocrates were to join him(318 a). And he claims that he is better than anyone else at helping a man acquire a good and noble character, worthy indeed of the fee which he charges and even more (328 b). When Socrates and Protagoras meet(318 c), Socrates asks Protagoras what Hippocrates, a well-born and wealthy friend of Socrates who is anxious to make a name for himself in the city, will achieve if he comes to be one of his followers.

To this Protagoras replies that Hippocrates will progress towards a better state if he joins him: the proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man of action (τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν 318 e).[3] Socrates interprets this as a claim to teach the art of politics, and to make men good citizens(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας 319 a) with Protagoras' agreement. However, Socrates is in doubt over this, as he has believed that this kind of art cannot be taught(αὐτὸ

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[3] A similar maintenance of the functions of man who has ἀρετή can also be found in the *Meno* : ... ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ᾗ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τάς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὑτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίταd ακὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπεμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμποιμεν *Meno* 91 a-b.

(τέχνημα) ... οὐ διδακτὸν εἶναι 319 a). At the same time Socrates gives two reasons why he cannot believe that it can be taught and furnished to any man by another: (1) the Athenians, allowing any citizen to speak on questions of the running of the city, treat any citizen's opinion about statesmanship as equally worth listening to as any other's, regardless of qualifications, because they do not think that this is a subject that can be taught, as opposed to the technical matters for learning and teaching on which there are experts; (2) the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens are unable to hand on to others the excellence which they possess(οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν ἣν ἔχουσιν 319 e): Pericles gave his sons the very best education in everything that depends on teaching, but in his own wisdom he neither trains them himself nor hands them over to any other instructor(ἃ δὲ αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτὸς παιδεύει οὔτε τῳ ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν 320 a); they simply browse around on their own like sacred cattle, on the chance of picking up excellence automatically (ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῆ ἀρετῆ 320 a).

Prior to our main argument we must carefully consider Socrates' two reasons. Socrates holds that the Athenians are wise(σοφόι 319 b). What makes him think so? Socrates' first question is based on the fact that the Athenian political system is a participatory democracy which endows the citizens with social equality and the right to take part in decision-making. According to his first reason Socrates' opinion of the Athenians' wisdom is based on the Athenian political system. From this ambiguous pronouncement of Socrates we cannot be sure whether the Athenian political system came to be a participatory democracy on account of the Athenians' wisdom or the Athenians' wisdom is due to the political structure of Athens. For Socrates' second reason we must ask if the question it entails is valid. As we can understand, Socrates' attention is entirely concentrated on the wise and supremely good individual, who possesses excellence regardless of what his son is like. Even if we admit that the ability to give instruction in political excellence depends on possessing it oneself, we cannot be sure that someone who does possess it will be a good teacher of it, for to have political excellence is entirely different from teaching it; that is a kind of art or skill. His second reason is that the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens are unable to hand on to others the excellence which they possess(οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν ἣν ἔχουσιν 319 e). Pericles, for instance, is the wisest of the Athenian citizens; however, he is not the

best teacher even if he possesses excellence. At the same time Protagoras could refute Socrates' position on the grounds that to be a good citizen one is required to have political skills such as the capability for persuasion and negotiation as well as intellectual abilities such as the good judgement of current situations and the ability to predict the future, at which Protagoras is said to be an expert.[4]

At any rate Protagoras has no choice but to answer Socrates' objections, for he is faced with "the choice of admitting that virtue cannot be taught and that his profession is a fraud, or of declaring that the theory of Athenian democracy is false, and his patron, Pericles, is ignorant of the true nature of political excellence".[5] Protagoras replies by means of both a myth and an explanation from 320 c8 to 328 d2. Concerning the great speech that Plato puts into Protagoras' mouth in this dialogue, it has been suggested that Plato is substantially reproducing the views of the historical Protagoras himself, taken from one of his published works, the *On the Original State of Man.*[6] According to C. C. W. Taylor Protagoras' reply can be analysed as follows:[7]

A. Reply to Objection (1) (the Athenians do not recognise experts in political matters);
(i) Story of Prometheus (320 c8 - 322 d5),
(ii) Explanation and expansion of story (322 d5 - 324 d1).

B. Reply to Objection (2) (Good Citizens do not teach their sons to be good : 324 d2 - 328 c2).

C. Summary : (328 c3 - d2).

A (i). *Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures. To create mortals the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the substances which can be compounded from earth and fire. Prometheus and Epimetheus were charged by the gods with the task of equipping them and allotting suitable powers to each kind. By means of*

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4 Plato Protagoras, Translated with Notes by C. C. W. Taylor, Oxford 1976 p.72
5 The Place of Protagoras in the Athenian Public Life, Classical Quarterly 1941 p. 7
6 Guthrie III, p. 63-64
7 C. C. W. Taylor 1972, p.76

begging Prometheus to allow him to carry out the distribution himself Epimetheus was entitled to carry out the allocations of power to created beings; to some creatures he gave strength without speed, while he equipped the weaker kinds with speed; some he armed with weapons, while to the unarmed he gave some other faculty and so contrived means for their preservation. Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of compensation(ἐπανισῶν), taking care, by means of these devices, that no species should be destroyed. He also provided for their comfort against the changing seasons, clothing them with thick hair or hard skins sufficient to ward off the winter's cold, and effective also against heat. He shod them, some with hooves, others with hard and bloodless skin. Next he appointed different sorts of food for them - to some grass of the earth; to others the fruit of trees, to others roots. Some he allowed to gain their nourishment by devouring other animals, and these he made less prolific.

When it came to the turn of man, Epimetheus found that he had used up all means of preservation, leaving man naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed. Prometheus therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena their technical skill, together with fire(τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί 321 d). In this way man acquired sufficient means of life, but had no political wisdom(τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτῃ ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν 321 d). Thus equipped, man, having a share in the portion of the gods, began to work to erect altars and images of the gods because of his divine kinship(διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν 322 a). And by the art which he possessed, man soon discovered articulate speech and names, invented housing and clothes and shoes and bedding, and got food from the earth. At first men lived in scattered groups; then the ravages of wild animals drove them to come together and found fortified cities; however, they were unable to prevent themselves from injuring one another for want of political skill, of which the art of war is a part (πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική 322 b). So Zeus, fearing the total destruction of the human race, sent Hermes to implant in man the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice (αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην 322c); man was thereby entitled to bring order into his cities and create bonds of friendship and union. Justice and respect for others were distributed to all alike, so that each could have his share, unlike what had happened with the distribution of arts. So, by Zeus' law, if

anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two excellences he shall be put to death as a plague to the city.

By means of myth Protagoras explains the origin and development of human society. From the fifth century onwards the rationalistic explanation of the origin of human life and culture was expounded by the natural philosophers(Democritus, Anaxagoras and his pupil Archelus). His view is based on human progress(evolution of society) as an inference from pre-Socratic physical theories about the evolution of life from inanimate matters, which were a reaction against earlier mythical explanations of human degeneration. Nature cannot be a sufficient condition for the organization of community, so something (political excellence) is to be added to the state of nature(innate capacity). Also we can find another piece of evidence in favour of the view that Protagoras is a supporter of the natural philosophers' theory: his account of how the gods formed them(mortal creatures) within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the substances which are compounded from earth and fire(τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός μείξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῇ κεράννυται 320 d) corresponds to a similar account by Empedocles in his surviving fragment 9.[8] The gods at first made all animal forms including man, and later the two Titans gave powers to them. Natural conditions had been given to them before they came out into the light. Human development can be classified into two stages according to this myth; the first stage of human development can be characterised as the period of technical civilisation for which Prometheus supplied the equipment[9]; the second stage as the period of political art(αἰδώς καὶ δίκη). From the first stage we can see that Protagoras' idea is based on the equilibrium i.e. well balanced order that controls the world of living beings according to Epimetheus' distribution "on a principle of compensation (ἐπανισῶν)". But, as Guthrie puts it, "nature's

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8 Empedocles Fragment 9 : And when they (sc. roots) are mixed in the form of a man and come to the air, or in the form of the race of wild beasts or of plants or of birds, then they say that this comes into being; but when they are separated, they call this wretched fate (οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἴ-κωνται ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων ἠὲ κατ' οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τὸ -λέγουσι γενέσθαι, εὖτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ' αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον ' DK 31B9) Text and Translation are from *The Presocratic Philosophers*, G.S Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield, Cambridge Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1983 p.291).

9 The Fragility of Goodness, M. C. Nussbaum pp. 94-95 In her book she contrasts the term τέχνη with the term τύχη, in that the term τέχνη is closely associated with practical judgement or wisdom with foresight, planning, and prediction; it is a deliberate application of human intelligence to some part of the world, yielding some control over the term τύχη.

device for preservation seems to operate only at species level and to ignore the individual".[10] So skills in the diverse arts and crafts(wisdom) were distributed among human beings, not the same skills to all men, but different skills to different men. Reason is an essential distinction of human beings, by which they can make use of fire and technical instruments and control subject matter. In this stage the social nature of human beings is in the state of the imperfect individual. Although technical arts sufficient for the existence of human beings were "innate in men as rational creatures" who had practical intelligence, the moral qualities necessary for social and political life were not, but were only acquired after the dangers of living widely dispersed had been experienced.[11] Protagoras might think that the individual's inner mind consists of anarchistic inclinations for his own benefit. The nature of the individual is not self-sufficient, so he must create a political community which can be self-sufficient and complete. Protagoras indicates that the difference between mankind and animals lies in the possession of a social consciousness, which animals whose instinct is to get the better of the others lack; this social consciousness operates by forming communities under laws for the restraint of aggression. Communities can be constituted only by human beings who can use language for discussion and mutual concession.[12] However, it is ambiguous whether political excellence is a pre-condition of the political community or a product of it.

However, in the second stage, the ordering principles(αἰδώς τε καὶ δίκη) are distributed to men on a different basis from the technical skills: all men should share in them, but this does not mean that these two ordering principles are possessed in equal measure by all. We can explain this by saying that the powers of animals and the skill of human beings in crafts naturally belong to them, for they were given to them before they came out of the earth.[13] In contrast to this first stage, all men, in the second stage, possess some share in justice and political excellence, but this share is not possessed by nature, but gained through instruction and practice(323 c3 - 324 d1), for these two principles are acquired after human beings have come into existence. Through the medium of two moral requirements(αἰδώς καὶ δίκη)

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10 In the Beginning, W. K. C. Guthrie, Metheun & Co Ltd. 1957p. 86

11 Guthrie IV, p. 217

12 Isocrates III 5f. treats language as the essential condition of law and art.

13 Protagoras' Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the *Protagoras* of Plato, JHS 73 1953 p.42-43

imposed by the intervention of Zeus, the human mind can be developed in such a way as to render coexistence and culture possible. Protagoras upholds Hesiod's idea(the *Works and Days* 276-280) that justice is Zeus' gift to mankind, and the quality which distinguishes them from animals that eat one another. As Protagoras argues "man is the measure of all things", he thinks that norms are superimposed upon the original or natural state of affairs by man, but with the help of Zeus.[14] The main function of human political excellence is to live in harmony with each other in a political community. This means that the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice(αἰδῶς τε καὶ δίκη) constitute political skill itself, for these two moral principles are the necessary and sufficient basis for the existence of the political community.[15] In addition to this Zeus ordered Hermes to distribute these two moral principle to all men (ἐπι πάντας ... καὶ πάντας μετεχόντων) and to lay it down as his law that if anyone were incapable of acquiring his share of these two moral principles he should be put to death as a plague to the city. However, these principles were not distributed in the same degree among the Athenian citizens. The possession of them differs in degree, for Protagoras basically presupposes the differences of human intellectual abilities: as for the people, they have no real understanding of their own, but only praise what their leaders tell them(317 a); some citizens have more correct opinions, others less(322 d); but why should we look into the opinions of the common man, who says whatever comes into his head? (353 a). If we assume that all men are to be regarded as sharing equally in these two moral principles, we can guess that all Athenian citizens would be equally qualified to give advice with equal abilities, and would throw the Athenian government into a state of confusion, for nobody could surpass any other citizen. Even though the citizens of the political community have unequal abilities and attributes, they have equal rights before the laws. Also if these two moral principles were distributed equally among the Athenian citizens, there was no reason for Zeus to lay it down as his law that if anyone were incapable of acquiring his share of these two moral principles he should be put to death as a plague to the city. From this it can be deduced as a matter of course that these two principles were not given to man by nature.

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14 The Open Society and its EnemiesI, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Reprinted 1973 p. 66

15 Kerferd 1953 p. 43

Let us interpret the evolution of the political community of Protagoras' myth in another way. If we believe that he was an agnostic, as his extant fragment talking of the gods tends to show, then we can remove the role of the gods from his myth. As we can read in our present text(321 c-d) man comes into the world endowed with reason. Reason is said to have the mind's power of determining right and truth and drawing conclusions. In this respect the role of Prometheus can be interpreted as human Forethought(foresight and anticipation), whereas the role of Epimetheus can be interpreted as human Afterthought(reflection). The development of human society seems to be the synthesis of human foresight and human reflection i.e. the process of trial and error in human mental and physical actions, which leads to the achievement of a higher quality. The contradictions in thought, nature, and society are driven into a further phase of development by a kind of necessity just as in Hegel's dialectical movements. The reason why contradictions occur is that human Forethought cannot always predict for the future, so after mistakes have been made the other function of the human mind, Afterthought, reflects on what mistake has been made, and at the same time tries to correct and modify it; but Afterthought takes time to perceive a truth. The problem of the distribution of skill in the arts results from the mistaken role of Afterthought, whose main function must be the examination of Forethought's action. Human life takes its origin from the state of nature in which Forethought and Afterthought are in conflict with each other for the higher application and realisation of nature. Human reason, which has this inner contradiction, is moving towards the development of its own sufficiency. So man is qualified to have knowledge of technical skills together with fire, which is how Protagoras characterises potential ability. It means that natural necessity leads men to discover the means of life by use of the technical skills. So the individual man has awakened to a control of the external world by means of his reason. In this state human beings live in scattered groups using languages, living in houses, wearing clothes and cultivating the soil. However, human desire cannot be satisfied with life in this natural state, for men are devoured by wild animals and killed by each other. Protagoras posits that the state of nature is anarchic, everyone set against everyone else, as Hobbes thinks. Uncontrolled and brutish life forced men to combine for survival, and to realise that communal life is impossible without submission to laws. By hard experience man came to learn to act justly and respect the rights of others and so to constitute political communities. By realising the necessity

of moral principles, man recognised that he should subjugate his self-seeking desires to respect for norms, for he has found from experience that he cannot live safely in scattered groups. The social nature of human beings arises from the state of the imperfect individual, so the human mind is driven by necessity to create a political community which is perfect and self-sufficient. Struggles among people are the prerequisite for the existence of moral principles, by which they can minimise the sacrifice they need to make for their mutual survival. This progress has been achieved through the synthesis of the subject(human reason) and its object(nature). So, as Untersteiner says, man stands within the world of universal nature which represents the victory of the human collective reason which generalises.[16] In Protagoras' thinking man's development of a nature(φύσις) which is imperfect and deficient has eventually been transformed into the political community which, being perfect and complete, set up the laws(νόμοι 326 d). In the world of Protagoras man's life is not subject to his natural state, rather it has overcome the difficulty of nature by the practice of Forethought and Afterthought, and has come to control it by establishing laws.

A (ii). *Thus it is that in a debate involving skill in building, or any other craft, the Athenians believe that few are capable of giving advice. But when the subject of their consultations involves political excellence(εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 322 e -323 a), which must always follow the path of justice and moderation(ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης323 a), the two qualities amounting to the excellence of a citizen, they listen to every man's opinion, for they think that everyone must share in this kind of excellence; otherwise the state could not exist. Another proof that all men do in fact believe that everyone shares a sense of justice and civic excellence(μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 323 a) is provided by the fact that, even if someone is known to be wicked, yet if he publicly tells the truth about himself, his truthfulness is regarded as mad. People do not regard excellence as innate or automatic, but as something to be acquired by instruction and taking thought(διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας παραγίγνεσθαι 324 c); for no one is angered by the faults which are believed to be due to nature or chance, such as being ugly, dwarfish or weak. In the fields of injustice, irreligion and everything that is contrary to civic excellence(ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς*

16 The Sophists, M. Untersteiner, Translated by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954. p.63

323 e - 324 a) indignation and admonition are universal, evidently because of a belief that such excellence can be acquired by taking thought or by instruction. So punishment is inflicted on the wrongdoer as a deterrent for the sake of the future, to prevent him from doing wrong again. This argument therefore shows that it is possible to impart and teach excellence.

In reply to Socrates' first question Protagoras proves the reason why the Athenians listen to everyone's opinion on political wisdom, for they think that everybody shares a sense of justice and civic excellence(323 b). So if a man declares himself unjust, he will be regarded as mad, due to this conviction held by the Athenians. In addition to this he demonstrates that the Athenians do not regard excellence as innate or automatic, but as something acquired by instruction and taking thought. And they believe that excellence can be instilled by education, indignation, admonition and punishment which is inflicted as a deterrent for the future.

B. *The second objection is given not in the form of a myth, but as an argument(logos). In the following argument Protagoras answers the questions: how all men come to have their share in excellence; why good citizens cannot teach their sons excellence; why the sons of outstanding citizens so often fail to show the excellence of their fathers. If there is justice and moderation and holiness of life (δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι 325 a), or, to concentrate these into a single concrete concept, excellence(ἀρετῆν), it is this in which all must share and which must enter into every man's actions whatever other occupation he chooses to learn and practice; anyone who lacks it, man, woman, or child, must be instructed and corrected until by punishment he or she is reformed, and whoever does not respond to punishment and instruction must be expelled from the state or put to death as incurable. Good citizens teach and admonish their sons from childhood and throughout their lives. As soon as a child can understand what is said to him, his nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself vie with each other to make him as good as possible, instructing him through everything he does or says. If he is not obedient, they try to straighten him out with threats and beatings, like a warped and twisted plank. In school, children's education lays more emphasis at first on their behaviour than on their letters or their music. Later they are educated to learn good poems by heart containing much admonition and many eulogies, and panegyrics of the good man, so that they may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like them.*

Also the music masters make the minds of children familiar with rhythms and melodies, and by analogous methods instill self-control and deter the young from evil-doing, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life. The citizen's life is an unceasing progressive process of learning goodness. All this is done by those best able to do it - that is, by the wealthy - and it is their sons who start their education at the earliest age and continue it the longest. When they have finished with teachers, the state compels them to learn the laws and use them as a pattern for their life, lest left to themselves they should drift aimlessly. We know how, when children have not yet learned how to write well, the writing master traces outlines with a pencil before giving them the slate, and makes them follow the lines as a guide for their own writing; similarly the state sets up the laws which are the inventions of good law-givers of ancient times, and compels the citizens to rule and be ruled in accordance with them(ὥς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὑρήματα, κατὰ τούτους ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 326 d 5-7).

Excellence is something in which no one may be a layman if a state is to exist at all. As in the case of flute-playing, differences of achievement in excellence are to be explained by different levels of natural aptitude on the part of the students. The general application of the education would lead to differences between the individual students, based on their natural aptitude. The son of a good flute player would often be a poor one, and vice versa, but at any rate would be good enough in comparison with someone who knew nothing about flute playing at all. The man who in a civilised and humane society appears to us the most wicked must be thought just if one has to judge him in comparison with someone who has neither education nor a court of justice nor laws nor any constraint compelling them to be continually heedful of excellence(, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 327 c). In Athenian society the teachers of excellence are just like the teachers of the Greek language, it is very difficult to find who they really are. So that if we can find someone who is even a little better than the others at advancing us on the road to excellence, we must be content. Protagoras claims that he is one of these, rather better than anyone else at helping a man acquire a good and noble character.

Protagoras answers Socrates' second question by means of an argument(λόγος). Protagoras argues that excellence is that in which all must share and which must enter into every man's actions whatever other occupation he chooses to learn and practice. His presupposition is that the basis of all human activities is excellence, so he argues that excellence can be taught by all the ubiquitous forces of the community from childhood to old age: parents, nurses, music teachers, grammar teachers, and the agents of laws and punishment. Protagoras intends punishment not as a means of brutal revenge, but as a means of education and improvement to protect and defend the political community. The aim of punishment is to encourage the sense of right as well as to restrain anti-social activity. Why does Protagoras forbid the individual from carrying out personal retaliation? The main reason might be that an individual's intention to carry out revenge is not based on the laws of the community, which deal with the justice of the community and not with personal wrath. In Protagoras' society τὰ δικαία is identified with τὰ νόμιμα (327a and 327b) in that the laws of the political community play the part of a moral teacher and urge citizens to observe the laws. Laws promote the citizens' mutual safety and interest, which are the regulating guides for a political community : ἡ πόλις ..... καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι(326 d). In this community the greater emphasis is laid on the interest of the whole community, which determines the standards for behaviour of the individual, rather than on the interest of the individual. Personal morality is nothing other than social devotion to duty in the observance of the laws. Protagoras asserts that life in Athens is a kind of education in the excellences required for community life just as it might be an education in the native language. It is therefore very difficult to find the teachers of it, for those who teach it have no special names, as many Sophists before himself adopted a disguise and worked under cover(316 d - 317 a). Protagoras' argument implies that one's political excellence can be acquired as a result of continuous practice, conscious or unconscious, within one's own society, not by nature. All citizens of the political community possess moral excellence which is the basis of the community's survival and existence. The individual and the political community are closely interdependent. The moral inclination of the individual equips the political community for survival, and the political community cultivates the

moral sense of its members through laws and customs.[17] Also within the community a man can develop his characteristic natural aptitude by himself; by doing this he can carry out his work efficiently. In this respect Protagoras identifies himself as the successor of the educational tradition of Homer, Hesiod and other older poets, who dealt with the ideal of human qualities. The wisest and best of the Athenian citizens too believe that excellence can be taught, both publicly and privately(325 b), and throw all their energy into it. And the reason why many of their sons turn out worthless is the lesser natural aptitude of their sons for learning excellence. Against Socrates' view that excellence cannot be teachable and excellence depends on the chance of picking it up automatically(320 a), Protagoras lays emphasis on moral teachings being instilled into one's mind(326), as well as on the unconscious teaching of social tradition and customs. Basically the acquisition of excellence according to Protagoras comes through natural aptitude, instruction and taking thought, as we can find in his surviving fragment: Teaching requires endowment and practice; learning must begin in youth(φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται; ἀπὸ νεοτητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν DK 80B3). The relationship between the influence of natural aptitude and deliberate education which are conducive to the acquirement of ἀρετή is a salient point in his educational philosophy. Protagoras' position is the opposite one to that of the aristocracy, which stressed the importance of one's own nature(ἀνδρεία ... ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροπιάς τῶν ψυχῶν γιγνεται 351b). Natural aptitude does not depend on heredity, as we can see from the case of the flute player. The possession of ἀρετή does not depend on noble birth, but all can possess it who can afford it. From this we can understand that Protagoras is a teacher of political excellence as well as a teacher of moral and social values i.e. prudential and utilitarian ends are connected with ethical and social purposes.

C. *Protagoras claims to have shown by the myth and argument that excellence is teachable and that the Athenians believe it to be so, and that at the same time it is quite natural for the sons of good fathers to turn out good-for-nothing, and vice versa.*

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17 Let us think of Glaucon's account - *Republic* II 358e -359a. And Aristotle also lays emphasis on the important factor for the permanent existence of the political community.- *Pol.* III. 6. 1278b

Above all we must examine whether or not Protagoras can justify himself as a teacher of political excellence(ἀρετή), thus refuting Socrates by his myth and argument. The very thing which Socrates believes unteachable is the subject of Protagoras' teaching: the proper care of a man's personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker and as a man of action. Then Socrates identifies Protagoras' subject with the art of politics and with a promise to make men good citizens(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας 319 a), and gives two reasons why he does not believe that excellence can be taught(319 b - 320 b). The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no differences are made between the moral terms and the technical terms. It is pointed out that Protagoras does not "make out sufficient justification for his claim to be able to teach statesmanship as a speciality".[18] And J. S. Morrison argues that Protagoras' argument is "based entirely on the ambiguity of of the phrase ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται".[19] Adkins also points out in his article *ἀρετή, τέχνη, Democracy and Sophists* (JHS 1973 p. 3-12) that Protagoras is confusing co-operative excellences(αἰδώς καὶ δίκη) with administrative and political skills(πολιτικὴ τέχνη). When Protagoras tells Socrates that from himself Hippocrates will learn only what he has come to learn(318 e), this means that Protagoras will teach whatever the pupil asks for according to the pupil's question(*ad hominem*). Protagoras' answers take up the same position as Socrates' viewpoint, as Protagoras affirms above : (a) Socrates identified the art of politics(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην)[20] with the excellence of politics(τῶν πολιτῶν ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν); (b) the viewpoint expressed in Protagoras' myth and argument concerns the Athenian political community. Morrison also argues that "the 'political virtue' about which he has latterly been arguing is not 'being good at politics' but good citizenship"(ibid). But we must note that Socrates identifies Protagoras' subject with the art of politics and with a promise to make men good citizens(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας 319 a). It is Socrates who identifies Protagoras'

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18 Plato : The Man and His Work, A. E. Taylor, 1952 Reprinted p. 243

19 Morrison 1941, p.8

20 The term "wisdom" in this explanation has a strong implication of the meaning "technical skill" as Protagoras uses this term in the phrase "skill in the arts, together with fire(τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί 319 d); for want of political skill (πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνη οὔπω εἶχον 322 b); council involves political virtue(εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 323 a); a sense of justice and civic virtue(μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 323 a); injustice, irreligion and everything that is contrary to civic virtue(ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 324 a).

subject with a promise to make men good citizen. In addition to that we must keep in mind that Socrates treats the moral term ἀρετή as a kind of skill, as we can see from the phrase "τοῦτο(τέχνημα) , ..., διδακτὸν εἶναι"(319 b). So we can say that it is Socrates who changed the subject of their argument from Protagoras' profession to "the art of politics and with a promise to make men good citizens(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας). At any rate the main problem with which Protagoras is confronted is the possibility of an identification of excellence(ἀρετή) with a kind of art(τέχνη), for Socrates thinks that only a kind of art can be taught, so how can citizenship be taught: an art is a special skill, possessed by only a few members of the society, and passed on from one member to the next, usually by apprenticeship; excellence(ἀρετή) is not confined to any one occupational group, nor by the fifth century to any one class, and thus it was uncertain how it was transmitted, if indeed it was not inborn.[21] Accordingly, we must consider whether or not Protagoras' thinking is consistent through his myth and argument. Let us examine his use of terms to see whether or not they are consistently used in his myth and argument.

A(i)A In the myth of Prometheus we must note that Protagoras puts the meaning as the term technical wisdom(τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν 321 d) in the same category of the term technical art(τέχνη). Also we can find the same usage in 321 d(τὸν βίον σοφίαν and τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν). At 321e(τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην) Protagoras uses the term technical art(τέχνη) in lieu of the term technical wisdom(σοφία). And in the second stage of the myth Protagoras uses his terms as follows: by art human beings soon discovered articulate speech and names(φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ 322 a6); their practical skills were sufficient to provide food(ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς 322 b3); for they did not possess the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part(πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμικὴ 322 b5); not having political art(οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τεχνην 322 b7); as the practical skills were distributed(ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηται 322 c5); if only a few shared in them as in the other skills(εἰ ὀλιγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν 322 d5). In the myth of Prometheus Protagoras makes no differences between σοφία and τέχνη; however, when he uses the term τεχνη alone, it definitely means a kind of practical skill. And we must keep in mind that Protagoras does not use the moral term ἀρετή in the myth

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[21] The Purpose of Plato's *Protagoras*, M. Gargarin, Transactions of the American Philological Association 100 1969 133 - 164 p. 142

of Prometheus. But the art of politics(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην) is used three times in the meaning of excellence in politics(τῶν πολιτῶν ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν) in the viewpoint of Socrates. The terms αἰδῶς τε καὶ δίκη are sent from Zeus to be the principles of organization of cities and the bond of friendship(322 c). The terms αἰδῶς τε καὶ δίκη are "human forces which render association possible, but as such are only *ministering* powers, for they serve as ordering principles maintaining the balance of things".[22] And these terms are indeed "converted to σωφροσυνν̀η τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη"(323 a3, c1-2 and d5).[23]

A (ii) In this explanation and expansion of myth Protagoras uses his terms as follows: in carpentry or any other skill(περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ ... ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς 322 d7); to consideration of how to do well in running city(εἰς συμβουλὴν πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 323 a); which must proceed entirely through justice and soundness of mind(ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι και σωφρσύνης 323a); to share in that sort of excellence(μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς 323 a3); share in justice and the rest of the excellence of a citizen(μετέχειν δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἰέναι καὶ σωφροσύνης 323 a2); in the case of the other skills(ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς 323 a7); any other skill(ἄλλην ἡντινοῦν τέχνην 323 a9); in the case of justice and the rest of the excellence of a citizen(ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ 323 b2); advice about this sort of excellence(περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμβουλον 323 c 4-5); one such quality is injustice and impiety and in a word whatever is the opposite of the excellence of a citizen(ὧν ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία ἡ ἀσεβέια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ ἐναντίον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς 323e -324d); excellence is something to be handed on(παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν 324 a6); excellence can be produced by education(παιδευτὴν εἶναι ἀρετήν 324 b6); excellence can be taught(διδακτὸν ἀρετήν 324 c5). It is worth noticing that he consistently identifies the term ἀρετή with the term τέχνη, which is used in the same sense to A(i). The term τέχνη's meaning is confined to that of practical skill in this section, whereas, when the term ἀρετή is used alone, its meaning represents political excellence i.e it is a moral term. And he suggests that the opposite of the excellence of a citizen is injustice and impiety. In this respect it is evident that δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη are the main parts of political excellence. Like Socrates, he identifies excellence in politics(τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν) with the art of politics(τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην).

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22 Protagoras and The Greek Community, D. Loenen, Amsterdam p. 8

23 Protagoras or Plato? II, J. Maguire, Phronesis 22 1973, p. 119

B. In reply to Socrates' second reason Protagoras uses his terms as follows: as far as concerns the quality in which they themselves excel(ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀρετὴν ἀγαθοι 324 d5); justice and soundness of mind and holiness-human excellence, in a word - if this is the quality which everyone must have and always display(δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι, καὶ συλλαήβδην ἓν αὐτὸ προσαγορεύω εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν 325a1-3); brought up to be good(μηδὲ θεραπευθεῖσιν εἰς ἀρετήν 325 c5); such trouble is taken about excellence both by the state and by private individuals(τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ 326 e1); if excellence can be taught?(εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; 326 e4); excellence is something of which no one must be ignorant(τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, ... , οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν 327 a); from another's justice and excellence(ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή 327b); compelling them to be heedful of excellence(ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 327 d2); the craft they learn from their father(αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν 328 a2-3); it is just the same with excellence and all the rest(οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς και τῶν ἄλλων πάντων 328 a7); to lead forward to excellence(προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν 328 b). In the course of his argument he demonstrates that his sense of the term ἀρετή can be identified with "δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι". Later Protagoras confirms to Socrates that justice, self-control and holiness(ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης) are parts of excellence which is a unified entity(329 d). And he does not use the term τέχνη in the area of morality. For the purpose of making his moral term clear he differentiates it from the technical term as he confines the term τέχνη to the area of practical skills.

As we have seen above in the myth of Prometheus(Ai), Protagoras makes no differences between σοφία and τέχνη; however, when he uses the term τεχνη alone, it definitely means a kind of practical skill. He does not use σοφία to explain, for he wants to show how the technical term, when it is used with the adjective, can be identified with the moral term without losing its original meaning in the viewpoint of Socrates. In this respect we can realise that the term σοφία, which can be used of practical skill(*Theages* 216d), is employed as a mediate meaning between the term τεχνη and the term ἀρετη. However, in the explanation and expansion of the myth(Aii), Protagoras consistently identifies the term ἀρετή with the term τέχνη only if the term τέχνη is used with an adjective. The term τέχνη's meaning, when it is used alone, is confined to that of practical skill in this section, whereas, when the term ἀρετή is used alone, its meaning represents political

excellence, i.e. the moral term. So Protagoras put the two moral terms δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη in the same category as the term ἀρετή. In the course of his argument(B) he does not use the term τέχνη in the area of morality any more. He might think that it has been sufficiently demonstrated how the moral term can be interchangeable with the technical term. So he affirms that his sense of the term ἀρετή can be identified with "δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι". In his argument Protagoras' viewpoint is centred on the moral term, so he differentiates it from the technical term as he confines the term τέχνη to the area of practical skills. It is clear that, even though Protagoras identifies the moral term with the technical term in his myth, his use of the moral and technical term is consistent throughout his myth and argument, for when the term τέχνη and the term ἀρετή are used alone, their original meaning has not been changed and has been used coherently.

We have examined Protagoras' terminology and seen that, when it is used exclusively, it is consistent in his myth and argument. Now we must investigate whether or not Protagoras explains his avowal to be a teacher of citizenship coherently. In the myth of Protagoras the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice(αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην), which constitute the excellence of citizenship, are distributed in order to promote the existence of order and the union of friendship in political communities. The main function of this political excellence is to live in harmony with each other in a political community. This means that the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice(αἰδῶς τε καὶ δίκη) constitute the necessary and sufficient basis for the existence of the political community. It means that, so far as a man is an Athenian citizen, he has a share of political excellence(good citizenship). However, these principles were not distributed in the same degree, for the Athenian citizens had unequal attributes and abilities. It is good evidence for justifying himself the teacher of political excellence. In reply to Socrates' first question Protagoras proves the reason why the Athenians listen to everyone's opinion on political wisdom, for they think that everybody shares a sense of justice and civic excellence(323 b). So if a man declares himself unjust, he will be regarded as mad, due to this conviction held by the Athenians. In answer to Socrates' second question about why the wisest and best of the Athenian citizens are unable to hand on to others the excellence which they possess(οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταυτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν ἣν ἔχουσιν), Protagoras gives as the reason why many of their sons turn out worthless the lesser natural aptitude of their sons for

learning excellence, against Socrates' view that excellence cannot be teachable and excellence depends on the chance of picking it up automatically(320 a). Protagoras lays emphasis on moral teachings being instilled into one's mind(326), as well as on the unconscious teaching of social tradition and customs. Protagoras' argument implies that one's political excellence can be acquired as a result of continuous practice, conscious or unconscious, within one's own society, not by nature. All citizens of the political community possess moral excellence which is the basis of the community's survival and existence.

Conclusion

As we have seen above, when replying to Socrates' two questions, Protagoras has given a coherent answer to Socrates' two questions through both myth and an argument and showed that good citizenship is a kind of political art which as a kind of theory is to be applied in practice. As both of them(Protagoras and Socrates) agree, if political excellence(good citizenship) can be identified with art(τέχνη), then it can be taught. Also Protagoras has shown that political excellence, as a kind of art, can be manifested according to one's natural aptitude, but needs practice and taking thought, for a good natural aptitude neglected is not so valuable as a poor aptitude given practice.[24] The gist of Protagoras' reply is that he has shown what excellence really is and why it can be teachable, as Socrates grants when he says: I used to think that there was no human diligence available to men for making good men(ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται), but now I am convinced(328 e). Protagoras has refuted Socrates' assertion that his contentions and assumptions cannot be justified, and shown that "Socrates' fundamental assumption, viz. that what the Athenians believe is true, actually leads to Protagoras' conclusion".[25] Socrates tried to confuse him by means of his fallacy, but Protagoras successfully explains his theory of the teachability of political excellence and his avowal to be a teacher of political excellence(good citizenship). As Kerferd says "if there is any confusion it is due to Socrates not to Protagoras".[26] And we must note that Protagoras, in opposition to the other Sophists(Hippias, Antiphon and

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24 The *Palamedes* of Gorgias shows the relations between knowledge and good action (ἀρετή); εἰ μὲν οὖν σοφὸς εἰμι, οὐκ ἥμαρτον ' εἰ δ' ἥμαρτον, οὐ σοφός εἰμι.

25 C. C. W. Taylor 1976 p. 100

26 Kerferd 1953, p. 44

Callicles), is consistently in the position of the supporter of νόμος which is interrelated with his relativism; moral standards are regulated according to the current respectability of a society. Protagoras seems to suggest that, in so far as a political community does exist, the laws of that community satisfy the minimum standard of moral requirements for its survival, which benefits every citizen.

V. THRASYMACHUS

Life and Works

Thrasymachus came from Chalcedon in Bithynia, a colony of Megara. In Aristophanes' *Banqueters* which was produced in 427 B.C., he is made fun of as a quibbling rhetorician, and this proves that the time of his activities in Athens was before that of Gorgias. The *Speech for the People of Larissa* is one of Thrasymachus' great speeches which might have been written under the rule of Archelaus of Macedon, who came to power in 413 B.C. The period of his prime activity falls in the last three decades of the fifth century. Neoptolemus of Parium saw his tomb at Chalcedon two centuries later (DK 85A8). Nothing else is known to us about his personal life.

Cicero mentions in his *On the Orator* (III 32) that Prodicus, Thrasymachus and Protagoras at once wrote and spoke about the nature of the physical world(DK 85A9). According to the Souda there is a list of his writings: Deliberate speeches(συμβουλευτικούς), Textbook on Rhetoric(τέχνην ῥητορικήν), Trivia(παίγνια), and Subjects for Speeches(ἀφορμὰς ῥητορικάς).[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus(Demosthenes III) cites a part of a speech Thrasymachus wrote under the title of *On the Constitution* (ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ), which is the opening of a speech to the Athenian Assembly (DK 85B1). The subject of this speech is Athenian politics in the period of the Peloponnesian war, which were in a confusion of distress, uncertainty and anxiety. The writer of this speech reflects on the past, when their ancestors administered the city's affairs in a correct fashion and with an honest political life-style. The speech is of mainly political interest as showing a conservative and oligarchic aristocrat's political philosophy. Thrasymachus could not have delivered it in the Athenian Assembly, for he was a foreigner.

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1 Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker II - H. Diels/ W. Kranz, p. 321

The speech should be regarded as a species of pamphlet, for circulation and for recitation before chosen audiences.[2]

Thrasymachus was a forensic orator and a teacher of rhetorical style. Aristotle regards him as the rhetorical successor to Tisias in his *On Sophistical Refutation* (XXXIV 183b 29). Theophrastus considered him the inventor of the middle style, an amalgam of the severe and the simple, and the originator of a diction which is wholly appropriate and indeed essential to forensic speeches and to every genuine contest(DK 85A3). Plato says in his *Phaedrus* 267c-d, "he(Thrasymachus) mastered tearful and moving speeches on old age and poverty ... and he was a great one for enraging many and charming the enraged again by his spells". Dionysius of Halicarnassus(Isaeus 20) mentions that Thrasymachus was clear-cut and precise, formidable in invention and in giving his meaning distinct and striking expression; but his works are all technical or showpieces(DK 85A13). He demonstrated the use of period and clause, and introduced the current style of rhetoric. And he tried out new departures in the use of rhythm, especially the Paean.

He was a Sophist in the recognised sense, in that he charged for his instruction (*Republic* 337d), travelled to foreign cities, and though specializing in rhetoric was prepared to answer ethical questions also.[3] Hermias, the Christian commentator on Plato, quotes him in one of his writings: "he (Thrasymachus) wrote something to this effect: that the gods take no notice of human affairs, or they would not have left out justice, which is the greatest of goods among men; For we see that men make no use of it (ἔγραψεν ἐν λόγῳ ἑαυτοῦ τοιοῦτόν τι, ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ οὐχ ὁρῶσι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθῶν παρεῖδον τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ταύτῃ μὴ χρωμένους DK 85B8)." This represents an idealistic way of thinking about justice. His teachings on justice are mentioned in another of Plato's dialogues, the *Cleitophon* (410 d-e), in which Cleitophon takes a position on the side of Thrasymachus and attacks Socrates on the ground that Socrates really wants to avoid addressing him in regard to justice and attaining it. Consequently Cleitophon will betake himself to Thrasymachus and anyone else who can give this instruction. In the *Phaedrus* (267 d) Plato

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2 Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, H. D Rankin, Barns and Noble Books 1983. p. 61

describes Thrasymachus as a man who is unbeatable at casting aspersions and dispelling them (διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὀθενδὴ κράτιστος).

Thrasymachus' Thought as Revealed in the *Republic* I

The main argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the *Republic* I is about identifying what "the just" is. The main theme of this dialogue is to identify what his conception of justice and the reciprocal coherence of his suggestions on justice are. Whether or not Thrasymachus has a mutually consistent view on justice in his sayings, which has come to be a central matter of debate in recent years, is pinpointed as the main problem of interpreting and understanding his ideas. Is he fundamentally confused, and driven from one position of difficulty to another by Socrates' criticism? Is he a hasty and confused thinker as J. Annas says?[4] Or is Thrasymachus a mere child in argument as B. Jowett contends?[5] Is Thrasymachus, on the other hand, merely drawing out what appear to him to be the logical consequences of Greek values as A. W. H. Adkins argues?[6] Or, as Harrison argues, is Thrasymachus manipulated by Plato consistently to meet his own artistic requirements?[7] On the other hand it has been suggested that Thrasymachus "has advanced two different criteria of justice ... without appreciating that they do not necessarily coincide".[8] Yet P. Nicholson judges that "he is also shown to have considerable self-control and integrity, for he extricates himself rather well from a situation where everything is weighted against him."[9] Plato's hatred for him is "plain enough from the outbursts of rudeness and bad temper in which he makes him indulge".[10] Is it Plato's intention to reveal that the rhetorician cannot reason logically? He is depicted as rude and arrogant, boasting that he can give a better answer about justice, accusing Socrates of hypocrisy and pretence, and revealing his shallowness by asking for money. Our task is to concentrate on explaining what Thrasymachus really intends to say on

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4 An Introduction to Plato' Republic, J. Annas, Oxford 1981 p. 38

5 The Dialogue of Plato, Translated into English with Analysis and Introductions II- B. Jowett, Oxford 1871, p.6

6 Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece - A. W. H. Adkins, p.119

7 Plato's manipulation of Thrasymachus - E. L. Harrison, Phoenix 21 1967 pp. 27 - 39

8 Plato's *Republic*: A Philosophical Commentary, R. C. Cross and W.D Woozley, Macmillan 1964 p. 41

9 Unravelling Thrasymachus' Arguments in the *Republic* - P. P. Nicholson, Phronesis 19 1974 pp. 210 - 232

10 A History of Greek Philosophy III, Guthrie, Cambridge University Press 1969 p. 297

justice and the consistency of his accounts of justice in this dialogue. So it is necessary for us to note the three propositions of Thrasymachus on justice in this dialogue as they are generally suggested to be:

A. Justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger (... εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον) (338 c).

B. Justice is obedience to the law (τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν ... ὑπο τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν) (340 b).

C. Justice is the good of another (ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι) (343 c).

According to Kerferd the position of Thrasymachus has been classified in four ways:[11]

I. Moral obligation has no real existence, but is an illusion in men's minds (Ethical Nihilism) - Burnet, Taylor, Cornford, Barker, Nettleship, and Joseph.

II. Moral obligation has no existence apart from legal enactment (Legalism) - Grote, Gomperz, Lindsay, Bosanquet and Winspear.

III. Moral obligation has real independent existence, and arises from the nature of man (Natural Right)[12] - Stallbaum.

IV. Men always do in fact pursue what they think to be their own interests and must from their nature do so (Psychological Egoism) - Joseph.

D. C. Reeve analyses the position thus: "the majority (Barker, Crombie, Cross & Woozley, Guthrie, Irwin and Nettleship) favour A; a good number of recent writers (Annas, Henderson, Kerferd, Nicholson and Sparshott) support C;

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[11] The doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*, G. B. Kerferd, Durham University Journal 40, 1947 pp. 19 - 27

[12] J. Annas says (in her book p. 37) that this is immoralism. The immoralist holds that an important question about justice is to be answered by showing that injustice is better.

while B is the minority candidate, supported in print by only a few hardy souls (Hourani and Anscombe)."[13]

Let us analyse the conversation between Socrates and Thrasymachus in more detailed ways. Above all we must consider each problematical matter in all its aspects, and later we will discuss whether Thrasymachus' position can be justified by his own argument or not. We will also discuss how we can find a way to justify Thrasymachus' position.

I. In answer to Socrates' question "what is justice?" Thrasymachus claims that **"justice is nothing other than the interest (advantage) of the stronger"**(... εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον338 c) And he explains, "each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own interest, a democracy democratic laws, a tyranny autocratic ones, and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their - rulers' - interest and the man who deviates from this they chastise as a lawbreaker and a wrongdoer"(338 d - e). Socrates attacks him on the ground that the rulers in the various states are fallible or capable sometimes of error. In this case it is just not only to do what is the interest of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his interest (339 c - d).

We can raise two questions: one is whether the proposition is a definition of justice; the other is what the meaning of this proposition is. N. R. Murphy interprets this situation as follows:

> "Naturally enough, ... , Plato makes him begin with an exhibition of fireworks; but his epigrammatic appraisement of justice as 'the interest of the stronger' is rather a consequence of its being what it is than a definition of it".[14]

Also G. Hourani agrees that Thrasymachus "is only concerned to make an impression of daring cynicism, and states his thesis as a definition because it is more arresting in that form".[15] In addition to that, he maintains that

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13 Socrates Meets Thrasymachus - D. C. Reeve, Archiv für Geschite der Philosophie 47 1985, p. 47

14 The Interpretation of Plato's *Republic* N. R. Murphy, Oxford 1951. p. 2

15 Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's *Republic*, G. F. Hourani, Phronesis 7 1962 p.112

"Justice is the interest of the stronger" is not meant as a definition but as an important generalization of an empirical fact, and a synthetic proposition, for a definition he says "no other facts could be relevant but the usages of language," whereas the proposition "Justice is obedience to law" is a true definition "*for without it there would be no connection between justice and the rulers*".[16] Also he criticises Thrasymachus for being "either ignorant or careless about the difference between definition and description".[17]

On the other side to Hourani's view, Kerferd, who thinks that Thrasymachus' proposition is an incomplete proposition, retorts that Plato's questions are not about the meaning of the a word or about linguistic usage but about something which he regards as a thing, so concludes that "synthetic statements conveying factual information is exactly what Plato is looking for in such cases".[18] D. J. Allan also shares Kerferd's view saying that "Thrasymachus, unlike Polemarchus, knows what is meant by a definition, and strives to include the whole of justice in a general formula."[19] However, D. C. Reeve argues another view on the problem of definition :

> there is strong textual support for thinking that A rather than C (originally B in Hourani's writing) is Thrasymachus' definition of justice. First, he states A when Socrates asks him to say what justice is and then repeats it no fewer than five times (339 a1-2, 339 a 3-4, 341 a 3-4, 343 c 4, 344 c 7); C, on the other hand, he mentions only once (343 c 2). ... Second, at 343 a 1-2 Socrates himself states that "it was clear to all that the account of justice (ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος) had turned into its opposite (εἰς τοὐναντίον περιεστήκει)".[20]

However, Reeve's suggestion raises some problems in the interpretation of this case if we ask whether A can subsume C and if his argument from A to C can be logically consistent. Moreover, Reeve disregards Thrasymachus' position in that Thrasymachus is a rhetorician

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16 Ibid, p. 112
17 Ibid, p. 111 - 112
18 Thrasymachus and Justice : a Reply, G. B. Kerferd, Phronesis 9 1964, p. 13
19 Plato : Republic Book I - D. J. Allan, London Metheun 1940 p. 26
20 Reeve 1985, p. 248

rather than a philosopher, who is not accustomed to the Socratic dialectical questions and answers. So Thrasymachus cannot express his thought sufficiently in the Socratic elenchus. Also another important fact is that the phrase "the account of justice (ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος) had turned into its opposite (εἰς τοὐναντίον περιείστηκει)" is comes Socrates, who is the main opponent of Thrasymachus in this dialogue, not from Thrasymachus himself. This is important textual evidence to bear in mind in trying to understand Thrasymachus' position.

As we have seen from the above enumerated views, it is not easy to come up with a convincing idea on what Thrasymachus' proposition really means. First of all we must examine the disputative problem over the definition of justice at issue. Let us take an example. In Plato's *Meno* (76 d) Socrates gives to Meno an exemplary definition of colour: colour is an effluence from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible by it (ἔστιν γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός). As we can see in this example, if A(definiens) is a definition of B(definiendum), then A and B can be conversible. In this respect the proposition A "Justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" is an incomplete proposition, as Kerferd says, for the conversion of this proposition is not always true. The interest of the stronger can be something other than justice. However, Kerferd is wrong if he maintains that Plato's definition is only concerned with something which he regards as a thing, for if we think about the case of the *Meno*, the example there is construed from the empirical factual world. On the other hand Hourani's maintenance concerning a definition that "no other facts can be relevant but the usages of language for a definition"[21] cannot be convincing, for in the case of the theory of Forms Plato's definition is about Forms which are perfect and unchanging definitions. Hourani disregards the ontological claim in the definition of Plato's Forms. R. E. Allen, talking of Plato's definition of a Form, says the following:

> it (real definition) is definition not of words which are true of things, but of the nature of those things of which words are true. Real definition is analysis of essence, rather than stipulation as to how words shall be used or a report as to how they are in fact used.[22]

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21 Hourani 1962 p.119

22 Plato' s *Euthyphro* and the Earlier Theory of Forms - R. E. Allen, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970. p. 79

So we can realise that Plato's definition can comprise both of these. In the case of Thrasymachus' proposition A it cannot be suggested as a definition of justice, for it lacks the condition of conversibility between definiens and definiendum. Another important point is that "the word which Thrasymachus uses is 'ἀπόκρισις'"[23] instead of λογός. It is a good indication that he (and with him Plato) does not think A is a definition of the just. Accordingly we might say that it is a kind of description based on the empirical world, rather than a definition. He just wants to show how this world operates under the name of justice.

Let us think about another problem which we have to face, which raises the question of the real purport of Thrasymachus' proposition A. Does this mean that "an action is just if and only if it serves the interest of the stronger, and that it is the fact of an act's serving the interest of the stronger that gives it the characteristic of being just?"[24] Or does it express "the attitude of mind that seeks to deprive justice of any reference to a valid standard, i.e. the good"?[25] Someone might suggest that Thrasymachus thinks that norms in the name of justice are arbitrary inventions to exploit the subjects for the rulers' interest. Or as Callicles says in Plato's *Gorgias*, it is just for the strong to rule and the subjects must follow his orders by nature just like animals. J. Annas' interpretation is that his real position is the immoralist one, which holds that injustice is better.[26] However, we should consider this question from another viewpoint: that proposition A is based on the result of a power struggle, as the term "συμφέρον," from the verb "συμφέρω" (bring together, contribute, bear together, confer a benefit, be useful etc), indicates. So the proposition indicates that the term "justice" is a kind of resultant and contributing benefit which belongs to the stronger after his power struggle to justify his action and interest. To him justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger if and only if he holds the reins of power at a particular moment. When Thrasymachus makes his meaning plainer, he gives examples of the laws which represent the results of each government(the stronger)'s interest when the ruler has power at that moment. Also in this case Thrasymachus does not maintain that the stronger

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23 R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, p.25. 337 d 1- 2: Τί οὖν ἄν, ἔφη, ἐγὼ δείξω ἑτέραν ἀκρόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαισύνης, βελτίω τούτων;

24 Ibid, p. 38

25 Plato II, P. Friedländer, trans. H. Meyerhoff, Panteos Books 1964p. 61

26 Annas 1981 pp. 36 - 37

is the just man, and that his subjects regard the stronger as the just man. The stronger, so far as he has power can guarantee his interest in the name of justice which is cloaked by a fine phrase irrespective of his subjects' public opinion and sacrifice. So we might agree that "Thrasymachus' argument is based on a daring insightful theory of the Polis as being a kind of exploitation machine in which both social behaviour and the standards by which it is evaluated are rigged by those who have the power to rule so as to benefit themselves".[27] To Thrasymachus the term "justice" is nothing other than the nominal means to justify the result of the rulers' actions. Accordingly it is not real justice in Thrasymachus' position. This represents the real political situation, i.e. the interest of the stronger is in the power of controlling the name of justice in their own way, for the ruler can establish laws or the standard of justice. However, Socrates misleads him by making him assent that the rulers are capable of error. It is an unwitting mistake on Thrasymachus' part, for he is ignorant of Socrates' intention and not accustomed to the Socratic elenchus. Socrates' viewpoint is not that of the result of the power game and of the stronger, but that of the process of that game and of the subjects. This problem we will discuss later.

II. Cleitophon interferes in this conversation and tries to support Thrasymachus by saying that by the interest of the stronger Thrasymachus meant what the superior supposed to be in his interest. And Cleitophon assists Thrasymachus by saying that Thrasymachus laid down that **it is just to obey the orders of the rulers** (τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν ... ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν 340 b) - This is conventionalism (or legalism). Hourani argues that this proposition "it is just to obey the orders of the rulers" is Thrasymachus' real position and a true definition.[28] However, we must note that this proposition is put forward by Cleitophon, not by Thrasymachus himself(τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν, ὦ Πολέμαρχε, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἔθετο Θρασύμαχος 340 a). So textually Hourani's view does not carry conviction. And Thrasymachus strongly rejects Cleitophon's suggestion, for he thinks that it is irrational to take his view in a case where the subject must obey the mistaken laws that the rulers enact irrespective of the rulers' interest. Thus that "to obey the law" and "to do what is just" can be coextensive is entirely mistaken if we think once more of the case of the ruler enacting mistaken laws. And this

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27 Reeve 1985, p. 254

28 Hourani 1962 pp. 110 - 115

interpretation does not differentiate between "is (fact)" and "ought (value)" which is how proposition B indicates the obligation of the subjects to the stronger. Facts represent the objective view, but value depends on one's subjective opinion. Thrasymachus clearly maintains that "the subject must obey what the ruler prescribes as law when the ruler is not making a mistake as to his interest, and not otherwise".[29] When Thrasymachus maintains his proposition A, his viewpoint is that of the stronger after securing his position in the power game. However, in the case of proposition B the viewpoint is entirely concentrated on how the subjects would view matters, and on the process of getting power in the course of a power struggle. The laws are the representations of the stronger's purposes to proclaim their actions justified in effect. So it is unconvincing to maintain that proposition B is Thrasymachus' real position, for the stronger's justice is not real justice to him.

Let us think about the case that would arise if Thrasymachus accepted Cleitophon's suggestion "justice is the interest of the stronger as it appears to the stronger whether it really is or not"(τοῦτο ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τό δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφερον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάντε συμφέρῃ ἐάντε μή ; 340 c). As we mentioned above, Thrasymachus would not have this problem if he were more careful regarding Socrates' intention, for the stronger in essence cannot, in Thrasymachus' view, use the name "justice" in such a case when he is mistaken. If Thrasymachus had taken up Cleitophon's suggestion, he would have been committing himself to a position of conventionalism. If he held this position, justice to him would be nothing but obeying the laws. In this situation justice can be changed according to social structure. Also he would have to agree that justice is only the supposed not the real interest of the stronger, so it will follow that justice is not the real interest of the stronger. Accordingly justice is not the actual interest of the stronger. Kerferd maintains that "the rejection of Cleitophon's proffered assistance shows that Thrasymachus does not in fact hold that Justice is obedience to the laws".[30]

III. Thrasymachus replies, "the most precise proposition is that, the ruler in so far as the ruler does not err, and in not erring enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, ... I say the just is

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29 Kerferd 1964 p. 14
30 Ibid. p. 14

to do what is for the advantage of the stronger" (τὸ δὲ ἀκριβέστατον ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὄν, τὸν ἄρχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν, μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντα δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ποιητέον. ὥστε ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον δίκαιον λέγω, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον 340 e). This situation reveals that Thrasymachus is trying with the utmost effort to escape from the Socratic elenchus. He must break out of the dilemma in which Socrates has deliberately placed him. So he has no choice but to cope with that problem from the viewpoint of Socrates. To this end Thrasymachus takes up another suggestion: his former proposition, but with the added clarification that this is true of the ruler in so far as the ruler does not err. We can interpret his suggestion as follows. If the stronger make mistakes in enacting the laws, then justice which is "τὸ συμφέρον" of the stronger, is no longer the property of the stronger. So he cannot be the stronger any more at that time, for he cannot have sufficient means to guarantee his own interest. Let us take an example. If an absolute monarchy enacts democratic laws by mistake in lieu of autocratic laws, then the result of his legislation will not guarantee his own interest. As a result of his mistake he cannot have any means to guarantee his power and interest, so he cannot any longer be the stronger. And he will be ousted from his post. The gist of Thrasymachus' contention is that we do not call someone who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake after his operation or prescription. Thrasymachus' meaning is that one cannot call a man a physician in the state of his error or mistake, because error is not art, but only in his demonstration of his medical art "at the moment of and in regard to a particular medical act."[31] So the ruler does not make any mistakes when he is entitled to bear the name of a ruler in the most precise sense of the word. D. J Allan says, "he (Thrasymachus) has had to take refuge in a remote Utopia, inhabited by impeccable artists".[32] However, P. P. Nicholson maintains that

> " ... the perfect ruler is a crucial and logical deliberate step in the unfolding of his ideas. By taking it, Thrasymachus has raised the whole argument to a higher level".[33]

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31 Reeve 1985, p. 250
32 Allan, p. 27
33 Nicholson 1974 p. 225

What Thrasymachus maintains is that rulers in so far as they are rulers, do not err in the most precise meaning of the term. This contention is logically consistent with the fact that rulers who sometimes make mistakes are still in the normal way of speaking called rulers after they have lost their power and failed in gaining their own interest. And, if we think about this contention in another way, we can understand his position easily. When we call a certain metal thing a knife, our usage of the term knife is meaningful if and only if it has the ability to cut something well from the view-point of the result. If not it cannot be called a knife, for it has lost its own function, rather it might be called a useless metal thing, if we stick to a strictly precise definition. Likewise if we call a man wise, we call him wise if and only if he shows wisdom in action, and displays no ignorance. However, even though he is the wisest man in the world, if he suddenly loses his mind, then he is not strictly speaking wise anymore. People may say that the wise man acts deficiently.

However, Socrates argues that an art is not to seek the interest of anything else than that of its object - every art has an object, "but there is no guarantee that every art seeks the good of its object, if it does, this may be because it coincides with the good of the artist".[34] It is not easy to generalise concerning his claim that an art works in the interest of its subject matter. This idea can be refuted if we think of the case of the art of fencing, martial arts or hunting. The agents of these arts perform them for their own benefit rather than for the benefit of their subject matter. According to Socrates' idea a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, does not consider and enjoin his own interest but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is profitable and suitable to that in all that he says and does. And his argument does not distinguish between an art's aiming at its own interest and its aiming at the interest of its practitioner (342 e). Socrates' main mistake is derived from making his own generalisation concerning the arts.

IV. Thrasymachus counterattacks in a long speech (343 b -344 c) by arguing that, just as the shepherds and the cowherds consider the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with nothing else in view

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34 Allan, p. 28

than the good of their master and themselves - so the rulers think of nothing else night and day than the sources of their own profit. **So justice and the just are in fact the other fellow's good** (ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι 343 c) - the interest of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves - while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just (... , τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καί ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη, ἡ δὲ ἀδικία δὲ τοὐναντίον, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐηθικῶν τε καὶ δικαίων, ... 343 c). So against Socrates' view Thrasymachus maintains that acting justly is not in the agent's interests but in another's good. He is speaking of all human and social relations.

This passage displays Thrasymachus' rhetorical power which enables him to express his idea sufficiently without interruption from Socrates. As a rhetorician he is an expert in giving a set speech; however, he is not accustomed to the Socratic question and answer, as we have seen before this. Thrasymachus' long speech is a reaction against Socrates' own way of discussion in which he cannot express his view clearly and forcefully. First of all, we must inquire into this proposition to see if it can be a definition or not. This proposition conveys more explicit and precise facts than the descriptive statement, and comprises not only verbal meaning but also the existential claim for which Socrates is always asking, as the phrase "ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν" indicates. And this proposition holds the essence of the just for the factual world with which we can evaluate people's morality according to the situation. Also the definiendum "the other fellow's good in fact" can be conversible with the definiens "justice and the just" without either losing their intrinsic implications. So we can easily conclude that this proposition can be a definition of justice. The proposition "justice and the just are in fact the other fellows' good" is good evidence for understanding the coherence of Thrasymachus' position and ideas on justice. The evidence that this is really his position is confirmed by his emphatic expression "τῷ ὄντι" which means "actually or really". He realises that his first proposition has been distorted by Socrates, so he has tried to defend his standpoint by way of introducing his viewpoint of "the power struggle process" and contrasting the just man and the unjust man in their dealings. He wants to clarify what his real meaning in the first proposition is and why he has that kind of view. From this section onwards the relation between the stronger as a ruler and the subject is changed into that of all

people and all human relations. In the real world if there are business dealings between the just and the unjust in any joint undertaking of the two, the unjust man always has the advantage over the just at the dissolution of their partnership. So the just man is always in the state of disadvantage. And when each holds his office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs falling into disorder through his own neglect, while because of his justice he makes no gains from the government, and thereby he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale, all the opposite advantages accrue. Injustice makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. Justice for the just man is the interest of the other who is unjust; for the unjust man justice is the interest of the just who is weaker. On this G. B. Kerferd declares, "for Thrasymachus injustice is moral obligation, in all senses which for Socrates justice is a moral obligation."[35] Also J. Annas says:

> "Thrasymachus admires the unjust man as being strong, self-reliant, and intelligent ... But the man he chiefly admires is the tyrant or dictator, the man who pushes his own interests at others' expense in such a ruthless and successful fashion that he gets into a position where nobody can challenge him".[36]

Their interpretations of Thrasymachus' view are misleading as to Thrasymachus' real intention, for he is describing the real facts of this world which we face every day. Such an interpretation does not necessarily follow on from his evaluation of the factual world, for value seems neutral to him who, as a kind of social scientist, is disclosing the real and actual operation of the world. We really cannot find any certain information as to whether he admires the strong tyrant. Thrasymachus knows exactly which people and which acts are just, for he asserts that the just man does not commit tax evasion, sacrilege, etc. F. E. Sparshott explains that "To act in another's interest is to make him stronger than oneself, so that it is natural for Thrasymachus to equate 'another's good' with 'the interest of the stronger'".[37]

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35 G. B. Kerferd 1949 p. 26

36 Annas 1981 pp. 44 - 45

37 Socrates and Thrasymachus, F. E. Sparshott, Monist 50 1966 p. 430

V. Stressing that justice is more profitable than injustice Socrates, still not shifting his firm ground, argues that every art is to be differentiated from the art of money-making. The art of the shepherd, Socrates claims (345 d), is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which it is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are surely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd's art. Socrates asserts that a man who is to exercise the art properly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. So every form of rule, in so far as it is rule, considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, in political and private rule alike. Thrasymachus might have refuted Socrates' suggestion on the grounds that Socrates cannot differentiate between the process of an aim and the result of it. To the shepherd the process of the aim of his art is to tend his animals very well, however, the final aim of his art is to make a profit for himself. Consequently the shepherd's ultimate aim is to profit from raising sheep, even if he takes care of them very well in the process of tending them. This is his real motivation for exercising his art. If there were no profit in exercising his art, nobody could have any motivation to learn and to exercise his own art in the real world. If Socrates' position is right, the shepherd must not make any profit by selling his sheep, for the art of being a shepherd is different from that of money-making. If he profits from selling sheep, then he is exercising the art of money-making. The art of money-making is quite different from that of the shepherd. Therefore at the time he is making a profit from his sheep, he is exercising the art of money-making instead of his real art i.e. the art of the shepherd, so he cannot be at that moment a real shepherd in the strict sense according to Socrates' view. This reasoning is absurd in the practical and factual world. And another point is that Socrates deliberately misdirects their argument(Socrates vs. Thrasymachus) to fit to his own position: that the relationship between the stronger and the weaker can be identified with that between the artisans and the enumerated arts, e.g. the art of a physician or a pilot. Thrasymachus' view of the relationship between the stronger and the weaker is primarily based on the antagonistic relation, the opposing relationship between the exploiting class and the exploited class. However, in the case of the art of a physician the relationship between the doctor and the patient is not that of opposition. If Socrates insists on regarding Thrasymachus' idea as being like

the case of a physician, Thrasymachus can be led into a dangerous trap, for a doctor can then be identified with the stronger who is in the exploiting class, rather than the helper of the sick(345 c-e).

VI. Socrates examines Thrasymachus' assertion that the life of the unjust man is more powerful (κρείττω) than that of the just man. He also elicits from Thrasymachus that justice is good nature or goodness of heart(πάνυ γενναίαν εὐήθειαν), and injustice is prudence or good judgement (εὐβουλίαν).[38] In addition to this Thrasymachus is led to agree that the unjust seems to be intelligent and good (Ἦ καὶ φρόνιμοί ... δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἄδικοι;). Also he is forced to put injustice in the class of excellence and wisdom (ἐν ἀρετῆς καὶ σοφίας μέρει 348 c-e). And it is claimed that the Greeks "did not make a clear distinction, as we do, between morality and prudence", and "ξυμφέρον and ἀγαθός are words often connected with prudence, efficiency, success, and the production of desired results".[39] Against Thrasymachus' opinion, Socrates wants to prove that justice is a more powerful thing than injustice if justice is wisdom and excellence. Socrates' main point is that the just man would not claim or wish to outdo the just man but the unjust man would claim to overreach or outdo equally the just man and the unjust man. And by using the analogy of a musician and a physician Socrates identifies the just with the wise. And from this he derives that the wise is the good and the ignoramus is the bad. So he concludes that the just man is good and wise, and the unjust man is ignorant and bad. In this reasoning we must note that Socrates makes use of a fallacy in the case of the analogy of a musician and a physician. The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no differences are made between the moral terms and the technical terms. He maintains that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would not want to overreach or outdo another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings. Socrates cannot be thinking of the competitive arts. Let us consider the case of a musical contest. In this case every musician will try to overreach and outdo other musicians for his own honour. And Socrates does not consider the quality of musicians' playing on a musical instrument.

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38 Thucydides uses in his *Peloponnesian War* iii 40 and 42-8 εὐβουλία as expedient judgement. A. W. H. Adkins explains the values of Athenian democracy, "what is needed to determine what is in fact sumfevron for the state is naturally a skill, whether denoted by eujbouliva or by some other word, a skill which has no, of course, no relation to the standards of the quieter virtues. ... this is a system of values based on calculation, and can be no other" - Merit and Responsibility, p. 222 - 223.

39 Nicholson 1974, p. 217

Thrasymachus' point is that the unjust man who gains his interest by injustice "knows how to use the just man for his own ends".[40] J. P. Maguire holds that "the notion of justice = ἰσότης and injustice = πλεονεξία is prominent in Plato's thinking".[41] The real unjust man, who is also an intelligent man, will exploit the simple just man by manipulating the just's good will to his interest by means of power, intelligence and prudence. Socrates attacks Thrasymachus' opinion on the ground that the just man does not outdo or overreach the just man but only the unjust, however, the unjust man seeks to overreach and get the better of everything from both the just and the unjust. So all his endeavour will be to get the most in everything for himself. Let us think about Socrates' view more carefully. If the unjust man tries to outdo or overreach both the just man and the unjust man, does he play the part of the just man in one respect as the just man does against the unjust? Or does the just man play the part of the unjust man in the other respect when the just man claims to get the better of or overreach the unjust man? If the just man tries to overreach or get the better of the other person, can we call such a person "just" in the strict and precise Socratic sense. The whole argument depends on a vague use of πλεονεκτεῖν in the Greek : "It is (a) to surpass, to do an action which contains more goodness, (b) to 'do better than' a rival in the sense of vulgar competition; to take unfair interest of him, to gain profit at his expense".[42] As Thrasymachus suggests, the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relations with the unjust in the real world, for the unjust man is out to get the most in everything for himself. The private unjust man and the unjust ruler have common attributes: "both are πλεονέκται and ἄδικοὶ ; but, whereas the private unjust man needs to act λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ, the ruler runs no risk at all of being punished".[43] They differ only in degree; in a political context, ὁ κρείττων is the ruler; in a private context, ὁ κρείττων is the successful unjust man, who exploits his fellow-citizens. The ruler is able to change what is unjust into justice by overthrowing the criteria of value because he is strong. The world of Thrasymachus is that of the survival of the fittest: the survival of oneself is to the detriment of others.

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40 Ibid, p. 228

41 Thrasymachus ... or Plato - J. P. Maguire, Phronesis 16, 1971 pp. 152-153

42 Allan 1981, p. 32

43 Thrasymachus and Pleonexia - C. J. Boter - Mnemosyne 39 1986, p. 272

From 350 d in this dialogue to the end the procedure of conversation is entirely a soliloquy by Socrates without any negative interruptions from Thrasymachus' denials. As Guthrie puts it, it is evident that "Socrates is pursuing his own train of thought irrespective of whether Thrasymachus is following him, and Thrasymachus is not committed to any of it".[44] Even though Socrates has reached the view that justice is more profitable than injustice, Socrates repudiates it, for he says that he does not know what the just is (354 a - c).

As we have noted above, Thrasymachus' real position is "justice and the just are in fact the other fellow's good". The main reason why this should be regarded as his real position is that while from this proposition his first proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" can be derived, but the converse of this procedure is not possible. He knows what the real meaning of justice is. It is the other fellow's good. In this passage we can notice that both Socrates and Thrasymachus are of the same mind as to which acts and persons are just, for they do not show any disagreement upon the illegal or unjust acts (tax evasion, kidnapping and sacrilege) which are enumerated as unjust. To them justice is "a social phenomenon, demanding for its instantiation a context in which people act upon, interact with, and in various ways deal mutually with each other, and the same goes for injustice".[45] The just man, because he is just, is always at a disadvantage in comparison to the unjust man who is only interested in his own interest even if to him justice is the just man's good, for Thrasymachus says that the ruler who pursues his own interest is unjust (344 a-c). Accordingly justice for the unjust man is not the advantage of the stronger (the unjust) but of the just man. And the just man who is interested in another's good is always exploited by the unjust man, for he is too just to take care of his own interest. On the other hand the unjust man who is prudent and powerful knows how to manipulate and control the just man's innocence because of the just man's good-naturedness. These relations have to do with the process of the power game as we mentioned above. To be just is to be a medium for the working out the interest of the stronger: to be unjust is to work for the interest of oneself. We might think that Thrasymachus regards the justice of the just man as a kind of material

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44 Guthrie III p. 91

45 In Defense of Thrasymachus, T. Y. Henderson, American Philosophical Quarterly 7 1970, p. 219

property accrued from the just man's just acts, for he thinks that justice is the good of another. In this view the justice of the just man will come under the property of the unjust i.e. the stronger. The stronger (the unjust) will readily seize the justice of the just man. From this respect we can easily understand how the unjust man comes to be the stronger according to the view of Thrasymachus.

And we must keep in mind that there are degrees of injustice in the unjust man. The absolute unjust man requires a great deal of knowledge as well as power, for he must know exactly what is to his advantage and how he can get it in each case. The unjust man's superiority consists in his intelligence and power (mental and physical). To Thrasymachus the perfect example of injustice is the tyrant, for he robs, plunders, and enslaves with impunity. He can violate all the moral rules and then justify them at that moment. So the life of the unjust man is stronger and more powerful than that of the just. A private unjust man (lower in degree) who does not have sufficient capability to overreach on a large scale cannot be the stronger in Thrasymachus' sense, for he does not have sufficient means to justify his interest and position in the name of justice. Only the absolute unjust man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale can be the stronger. After the process of these power struggles which includes the various struggles between the stronger unjust man and the weaker unjust man, between the weaker unjust and the just, and between the stronger unjust man and the just man, the strongest as a matter of course will come to have an advantage in comparison to the other people as a result. The just action of the just man can easily work to the interest of the stronger, for the stronger's injustice will be always trying to exploit the just action of the just man. So it is "a (logical) consequence of acting justly that one becomes vulnerable to unjust or unfair exploitation".[46] So we can derive from this reasoning that justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger, for he has the sufficient power to justify his action in the name of justice after he has got political power. Also we can realise how the just man's justice has come under the property of the stronger in consequence. As a result we can find that Thrasymachus' position is coherent. We can explain this procedure by summing it up in the following argument:

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[46] Ibid, p. 220

A. The just and justice are in fact the other fellow's good, while the unjust is what profits one's own interest.

B. The just man is always at an disadvantage compared to the unjust man, for he does not profit for his own interest.

C. The just man's just act(justice) contributes to the interest of the unjust man.

D. The man who has more advantage and interest is more powerful and prudent that the man who has not - If he does not have prudence and power, he cannot acquire interest and advantage.

E. The unjust man is more powerful and prudent than the just man.

F. The absolute unjust man who is the most prudent and powerful can finally come out on top at the end of a power struggle among people.

G. In so far as he is stronger he can violate and control all moral rules, and justify his acts in the name of the just in consequence.

H. As a result the just or justice is the interest of the stronger(the ruler) at that moment even if it is not just in its essence.

As we mentioned above, the procedure from A to E occurs in the course of a power struggle. And the procedure F to H is the result of that power struggle. Thrasymachus is simply depicting the real world as he has experienced it rather than systematically outlining his own political philosophy. In this dialogue also "the ineffectiveness of the Socratic idea is displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic".[47] And we must think about the alleged fallacies in Thrasymachus' logic which underlie the charges against him:[48]

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47 Annas 1981, p. 57

48 Thrasymachan Justice: The Advantage of the Stronger, C. Johnson, Durham University Journal 1985 pp. 41

1) "Advantage of the stronger" is contradicted by "obedience to the laws" in the case when a ruler is in error as to which laws serve his advantage.

2) "Advantage of the stronger" is contradicted by "another's good", in two cases:

a) When "another" is not the same as the "stronger" (i.e. ruler), as, for example in the private dealings of subjects among themselves.
b) When the just agent is not the subject but the ruler; for the just ruler, justice as "another's good" can only mean " advantage of the weaker"

3) "Obedience to the laws" is inconsistent with "another's good" in those cases when "another's good" is achieved without obedience to any law, e.g., in private relations among subjects.

(1) The first problem is not serious, for as we mentioned above in II Thrasymachus does not mention "obedience to law" as his own proposition concerning the nature of justice. Indeed he strongly rejects Cleitophon's suggestion. Also, his position is based on the result of a power struggle not the process of it in this case. Thrasymachus' thinking is entirely irrespective of the subject's attitude and opinion. Accordingly this cannot be the problem with Thrasymachus' logic. (2) a) In private dealings and social relations among people Thrasymachus does not identify "the interest of the stronger(the ruler)" with "another's good," for in this stage there are only two kinds of people; one is just and the other is unjust. So it is not reasonable to identify "another" with "the ruler". b) According to Thrasymachus' view it is not possible for the just man to be the ruler, for the ruler's essential characteristic is to know how to use the just man to his own ends and exploit the simple just man by means of power and prudence, i.e. the most unjust man's characteristic. To the unjust man the just or justice is the just man's interest, however, we cannot expect justice from him, for he is unjust. (3) We have already mentioned that "obedience to the laws" is not related to Thrasymachus' thinking. In consequence we can resolve the alleged fallacies of Thrasymachus.

Conclusion

Now we have come to realise that Thrasymachus' position is coherent in his discussion with Socrates about the nature of justice, and Socrates' counterattack falls short of refuting his position. To understand Thrasymachus' consistent idea of justice, as we have noted above, his real position should be seen as based on the view that "justice and the just are in fact the other fellow's good". The main reason why this should be regarded as his real position is that from this proposition his first proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" can be derived, in which Thrasymachus is only concerned to make an impression of daring cynicism, rather than to give a definition of justice, and by which he just wants to show how this world operates under the name of justice. And we have examined that the proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" indicates that the term "justice" is a kind of resultant and contributing benefit which belongs to the stronger after his power struggle to justify his action and interest. His thinking is primarily concerned with the consequence(result) of the just man's justice with respect to the relations of its enactors. So it is baseless to say of him that, as an immoralist, he is a hasty and confused thinker, as Annas argues, or that he has advanced two different criteria of justice, as Cross and Woozley hold. The Socratic fallacy is hidden in that no differences are made between the moral terms and the technical terms. Thrasymachus' purpose, as Guthrie says, is "to unmask the hypocrisy and show how the meaning of justice is being perverted".[49] It is apparent that Thrasymachus, having a cynical outlook on human morality in general, "interprets 'the interest of the stronger' as something like material, worldly advantage of the selfish and wicked (stronger) over the generous and kind(just)".[50] He intended to offer a sturdy realistic view, which had the courage to look the facts in the face, and would not be deceived by fine names. We may agree that his view of the world is deeply rooted in sorrowful pessimism; it does not deny justice but recognises that "the supreme human value, justice, is not practised in life and that he who is forced to conform to it is the victim of the unjust".[51] So he laments that the gods take no notice of human affairs, or they would not have left out justice, as Hermias quotes him.

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[49] Guthrie III, p. 92

[50] Johnson 1985, p. 37

[51] The Sophists, M. Untersteiner trans. by K. Freeman, Oxford 1954 p. 325

Later on in an account of justice Glaucon explains that men reproach injustice only, for they are afraid of being unjust, and argues that men are just unwillingly because they cannot be unjust(359 b - 360 d). This idea is interrelated with Thrasymachus' statement in 344 c: it is not the fear of doing but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Also Adeimantus agrees with Thrasymachus' idea (367 c) that justice is another's good, the advantage of the stronger, and injustice is advantageous and profitable for oneself, but disadvantageous to the weaker (... τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορν). Also Aristotle in his explanation of justice in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1130 a - 1133 b 32) accounts for the view that justice alone of the virtues is "the good of others," for it does what is for the interest of another, either as a ruler or associate (διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτο τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον ἐστὶν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ). So we are convinced that Thrasymacus' view of justice is persuasive and compelling to both Plato and Aristotle. Socrates also thinks that "the just" is some kind of advantage, and does not deny that justice is the interest of the stronger. Their (Socrates' and Thrasymachus') disagreement is over the interpretation of the real meaning of the phrase "justice is the interest of the stronger".

CONCLUSION

We have examined the ideas of six individual Sophists in detail both by concentrating our viewpoint on the Sophists rather than on Socrates, and by connecting the ideas of the historical Sophists with those of the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. Through our research we have found that in many respects their ideas have been distorted, misrepresented and exploited by Plato for his own purposes, even though they have coherent views, and at the same time that their ideas, once unveiled, reveal multi-faceted philosophical interests as well as various concerns to do with social science. We have also realised that the Sophists' thinking is interrelated with pre-Socratic philosophy in developing their own ideas, while their anthropological ideas mark the growth of the new intellectual movement based on empiricism and relativism. On the other hand we have examined whether Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists; however, Plato's criticism of the Sophists cannot always be justified from the viewpoint of the actual world and logical inference, for Socrates(Plato's mouthpiece) employs the so-called Socratic fallacy for the purpose of refuting his opponents, as we can see frequently in the course of an argument between Socrates and the Sophists.

The Sophists, as portrayed by Plato in their arguments with Socrates, raise a lot of philosophical questions which have been repeatedly-questioned themes in the history of philosophy. Plato's reflection upon the philosophical questions raised by the Sophists is the starting point in his philosophical development.[1] In the course of the debate between the Sophists and Socrates, the Sophists raise fundamental problems in the areas of social science and philosophy: the relation between language, fact and

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[1] The Sophistic Movement, G. B. Kerferd, Cambridge University Press 1981 p. 173

thinking; the relationship between epistemology and ontology; is it possible to say anything false?; *nomos*, a tyrant over mankind, ordains many things by force contrary to *physis*; why should I follow *nomos* ordained by others for their own benefit?; how can one learn political excellence?; what is justice?

As far as our research is concerned, as a result of our investigation, we can find that the term "immoralist", applied to Callicles by Adkins and Annas, is shown to be inaccurate for one who declares the individual's natural right against a hypocritical society, for his idea of *physis* is basically derived from the Homeric hero's power and honour with unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence(ἀρετή). As a polymath Hippias has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles. Hippias' idea of *physis*, as revealed in the *Protagoras*, signifies the idea of a more objective and lasting universal law, as suggested by Heraclitus' definition of Logos, underlying the phenomenal and changeable world. And our detailed analysis of Hippias' "the natural continuous bodies of being" has revealed that his idea of "being" can be interrelated with Empedocles' theory of effluence, based on materialism. To put it another way, "the natural continuous bodies of being" implies that the nature and status of material objects exist external to us and transmit their representation to our sense perception. And we can find the difference between Hippias and Callicles to lie in that Hippias claims that democratic equality is too limited as being only for free citizens of equal privileges. Protagoras has shown Socrates that his claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and to make men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Protagoras, in opposition to the other Sophists(Hippias, Antiphon and Callicles), is in the position of the upholder of *nomos,* which is interrelated with his relativism; moral standards are regulated according to the current respectability of a society. And by analysing Protagoras' way of using words we have come to realise that his use of terminology is consistent in his myth and argument, when it is used exclusively, and that the ambiguity of Protagoras' terminology comes from Socrates, not Protagoras. After an examination of the main argument between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the *Republic* I we have realised that to characterise him as a hasty and confused thinker or a mere child in argument is really absurd and baseless, a view stemming from a misunderstanding of his consistent view and from prejudice against him.

We have seen how Thrasymachus' definition of justice: "justice and just are the other fellow's good" leads logically to another of his propositions: "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger," since as a result of the former proposition the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relations with the unjust man in the real world. Having a cynical outlook on human morality, Thrasymachus has the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue. The validity of *nomos* and the right of the individual are expounded by Protagoras, Hippias, Thrasymachus and Callicles. The *nomos* which creates an arbitrary bond among people is a tyrant for Hippias, the pan-Hellenist, whereas for Protagoras, the upholder of democratic *nomos*, the law is the symbol of civilisation which makes men respect the legal and moral rights of others for the maintenance of society. To Hippias Hellenic citizens are all related and all akin by nature, for like is akin by nature to like. So it is against nature to treat people with discrimination. Hippias' objective is to set up a more reasonable and lasting *nomos* which is devoid of arbitrariness. However, Callicles strongly claims the natural right of the individual against *nomos*. Callicles' liberalism has reduced all natural criteria to the fulfilment of the individual's desire, so his position cannot be maintained to be liberation from artificial *nomos*, for his idea "obedience to what is prescribed by (human)nature" is in fact opposed to the ideas of the Sophistic Movement. But Callicles and Socrates have a similar view on life in that the fulfilment of the needs of the individual human beings is regarded as human excellence, even though their positions are absolutely different in respect of what constitutes one's fulfilment. Thrasymachus also contrasts the justice of *nomos* with the justice of *physis* even though he does not use these antagonistic terms. The justice of *physis* : "the just or justice is in fact the other fellow's good" leads to the justice of *nomos* : "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger," in the actual world. On the other hand the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, is investigated in comparison with that of the Eleatics. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, basing their arguments on the Eleatic logic, raise the question of the identification of "meaning and reference", of "coming into being(becoming) and rest", of "one and many," arising from the identity of being and the troublesome problem of the verb εἶναι between the existential meaning and the predicative meaning. They also

raise a question on the possibility of falsehood. If a man says what is not the case, then he talks about nothing. So he is not talking about anything, for what is not cannot be spoken of. By an analysis of their application of fallacy, whose main aim is to put down their interlocutors, we have discovered that the logic and ontology of the Eleatics is closely interrelated with the Sophists' ideas in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies, even if they are not natural philosophers.

According to the results of our research we can realise that Plato's charges against the Sophists of immoral teaching and being the corruptors of young men cannot be justified. The reason for the general opprobrium and disapproval was the ruling class' objections "to all kinds of people being able to secure, simply by paying for it, what the Sophists offer".[2] Is it possible for us to apply the pejorative traditional sense of the term Sophist to Protagoras, Hippias and Thrasymachus? Certainly it is unfair and unreasonable to condemn the Sophistic Movement and its agents without reservation. On the other hand, as a matter of course, it cannot be denied that the method of Euthydemus or Dionysodorus and the viewpoint of Callicles might invite misunderstanding of the whole movement and the Sophists as a whole. So if we ask "who are the Sophists?," we cannot easily answer or define them in a word. Our mistake arises from attempting to come to a general characterisation of the Sophistic Movement and the Sophists. The only subject all the Sophists taught and studied in common might be suggested to be the art of language within a comprehensive meaning.[3]

When a man awakens, disillusioned by his blind belief, in a period of social change, and then looks into what he has believed and obeyed, he will at once enjoy his self-assertion and fear his endowment with reason and freedom, for he must assume responsibility for it. Under these conditions his responses may be diverse and sometimes illogical in both thinking and behaviour. However, he must face two alternatives according to his own interpretation of the world in which he lives: one is to trust human reason, the other is to create a more perfect ideal than the broken one by ignoring human rational power. We should keep this attitude in mind when we think about the Sophistic Movement as one which marked a turning point from the

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[2] Ibid 1981 p. 26

[3] A History of Greek Philosophy III, W. K. C. Guthrie 1969, p. 44

closed society to the open society; this is because of the extension of perspective it involved, which favoured a belief in progress and the development of humanism in the history of human beings. However, it cannot be denied that the process of the intellectual movement in this period had harmful effects. The pupils of the Sophists might identify the new rationalism with the realisation of their own desires, i.e. an unconstrained freedom "to get the better of others" and to venture to shake off what were regarded as moral fetters and obligations, as can be seen in the cases of Callicles, Alcibiades and Critias. But who were responsible for these cases? Blaming the Sophists as a whole "for the few black sheep"(Callicles, Euthydemus or Dionysodorus) is surely unreasonable and unfair.[4] Where there are liberals, there are always conservatives. Action always brings about reaction, so positive intellectualism gives rise to anti-intellectualism, for "the new rationalism carried with it real as well as imaginary dangers for the social order".[5] As Popper puts it, "Individualism, equalitarianism, faith in reason and love of wisdom were new, powerful, and, from the point of view of the enemies of the open society, dangerous sentiments that had to be fought".[6] The Sophists' democratic and liberal ideas are counterattacked by Plato's authoritarian ideas of class distinctions based on his idealism. So the Sophists must have invited opprobrium and disapproval from the Athenian ruling class, for they claimed "to teach in what at Athens was thought to be for the right people" even if they were not Athenian leaders or teachers.[7] In the course of the arguments between the Sophists and Socrates we can see plenty of evidence of the conflict between the liberalism of the Sophists, who regard history as progress, and the classicism of Socrates or Plato, who regards history as regress. The two sides are at odds with each other particularly over the identification and origin of justice and laws. The victor, in the process of action and reaction, inevitably manipulates his opponents to justify his own action, as we have seen in the main chapters. So the Sophists are destined to be unfairly criticised and sacrificed to Plato's own purposes. And we must note that traditionally scholars have been generous to Socrates even if he attacks and refutes his opponents by means of the so-called Socratic fallacy. Of course Plato should bear the blame for this logical fallacy.

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[4] Ibid p. 36

[5] The Greeks and the Irrational, E. R. Dodds, University of California Press 1951 p. 191

[6] The Open Society and its Enemies I, K. R. Popper, Routledge and Kegan Paul Reprinted 1973 p. 199

[7] Guthrie III, 1969 p.40

Plato and Aristotle emphasise that the Sophists taught for pay and that their teaching was immoral: Gorgias earned and took away with him a large sum of money (*Hippias Major* 282 b); Prodicus made an astonishing amount of money by giving demonstrations to the young(ibid c); a Sophist is an impostor who makes money out of an apparent but unreal wisdom(*Sophistici Elenchi* 165 a21). However, against their views Isocrates states(XV. 155): overall none of those known as the Sophists will be found to have accumulated much money, but some lived in poor, other in moderate circumstances.[8] The conventional way of slandering someone's honour or reputation is to stigmatise them as a mere money-maker or a man of immorality. It is true that the Sophists educated the well-to-do who could afford it and who aspired to be the power élite of Athens, for supply could not meet demand. As Adkins argues, "it is the rich who, even in a society which is a democracy in name, will give advice in assembly and hold the most important offices".[9] Across the ages and countries of the world, one's social success or influence usually depends on one's property and means. Plato's and Aristotle's testimony suggests that the Sophists came to Athens to teach immoral subjects for the purpose of making money. We must differentiate the means from the end. They came from non-Athenian cities, so, if they did not receive pay for their teaching, they could not survive. And "there was no prejudice in Greece against earning a living as such".[10] And it is ironic to discover that "Plato's Academy charged fees and high ones at that".[11]

Aristotle calls Aristippus a Sophist, and Xenophon gives Antisthenes that name (Arist. *Metaphysics* iii 2. 996 and Xenophon *Symposium* iv. i.). Both of these were Socrates' disciples. Ironically Timon(B.C. 320-230), the friend of Pyrrho, classified all philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, under the name of Sophists(Diogenes Laertius ix 65). We might interpret this in two ways. From the positive viewpoint the original meaning of the word Sophist, i.e. a person distinguished for knowledge in a particular subject, could have been in continuous popular use until the time of Timon, and so attached to all philosophers. Or from the negative viewpoint the term

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8 Kerferd 1981 p. 26

9 Merit and Responsibility, A. W. H. Adkins, Oxford University Press 1960 p 197

10 Guthrie III, p. 38

11 The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics, E. A. Havelock, London 1957 p. 162

Sophist might be used by him for the purpose of deriding or disdaining them with a certain odious connotation. If the latter were true, then we might guess that the term Sophist was a convenient and favourite weapon for attacking one's opponents, irrespective of their ideas or profession, as Plato might do. As we can understand, the strength of the effect attaching the term Sophist to another person depends on one's position and influence in the history of ideas. Because of the habitual respect for the great philosopher Plato, Timon's attribution of the term Sophist to Plato has not been made widely known. Even if people do know of it, they usually ignore the fact. In this respect, as Thrasymachus says, justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger.

What we have examined through conjecture and incomplete evidence are only "the fragmentary remains and traditions of a great movement in human thought".[12]Suffice it to say that our research will have fulfilled its purpose if it is accepted as an attempt to explain the supposed relationship between the historical Sophists and the Sophists of the Platonic dialogues, for we cannot have confidence in Plato's description of the Sophists because of his hostile attitude. However, it is encouraging that interest in the historical and intellectual Sophists has now much more general appeal than before, for the major scholars of the modern world are not Platonists who posit an ultimate reality for the explanation of our world, but rather base their thinking on the empiricism or phenomenalism which Plato disregards as dealing merely with a copy of the real world.

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12 Kerferd 1981 p. 174

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